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Abstract
Empowering women and understanding its role within households is one of the
main policy objectives in the developing world. However, while there is con-
sensus on this objective, there is still little evidence on which is the most eﬃcient
way to approach this issue. The PhD thesis is based on understanding whether
a variation in intra-household control of resources has an eﬀect on household
outcomes in developing countries and whether this eﬀect is related to subjective
expectations. This research question is approached using empirical microeconom-
ics methods. Chapter “The Marriage market and intra-household allocation of
expenditure” tests the assertion that the status of the marriage market impacts
on intra-household allocation of expenditures. Chapter “Validation of Subjective
expectations” analyses the validity of questions related to subjective expecta-
tions using the data collected among social financial recipients in the Republic
of Macedonia during the 2010 and 2012 data collection waves of the Macedo-
nian “Secondary School Conditional Cash Transfer” evaluation household survey.
Chapter “Parental perceived returns to schooling and human capital investment”
analyses how parental subjective expectations about the return to schooling of
their children aﬀect future decisions about schooling. Chapter “Who wears the
trousers in the family?” studies how the interaction between intra-household al-
location of resources and expected returns to schooling influences human capital
investment among poor households.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Empowering women is one of the main policy objectives in the developing world.
However, while there is consensus on this objective, there is still little evidence
on which is the most eﬃcient way to approach this issue and how dynamics work
within households. This thesis is based on understanding whether a variation
in intra-household allocation of resources has an eﬀect on household decisions in
developing countries and whether this has a relationship with information and
subjective expectations. A first approach is to consider an exogenous variation in
variables aﬀecting the formation of the household, such as the marriage market.
Another strategy is to study a policy that exogenously switch resources between
household members. In the thesis I followed both approaches by looking at the
Macedonian Conditional Cash Transfer for Secondary School Education, which is
a program aiming at increasing secondary school attendance across poor house-
holds in the Republic of Macedonia and whose payments are randomised across
the country in relation to the gender of the recipient (the mother versus the
household head in the household). Although there are several “first generation”
impact evaluation studies assessing the impact of conditional cash transfer pro-
grams, there are far fewer “second generation” studies focusing on the question of
how to design CCTs more eﬃciently and specifically whether the gender of the
recipient matters.
As a first approach to understand whether variables aﬀecting the formation of
the household, such as the marriage market, has an eﬀect on intra-household
dynamics, chapter 2 tests the assertion that the status of the marriage and re-
marriage market impacts on intra-household allocation of expenditure by looking
at the pre-policy structure of expenditures of poor households in Macedonia. I use
12
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measures of both the marriage and the re-marriage market to capture diﬀerences
about these two variables to understand whether households take decisions as a
unitary model or whether they conform to a collective model. To do so, I study the
eﬀect of local variation of sex ratios and of the shares of new weddings attributed
to a previous divorce to capture variation in intra-household distribution of power.
Understanding whether the distribution of power within household members af-
fects the decision to spend on specific good categories is central since, at the
same time, there is still no consensus about how household members interact to
take important investment decisions, such as determining human capital invest-
ments for the children. Understanding how this decision is taken is particularly
important in developing countries, where households tend to underinvest due to
market failures related to information, such as incomplete or asymmetric inform-
ation. For this reason, in Macedonia, information about the parental perceived
returns to schooling was collected to understand how information interact with
intra-household dynamics to determine child human capital investment. Chapter
3 analyses the validity of questions related to subjective expectations using the
data collected among social financial recipients in the Republic of Macedonia
during the 2010 and 2012 data collection waves of the Macedonian “Secondary
School Conditional Cash Transfer” evaluation household survey. Data on subject-
ive expectations have been collected using the method proposed by Guiso et al.
(2002). Under distributional assumptions, this method allows eliciting the sub-
jective expected earning distribution for each respondent. This chapter analyses
the validity of the data by testing whether respondents understand the question
and use suﬃcient mental eﬀort to report their answers. Using randomisation in
the order of questions, I find that when asked about the probability to earn less
than a certain threshold and more than the same threshold, respondents tend to
reply with suﬃcient mental eﬀort only to the first question they are asked.
To understand how subjective information aﬀect human capital investment, chapter
4 investigates the role of parental expected returns to schooling as determinants
of schooling decisions. The chapter analyses the relationship between schooling
decisions and ex-ante parental perceived returns to secondary school. I show that
when observing schooling decisions two years after the collection of information
about perceived returns, parental subjective expectations are strong predictors
for the probability of the child to be enrolled in secondary school. I provide evid-
ence that this relation is distinctively diﬀerent when looking at boys and girls.
In addition, by using the longitudinal dimension of the data, I provide evidence
13
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against cognitive biases in expectation reporting and against endogeneity issues,
which provide support for the use of subjective data in decision models.
Since both intra-household power allocation and the subjective expectations are
credible determinants of schooling decisions, chapter 5 studies how the interaction
between intra-household allocation of resources and expected returns to schooling
influences human capital investment among poor households. To do this I use
a nationally implemented randomised programme in the Republic of Macedonia.
This programme provides cash transfers to poor households conditional on sec-
ondary school enrolment of their children and payments are transferred either to
mothers or to household heads. I make use of a unique dataset with informa-
tion on parental subjective expectations of returns to schooling and employment
risk to estimate the heterogeneity of the eﬀect of the intervention. This chapter
provides evidence that targeting mothers allows increasing secondary school en-
rolment only for children whose returns are suﬃciently high at the beginning
of the program. This outcome is driven by increases in individual expenditure
shares on education for children in the highest tercile of the return distribution.
Heterogeneous eﬀects along the expected return distribution are supported by
large ex-ante heterogeneity in parental expectations. At the same time, no eﬀect
is recorded for other inputs, such as monitoring of children school attendance and
parental time use.
14
Chapter 2
The Marriage market and
intra-household allocation of
expenditure
2.1 Introduction
Groups don’t usually behave as a single rational individual and it is known at
least since Arrow’s Impossibility theorem. As a group of individuals, households
may not behave as a single entity whose objective is to channel resources towards
the best use of the family. Rather, members of the households bargain for max-
imal shares of the household resources and relative power may have fundamental
consequences on the final decision of consumption.
Understanding the role of each member in familial interactions is key to predict-
ing the response of households to public policy. As an important example, we
can note that virtually all CCT programs in the world transfer money to women,
but it is still uncertain if the registered eﬀect is due to the release of budget con-
straint or a change in the use of resources by the household following an increase
in the decision power of the wife. This understanding is fundamental in coun-
tries where the empowerment of women may have important indirect implications
on investments in children’s human capital through behavioural changes within
households. This chapter studies the intra-household allocation of expenditure
among Social Financial Assistance recipients in Macedonia by analysing the role
of the marriage and the re-marriage market. In order to understand the be-
15
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haviour of households, it is fundamental to understand how these interact with
their environment. Studying the marriage market allows understanding how the
power of women within their families varies depending on the strength of its bar-
gaining position. By looking at the eﬀect of local variation of the sex ratio and
of new weddings shares where one of the two partners is divorced, I can proxy
for the bargaining power of each partner and study how the household allocates
expenditure to diﬀerent goods.
A large body of research reports evidence that the amount of resources that each
household member contributes to the family aﬀects its allocation of consumption
(for a literature review, see Duflo, 2005), however, there is no clear consensus on
the precise mechanism through which households take decisions and allocate con-
sumption. Diﬀerent studies in the literature tested for the validity of the unitary
model by using measures of relative income between husband and wife. Thomas
(1990) and Schultz (1990) test for the eﬀect of individual unearned incomes on
diﬀerent outcomes1, while Bourguignon et al. (1993), Bourguignon et al. (1994)
and Phipps and Burton (1998) provide evidence against the unitary model by
using measures of relative income. However, using this measure to underpin the
distribution of power inside the household may be disturbed by the endogeneity
problem, since the relative earned/unearned income might depend on decisions
that are not independent from the observed outcome.
Evidence on the importance of each member’s role inside the household gave
support to theories of intra-household allocation based on relative power within
the familial environment. The main theoretical contribution to this research
line is the collective rationality model (Chiappori, 1992), which assumes that
decisions carried out within households are Pareto eﬃcient. However, there is still
controversy around this assumption. Evidence from a number of studies shows
that in developed countries, households’ consumption decisions tend to be Pareto
eﬃcient (Bourguignon et al., 1994; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori
et al., 2002), while other recent studies in developing countries provide mixed
evidence against and in favour of eﬃcient decisions. Evidence of ineﬃciency has
been provided for agricultural choices (Udry, 1996, shows evidence for Nigeria)
and for the inability to provide full insurance against individual income shocks in
the marital contract (Duflo and Udry, 2004), while Bobonis (2009) and Attanasio
1Thomas (1990) finds evidence for the eﬀect of husband’s and wife’s unearned income on
labour supply and fertility decisions using the 1981 Socioeconomic Survey of Thailand. Schultz
(1990), using a survey on household conditions in Brazil, rejects income pooling hypothesis by
observing an eﬀect of mother’s unearned income on family health and nutrition status.
16
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and Lechene (2011) support the eﬃciency assumption for consumption choices in
rural Mexico. Related to evidence of ineﬃcient choices, a growing theoretical
literature states that the presence of imperfect marital contracts (Lundberg and
Pollak, 1993, 2003; Ligon, 2002; Basu, 2006) or asymmetric information (Bloch
and Rao, 2002) can lead to ineﬃcient allocation of resources.
Testing for individual rationality or for alternative models of intra-household
behaviour (such as the collective model), we require an exogenous shift in the
intra-household allocation of power. Examples of such variation used in literature
are policy interventions shifting power towards one of the household members.
Lundberg et al. (1997) and Ward-Batts (2008) use the 1979 UK Reform of Child
benefits, which exogenously shifted the recipient of the benefit towards mothers;
they both provide evidence towards the rejection of income pooling. Attanasio
and Lechene (2002) use the Progresa Program and its experimental nature to test
for income pooling by instrumenting the wife’s income share with the transfer
generated by the program (which was targeting women); they confirm previous
rejection of the income pooling hypothesis. The same experimental feature of
Progresa is exploited by Bobonis (2009), who combines randomised variation in
women’s income and local rainfall shocks as distribution factors; he finds evidence
that wife-specific income changes increase expenditure on children’s goods, while
income shocks generated by rainfall shocks have a smaller eﬀect on public goods
expenditure. A large CCT program such as Progresa is used as well by Attanasio
and Lechene (2011), who test the restrictions implied by collective rationality
estimating a z-conditional demand system in rural Mexico. By using the random
allocation of cash transfers to women and the relative size of husband and wife’s
family network as distribution factors, they reject the unitary model and cannot
reject eﬃciency in household decisions.
Other sources of variation in the intra-household allocation of power that are
readily observed and have been used in diﬀerent studies focus on elements of
the household environment. Chiappori et al. (2002) use the state of the marriage
market (measured by the sex ratio by age, race and state and by the features of the
legislation on divorce) as a distribution factor in the intra-household decision for
labor supply. They find that sex ratios associated with stronger power for wives
(fewer women are associated with stronger bargaining power within the marriage
contract) significantly decrease the labour supply of women. Other distribution
factors, such as the legislation of abortion (Oreﬃce, 2007), the generosity of
single parent benefits (Rubalcava and Thomas, 2000), the distribution of wealth
17
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by gender at marriage (Thomas et al., 1997) and the pension recipient’s gender
(Duflo, 2003), showed to have a significant eﬀect on intra-household allocation of
power.
This chapter focuses on the specific role of the marriage and the re-marriage mar-
ket in explaining intra-household allocation of expenditure by looking at measures
of the relative bargaining power of both spouses and by looking at the environ-
ment that characterise their marital contract. However, understanding the role
of the marriage market on the intra-household allocation of expenditure requires
a precise measure of the relative power of partners in this market. The main idea
is that factors influencing spouses’ opportunities outside the wedding can have
an eﬀect over the intra-household distribution of power, even if the marriage is
not dissolving. The idea was first proposed by Becker (1991), who proposed that
the marriage market is an important factor influencing redistribution of utility
across family members. The sex ratio, i.e. the relative scarcity of one gender
versus the other, is a fundamental factor that explains the status of the market.
One of the main results in the literature on intra-household decision and the
marriage market is attributable to Chiappori et al. (2002). In this study, they
used actual local sex ratios (together with indicators for the divorce law) to proxy
for the distribution of power across spouses and for its eﬀect on labour supply
decisions for both partners; they find evidence in favour of the marriage market
hypothesis, for which households living in areas where women are scarcer have
on average more decision power allocated to wives, resulting in a lower number
of hours worked. Other studies showed evidence that an increase in the rarity of
women in the local marriage market is associated with a decrease in the female
work participation (Angrist, 2002; Grossbard-Shechtman and Neideﬀer, 1997).
As proposed by Thomas et al. (1997), another direct measure of the bargaining
power across partners that is related to the marriage market is the relative eco-
nomic power (for instance, through the relative wage) at the moment in which
the marital contract is stipulated, namely at wedding. However, it might be
possible that the past distribution of income across spouse is correlated with
unobservable factors and this would bias the eﬀect of such distribution factor.
Moreover, a questionable matter is whether the important factors aﬀecting the
intra-household distribution of power can be related to the marriage market or
to the re-marriage market. In other words, we need to understand whether the
past distribution of power (at the time of the wedding) matters for the current
allocation of consumption or it is the current bargaining power in the re-marriage
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market that matters for household decisions. It is reasonable to assume that this
problem may be explained by the degree of commitment that the wedding con-
tract includes. If we assume, as it is reasonable for the setting of this chapter,
that commitment to marriage is not perfectly enforced since partners cannot com-
mit not to divorce, then in order to understand relative positions of partners we
need to study the current conditions of the marriage market. In fact, Thomas
et al. (1997) provide evidence that the distribution of income at wedding time
doesn’t aﬀect intra-household balance of power in those regions where wealth is
traditionally pooled within the household.
To answer this issue, in this chapter I will use measures of both the marriage and
the re-marriage market to capture diﬀerences about these two variables. I use
data collected in the Republic of Macedonia among the poorest quintile of the
population to test for the unitary model by exploiting variation of local sex ratios
as a source of distribution factor. I find that sex ratios with a higher percentage
of women aﬀect intra-household allocation of expenditure through an increase
in the expenditure share of education and health and through a decrease of the
share allocated to food. Given general results on preferences diﬀerences across
gender, this provide new evidence on the relationship of sex ratio with labour
market characteristics since, we would expect rarity of women to have a positive
eﬀect on the decision power of women within the household. One possible explan-
ation is that the relative power of spouses aﬀects only labour supply decisions
and then, through a lower relative income for women, it influences the allocation
of consumption. I propose that, at least in the case of the Republic of Macedo-
nia where unemployment is very high (in 2008, in some regions unemployment
reached a peak of 58% with an average of 32%) variations in the local labour
market characteristics influence the relative labour demand of women compared
to men and this in turn aﬀect the relative income of partners. The results are
supported by IV estimation for sex ratios.
Using the sex ratio as a measure for the status of the wedding market doesn’t
allow us to discriminate on the precise eﬀect of the distribution factor on the
bargaining position of each partner. I then concentrate on more direct measures
of marriage market status by focusing on the municipality-level share of weddings
in which the spouse had previously divorced from another partner (diﬀerentiating
between men and women), and I consider the two years previous to the survey.
Using this measure I want to proxy for the real possibility for each partner to exit
from the actual marriage and to find another partner. Moreover, it is reasonable
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to assume that this measure is exogenous since divorce decisions are taken by
other households2. Secondly, this allows distinguishing for the bargaining power
of each partner by exploiting the variation of share of weddings attributable to
divorces across genders. Using these measures as distribution factors I test for
income pooling and I find evidence against the unitary rationality hypothesis.
Moreover, using the possibility to distinguish among each partner’s bargaining
power, I provide evidence that is consistent with the eﬀect of the sex ratio and
in favour of the eﬃciency assumption.
The structure of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
theoretical framework. Section 2.3 report information about the data and its
descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 describes the empirical strategy and its validity.
Section 2.5 discusses the results.
2.2 Theoretical framework
This section makes direct reference to the general version of the collective model
proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2009), which allows intra-household allocation
of consumption to be an eﬃcient outcome whose position on the Pareto frontier
depends on the relative power of decision makers within the household. I allow for
the presence of diﬀerent kind of goods, namely private and public goods. Consider
a static version of the household collective model where husband and wife are the 2
decision makersm = {H,W}. Consumption can be allocated among n goods that
are divided into private and assignable (na), public (np) and a Hicksian composite
good C, that can be privately or publicly consumed, such that these are all
possible goods that can be consumed by the household (n = na+np+1). I denote
the vector of privately-consumed goods as qm 2 Rn+ and the vector of publicly-
consumed goods as Q 2 Rn+. Each household member’s preference is represented
by uH(qH , qW , Q, C, a) and uW (qH , qW , Q, C, a) where a are preference factors, e.g.
a vector of individual and household characteristics that aﬀect preferences directly
through utility functions. Preference factors are divided into observable (ao) and
unobservable (au) individual and household characteristics, such that a = {ao, au}
and the utility functions are then defined by um(qH , qW , Q, C; ao, au). I define z
as a K-vector of distribution factors such that every zk influences the allocation
of consumption only through the allocation of power among household members,
but it is not influencing individual preferences and the budget constraint.
2The issue of possible endogeneity is discussed in Section 2.5.2.
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Any eﬃcient allocation of consumption can be characterised as a solution of the
following program
max{qH ,qW ,Q,C} uH(qH , qW , Q, C; ao, au) +  uW (qH , qW , Q, C; ao, au)
subject to pHqH + pW qW + pQQ+ pCC  y
  =  (y,p, z; ao, au)
y = yH + yW + yJ (2.1)
where p = (pH , pW , pQ, pC) is a vector of prices for all kind of goods,   is the
Pareto weight, y is total household income, yH and yW are individual incomes
of husband and wife and yJ is income jointly held by both partners. The res-
ulting demand is then a function of total resources (or expenditure, denoted by
x), prices, individual and household characteristics and the Pareto weight which
influence the decision power of each partner in the household:
g = ⇠(x,p, (y,p, z; ao, au); ao, au) (2.2)
where g = (qH , qW , qQ, C). The Pareto weight   =  (y,p, z; ao, au) aﬀect the
sharing rule which determines the allocation of available resources to partners
and the sharing rule is influenced by distribution factors that determines the
power in the decision making process for each decision maker. It is common in
literature to consider partner-specific incomes (yH , yW , yJ) as distribution factors,
while this choice, as I will explain later, may generate empirical problems due
to the endogeneity of incomes. In order to overcome this problem I will use
alternative distribution factors by exploiting the variation in the characteristics
of the wedding market.
The first testable prediction of the collective model follows from the demand
system 2.2 and is the rejection of the unitary rationality hypothesis. In other
words, we want to test that the allocation of consumption is not aﬀected by any
distribution factor. In contrary, the demand system is compatible with unitary
rationality if and only if it satisfies the following condition for any i = 1, ..n and
k = 1, ..K:
@⇠i
@zk
= 0 (2.3)
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Testing for income pooling allows us to reject the unitary model under the as-
sumption that the chosen distribution factor aﬀects the allocation of consump-
tion only through the Pareto weight and not through partner’s preferences. In
our case, testing for individual rationality means to test for the joint significance
of the sex ratio and of measures of divorce rates in the demand system. Joint
significance of these measures, allow us to claim that the distribution of power
across partners do matter for the allocation of expenditure to diﬀerent consump-
tion goods. If we assume two distribution factors, (z1 and z2), we can express the
demand in the form g = ⇠(x,p, (y,p, z1, z2; ao, au); ao, au). By computing the
partial derivatives of the demand with respect to the two distribution factors, we
obtain:
@⇠
@z1
= @⇠@  · @ @z1
@⇠
@z2
= @⇠@  · @ @z2
(2.4)
If we consider one specific good i, we can compute the ratio of the first derivatives
with respect to the two distribution factors and we can show that such ratio is
constant since  (.) doesn’t depend on i. The ratio is then equal to:
@⇠i/@z1
@⇠i/@z2
=
@ /@z1
@ /@z2
(2.5)
The ratio of partial derivatives of demand for good i with respect to each dis-
tribution factor and conditional on total household expenditure, is equal across
all goods and equal to the ratio of partial derivatives of the Pareto weight with
respect to the distribution factors. This condition is know as the proportionality
condition. The main idea behind such condition is that the eﬀect of distribu-
tion factors is equally proportional for all goods since each distribution factor
aﬀects demand allocation only through its eﬀect on the Pareto weight. Hence,
their impact is one-dimensional, in the sense that they aﬀect allocation as if there
was only one distribution factor. In addition, recently, Bourguignon et al. (2009)
showed that this condition is necessary and suﬃcient for eﬃciency. The main
testable prediction for collective rationality is then that for any good i, j = 1, ..n
with i 6= j and any distribution factor k, k0 = 1, ..K with k 6= k0
@⇠i/@zk
@⇠i/@zk0
=
@⇠j/@zk
@⇠j/@zk0
=
@ /@zk
@ /@zk0
(2.6)
Bourguignon et al. (2009) shows that, if we consider two distribution factors (z1
and z2) and we assume that the Pareto weight   is increasing function of the
22
2. The Marriage market and intra-household allocation of expenditure 23
distribution factor z1 and decreasing function of the distribution factor z2 , we
can conclude that demand functions consistent with any bargaining model are
such that for any good the ratio of partial derivatives of the demand with respect
to the two distribution factors is equal across goods and is negative. For any
i = 1, ..n , the condition can then be expressed in the following way.
@⇠i/@zk
@⇠i/@zk0
=
@⇠j/@zk
@⇠j/@zk0
< 0 (2.7)
In the rest of the chapter I will estimate an empirical version of the model presen-
ted in this section and perform tests of individual rationality and collective ra-
tionality based on diﬀerent distribution factors. In order to understand the envir-
onment and the main characteristics of the sample, the following section presents
the sources of data used and its main descriptive statistics.
2.3 Data
The data used in the chapter comes from a diﬀerent number of sources. The
main datasets are the Macedonian Household Surveys collected by the Ministry
of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP), which contains detailed information on
a variety of household information (demographics, expenditures, durable goods,
housing characteristics) and individual level information on household members
(education, health, labour supply). For children enrolled in secondary school, the
Household Survey is supplemented with administrative data about attendance
and performance at school. Additionally, I make use of diﬀerent aggregated data
at municipality level, supplied by Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce, to construct
measures of sex ratios, local labour market characteristics and other marriage
market indicators. Specifically the secondary data used in the chapter comes from
the 2002 Census of Population (State Statistical Oﬃce, 2002), the 2007 Census
of Agriculture and the 2007-2010 Population and Vital statistics (all provided by
the Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce).
For the scope of the program evaluation of the Macedonian CCT program for
secondary education, two household surveys were collected during the Winter
2010, at the beginning of the program, and in Fall 2012, after two years of im-
plementation. This chapter makes use of the baseline household survey was con-
ducted between November and December 2010, coinciding with the beginning of
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the first school year in which CCT program became available. The Macedonian
“Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) for Secondary School Education” is a social
protection program aiming at increasing secondary school enrolment and com-
pletion rate among children in the poorest households of the population. It was
first implemented by the Macedonian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy in
Fall 2010 to provide cash transfers to poor households conditional on having chil-
dren in school-age attending secondary school at least 85% of the time. In order
to target poor households, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy decided to
oﬀer the program to the beneficiaries of the Social Financial Assistance (SFA)
benefit, which is the most significant income support program, accounting for
around 0.5 percent of GDP and 50 percent of total spending on social assistance
(Verme, 2008). SFA is a mean-tested monetary transfer granted to people who
are fit for work, are socially not provided for and cannot support themselves.
The amount paid for SFA is equivalent to the diﬀerence between household in-
come and the social assistance amount determined for the household, depending
on household size and time spent in SFA, varying from 1 825 MKD (around 40
USD) for one-member household to 4 500 MKD (around 98 USD) for households
with 5 or more members. It is considered as the benefit of last resort, meaning
it is provided after other benefits if the household income is still below a certain
living standards threshold. It is mainly collected by households in the poorest
tail of the income distribution; in 2009, the World Bank3 reports that total SFA
benefits are collected for 55 percent by the poorest quintile, 22 percent by the
second poorest quintile and 11 percent to the middle quintile.
At baseline, a sample of Financial Assistance households (recipients of SFA and
Child Benefit) were interviewed during the first two months of the program, rather
than before the start of the intervention. However, it is reasonable to believe that
this timeline had no eﬀect on baseline results, since the program implementation
was very slow at the beginning and the first payments were processed only in
March-April 2010. In contrast, the survey was quick and the last interviews were
carried out by the end of December.
A sample of recipients of SFA and Child Benefit was produced using the Ministry
of Labour and Social Policy’s electronic database of the recipients of all types of
financial assistance, which has been assembled during Summer 2010 along with
3I make reference to the “Project Appraisal Document - Report No: 47195-MK” between
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the World Bank.
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the implementation of the program4. The population frame has been produced
using the hardcopy archives at Social Welfare Centres (SWCs), which are the
main territorial units for social welfare provision. There are 27 inter-municipal
SWCs and they function as the key public providers of professional services in
social work. The use of the electronic database for sampling allowed identifying
12481 SFA households with at least one child of secondary school age, from which
we drew a random sample5.
The survey contains detailed information on a variety of household information
(demographics, expenditures, durable goods, housing characteristics) and indi-
vidual level information on household members (education, health, labour sup-
ply). Moreover information on family networks (given by the number of visits
from/to relatives for each member) and on domestic violence attitudes are col-
lected. The survey asks for expenditure on food, alcohol and tobacco over the
last week, on education, health, home, entertainment and services over the last
month, on clothes in the last 3 months. The presence of questions with diﬀerent
length of time for diﬀerent goods depending on their frequency of purchase re-
duce the problem of imperfect coincidence between actual consumption, which is
directly measured, and observed expenditure (seeBlundell and Meghir, 1987, for
an exposition of the purchase-infrequency model).
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics about household structure,
divided by type of municipality of residence of the household (rural versus urban)
and across diﬀerent ethnic groups. Households are composed on average by 4.7
members with an average age of the household head of 44.9. Each household
has 1.6 children in the age group 13-18 years old and fewer children with a lower
age (0.15) in the 0-6 class age and 0.44 in the 7-12 class age). If we look at
ethnic composition6, the majority of households in the sample is Macedonian
(45.6 percent), versus a 30.5 percent of Albanian households, 12.9 percent of
4All estimations are weighted by sampling weights in order to reconstruct the SFA
and Child Benefit population at the time of the interview.
5We aimed for a sample size of 17 households eligible for the CCT (recipients of social and
financial assistance with children of secondary school age) per municipality, although in practice
there was some variation in this number due to the fact that in some municipalities the eligible
population was smaller then 17. For power calculations, we considered a power of 0.8 and a
significance level of 0.05. With 42 clusters per arm and an inter-cluster correlation of 0.25,
using 17 households per municipality it would be possible to detect a diﬀerence in expenditures
in children’s education (or in any other item) of 0.33 of a standard deviation and an increase
in the proportion of students attending 85% or more of the classes of roughly 10% points.
6Ethnicity refers to the ethnic group reported by the household head. The main ethnicities
present in the Republic of Macedonia are the Macedonian, Albanian, Roma and Turk ethnicities.
Mixed marriages are rare exceptions in the sample.
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Roma households and 11.0 percent of Turk households. Macedonian households
have less members than Albanian and Roma households (4.3 versus 5.2 and 4.9
members) and on average have a lower number of children in the 13-18 years old
age group (1.5 versus 1.75 and 1.53 children). Additional descriptive statistics
are presented in Table 2.11.
In order to understand the distribution of decision power across partners, it is
necessary to look at the characteristics of husbands and wives. Table 2.3 presents
the main individual characteristics for these individuals in terms of age, educa-
tion and wage share at the time of the wedding. Wives are less educated than
husbands, with 20.8 percent who completed at least secondary school, compared
to 33.0 percent for husbands. On average, wives are 2.5 years younger than
husbands.
2.3.1 Expenditure and budget shares
Expenditure data was collected using a recall method, based on the frequencies
reported by the Macedonian Household Budget Survey, which is collected by
the Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce with the purpose to identify expenditure
attitudes by the average Macedonian household. The expenditure section of the
questionnaire was divided into sub-sections depending on the characteristics of the
goods and their proposed frequency of purchase. For food items, the questionnaire
initially asked about the quantities purchased and expenditure in the last 7 days.
The food aggregate is composed by the following categories: cereals and wheat
products, vegetables, fruit, meat, fish and other foods. Other foods contains
oils and fats, sugar, salt, honey and jam, chocolate, sweets and cookies, salties,
coﬀee and cocoa, infant food, spices, teas, sauces, instant soups and meals and
other beverages (mineral water, soft drinks, fruit juices). For non-food items,
information was collected on the purchases during the period of reference and
about the items that were received for free or as a payment in kind. For this
kind of goods it is more complicated to impute values of items that were not
purchases, since the heterogeneity in quantity and quality is higher. To this
extent, the respondent was then asked to imagine to be in the situation to buy
these goods and to report at which price they could have found them at the local
market.
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In order to have a measure of comparison and to compute expenditure shares, all
figures have been converted to monthly expenditures. This allowed constructing
an aggregate measure for total household expenditure. The expenditure shares
allocated to diﬀerent categories are then determined as the ratio between the
amount spent on the category and the total household expenditure. In order
to exclude problems of infrequency related to the decision to purchase durable
goods, the expenditures on durable goods were removed from the analysis. Table
2.4 presents summary statistics on monthly household expenditure and on budget
shares allocated to diﬀerent categories. On average, households spend 22.126
MKD monthly7(roughly 290 British pounds). The highest budget share is alloc-
ated to food with an average share of 47.2 percent. We can note that some house-
holds spent the whole expenditure on food, showing that the living conditions of
families are fairly poor. Among sub-categories, cereals and vegetables are the
mainly component of the food expenditure with an average share of respectively
17.69 and 10.93 percent. The share allocated to meat is lower (5.83 percent), while
the one for fish and fish-related products drops to 0.42 percent. Dairy products
captures around the same share as meat, with 5 percent of expenditure on aver-
age. Clothing corresponds to around 4.7 percent, while expenditure on children
education collect on average 13.0 percent of total household expenditure, with a
slightly bigger average share for girls. It is interesting to note that on average
households spent around 3.1 percent on alcohol and tobacco. Health expenditures
reach instead an average share of 8.6 percent, while house and hygiene-related
expenses capture 7.4 percent, compared to 14.1 percent for utilities.
I will refer to budget shares as monetary expenditure allocated to a specific good
as a percentage of total household expenditure. An alternative strategy would
be to consider consumption shares, since expenditure decisions might diﬀer from
actual consumption. Using expenditure shares allows avoiding measuring error
linked to the imputation of values for consumption, but if household expenditure
diﬀers systematically from consumption this could lead to a misinterpretation of
the results. To check whether there are substantial diﬀerences between expendit-
ure and consumption decision, a household consumption aggregate was built us-
ing information on food consumption and non-food consumption. In order to
build an aggregate for food consumption, we take into account not only what the
household spent on food purchases, but what the household actually consumed
during the last 7 days. In order to impute the value of consumed food (either
purchased, self- produced, stored or received as gift), the quantities reported by
71 Macedonian Denar = 0.015 British pounds.
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the household are multiplied by a set of prices using a criterion of proximity to
the household. The first choice is to use prices directly paid by the household, but
for a large number of households, goods are either purchased or self-produced, so
that prices at household level might not always be available. In order to overcome
this problem, we compute median prices using observations on other households
at diﬀerent geographical levels (municipality, region and Macedonia). To be sure,
in order to compute values of self-produced goods, we should use farm-gate prices,
that would more precisely estimate the value of such goods, while using market
prices would include intermediaries markup into the purchasing price. However,
given the size of the country and its relative degree of closeness to international
market, it is reasonable to assume that observed food prices are very close to
farm-gate prices, since there is large availability of locally produced green mar-
kets, where prices are relatively lower than goods purchased at other distribution
chains. For non-food items, consumption is computed by adding the value of
expenditures and the value of good received without paying, using as a value
the self-reported price at which the respondent could buy the same good in the
local market. Table 2.4 presents a comparison of expenditure and consumption
aggregates (and its composition) for households in urban and rural areas. We can
notice that there are little diﬀerences between the two measures, showing that
expenditure and consumption decisions are not very dissimilar. For this reason,
we proceed analysing only expenditure shares since they present a lower degree
of measurement error.
2.4 Empirical strategy
This Section presents the econometric model used to asses the validity of the
theoretical framework presented in Section 2.2. As previously explained, in order
to test for unitary model of household decision, I express household demand as
a function of total (log) household expenditure, distribution factors and a set of
individual and household specific characteristics8:
wih = ↵i +  iln(exp)ih +  zh +⌦Xh + ✏ih (2.8)
where wih is the budget share spent on good i in household h, zh is a vector of
distribution factors, Xh is a vector of wife, husband and household characteristics
8In this specification I allow prices to be part of the error term. The potential problems are
discussed along with the chapter.
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and ✏ih are unobservable determinants of demand for each good. Controls include
household composition, gender and ethnicity of the household head, husband and
wife age and schooling, regional dummies, dummies for whether the household
live in rural areas and live in the capital city (Skopje) and number of financial
assistance recipients in the municipality.
To the extent that total expenditure is determined by unobserved factors aﬀecting
household expenditure allocation, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates would
be aﬀected by omitted variable bias. The presence of unusually high (or low) val-
ues of expenditure on a consumption good would generate a correlation between
(total) expenditure and the unobservable factors in the error term. As shown
by Browning and Chiappori (1998) this problem may be solved by using total
household income as an instrumental variable for expenditure, since it is correl-
ated with the total level of household expenditure, but conditioning on income
should have no eﬀect on the consumption shares allocated to diﬀerent goods. As
in most studies in literature, I consider the possibility of having total expendit-
ure as endogenous and I instrument it with total household income9, an asset
index built using principal component analysis (see Section 5.8) and regional un-
employment rate in 2010 (Um). I allow for more flexible forms by higher order
polynomials for total income and I find that the best fit is quadratic in total
household income and linear in unemployment and asset index. Since household
income is zero in some cases, I don’t use a log specification to match for total
expenditure10. First stage OLS regression of total expenditure using the chosen
instruments is reported in Table 2.10; all regressors are significant at 1% level and
joint-significance test of instruments reject the hypothesis of weak instrument.
In order to test for income pooling I then proceed by focusing on the marriage
market and by using, as previously discussed, a measure of rarity of women, the
sex ratio at husband’s age, and a measure of the weddings share from divorces.
I compute sex ratios at municipality level using the 2010 Population Statistics
available from the Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce. Population statistics allow
me to know for each age class11 the number of male and female individuals living
in each municipality12. I compute the corresponding sex ratio xh for household h
9I compute (yearly) total household income by using information on labour income (monthly
salary paid and months worked), agricultural and breeding income and other sources of income.
10Ward-Batts (2000) follows a similar approach.
11Age classes are mainly of 5 years.
12Interracial marriages in the sample are rare, but it would be an improvement to use sex
ratios at municipality and at ethnicity level. However, this information is not available.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of sex ratios at husband and wife age (2010)
Note. The graph shows a density estimation of the sample distribution of the sex ratio at wife
and husband age. Sex ratios are defined as the ratio between the number of women and the
number of men in the municipality of residence of the household and in the corresponding age
group.
living in municipality m by
zh,m =
femalem,a
malem,a
where female is the number of female individuals andmale is the number of male
individuals living in municipality m and being in the same age class a of husband
in household h. Figure 2.1 presents the kernel density of sex ratios associated
to wives’ and husbands’ age. Sex ratios at husband’s age range from 0.48 to
1.263 percent, with an average value of 0.918. The distribution of sex ratios for
husband’s and wife’s ages is very similar due to the close relationship between
the age both spouses and the availability of data for 5-years age class.
Using the computed sex ratios, I estimate the following model for each good13:
wi,h = ↵i +  iln(exp)i,h +  izh,m +⌦Xh + ✏i (2.9)
13I estimated the model with a more flexible functional form by introducing higher orders
polynomial in expenditure. The best fit is obtained using with a linear specification.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of weddings share attributed to divorces
Note. The graph shows a density estimation of the sample distribution of the share of weddings
attributed to divorces for women and men. The share is defined as the total number of men
(women) that got married after a divorce in the municipality of residence during the reference
period.
and I proceed testing for the unitary rationality of the household by checking for
the joint significance of zh,m.
The use of sex ratio as a distribution factor doesn’t allow us to discriminate
among the power of husband and wife within the household since the measure is
reflecting the relative position of both partners. Moreover, the high correlation
of the measure at husband’s and wife’s age doesn’t allow us to use these two
measure to proxy for the power of both partners. In order to test for collective
rationality, I then divide the bargaining power in the marriage market by using
as distribution factors the share of total weddings (for men and for women) in
which the spouse had a previous divorce and I consider the three years previous
to the survey (namely 2007-2009). In other words, if I indicate WH (WW ) as the
total number of men (women) that get married in the period 2007-2009 and W divH
(W divW ) as the total number of men (women) that get married in the same period
but after a divorce, the computed distribution factors will be equal to:
zH = W
div
H /WH
zW = W
div
W /WW
(2.10)
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Figure 2.3: Regional distribution of share of total weddings after a divorce (2007-
09)
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Note. The pictures show the geographical distribution of the share of weddings attributed to
divorces for women and men. The share is defined as the total number of men (women) that
got married after a divorce in the municipality of residence during the reference period.
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It is reasonable to assume that the distribution factors zH and zW are correlated
with the bargaining positions of wives ad husbands since they are measuring
the possibility (or the individual perception) to exit the marriage and to re-
marry with another partner. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the coeﬃcient is
ambiguous, since a higher number of men that re-marry after a divorce (compared
to women) could be explaining the higher possibility of a husband to exit the
marriage (increasing the bargaining power of men) and, at the same time, the
higher availability of men in the marriage market (increasing the bargaining power
of women). However, this paper aims at testing for the individual and collective
rationality hypothesis and therefore will not be looking at diﬀerent mechanisms
through which diﬀerent divorce rates aﬀect intra-household decisions.
Figure 2.2 compares the distributions of zH and zW in the sample, while Figure
2.3 reports the regional distribution of shares of weddings after a divorce for men
and women across Macedonia. It is easy to observe that the two distributions
are quite diﬀerent: the distribution of shares of weddings attributed to divorces
is more concentrated for women and with a lower average, while the distribution
for men is more dispersed. In the sample, zW has an average of 3.09 percent
(standard deviation 0.014) with a maximum value equal to 7.41 percent, while
zH has an average of 7.13 percent (standard deviation 0.036) with a maximum of
17.54 percent. This shows that if we look at the collective behaviour in the mar-
riage market, we can obtain two measures that are reflecting wife and husband’s
position in the re-marriage market and in the meantime with a diﬀerential eﬀect
among the two partners. This allow us to test for the collective model since we
can use as distribution factors two measures which aﬀect the position of wife and
husband in a diﬀerent way. In this case, I use the two distribution factors zH and
zW and I estimate for each good the following model:
wi,h = ↵i +  iln(exp)i,h + ⌘i,HzH,h + ⌘i,W zW,h +⌦Xh + ✏i (2.11)
The possibility to include two distribution factors in the estimation of the demand
system allow us to test for the two following hypothesis:
1. Individual rationality. As reported in Section 2, the model is consistent
with individual rationality if and only if for any consumption good i = 1, ..n
@wi
@zH
=
@wi
@zW
= 0 (2.12)
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2. Collective rationality. The model is consistent with the eﬃciency as-
sumption if and only if the proportionality condition is not rejected, namely
if and only if for any consumption good i, j = 1, ..n, i 6= j
@wi/@zW
@wi/@zH
=
@wj/@zW
@wj/@zH
(2.13)
The following Section presents the main results obtained by following the pro-
posed empirical strategy.
2.5 Results
Given that households decisions to allocate expenditure in diﬀerent goods may be
interrelated, we need to take into account the plausible cross-equation correlation
of the error terms. This matter is solved by estimating the econometric model
presented in Section 2.4 with system estimation methods. To understand the
structure of household expenditure allocation, all tables present the estimated
coeﬃcients not only for the distribution factors, but for the total household ex-
penditure. When the endogeneity problem related to total household expenditure
is relaxed I estimate the system by seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), while
for the majority of the results the system is estimated with Instrumental Vari-
able via Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). In every specification,
I allow for standard errors to be clustered at municipality level. In all estima-
tions of demand system, the sample is restricted to only couples and single parent
households are excluded. I will consider the following good categories: food, adult
clothing (male and female), child clothing, education, health, tobacco and alcohol
and other goods (utilities, home expenditures and residual expenses).
Table 2.6 presents the estimated coeﬃcients for the sex ratio at husband’s age and
for total expenditure14. In column (1), I estimate the model with SUR without
instrumenting for total expenditure, while in column (2) total expenditure is
instrumented using the IV strategy previously proposed. The test for unitary
rationality is rejected at 1% in both cases. Under the assumption that the sex
ratio conforms to the definition of distribution factor, it has a significant eﬀect on
the allocation of expenditure through the distribution of power across partners.
Specifically, we observe a stronger eﬀect on the allocation to expenditures on
14The whole regression is reported in Tables 14-16.
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food, male adult clothing and education. A higher sex ratio leads to a significant
increase on the expenditure of education, while reducing the share spent on food
and adult male clothing. Given the generally accepted proposition that women
have stronger preferences for collective consumption needs, this result provides
evidence that a higher sex ratio might be related to a higher decision power of
women, rather than the opposite. These results may be biased in the case the
sex ratio is correlated with unobservable characteristics of the household that are
related to current expenditure allocation. I will discuss this issue more in detail
in Section 2.5.1.
When turning the attention to total expenditure, we can observe that results are
in line with the literature, resulting in a higher total expenditure linked to a higher
share on education and a lower share on food. Additionally, by comparing the
two estimation methods, we can observe that instrumenting for total expenditure
has the eﬀect of pushing the coeﬃcients towards zero, excluding female clothing,
for which the coeﬃcient becomes significantly positive.
Table 2.6 showed that using the sex ratio as a distribution factor allows us claim-
ing that local variation in the marriage market has a significant eﬀect on the
expenditure allocation within households. However it is not clear if the sex ra-
tio is aﬀecting the decision power from a wife or from a husband perception,
but it only identifies a measure of their relative power. In order to identify each
partner’s bargaining power and in order to test for the collective rationality hypo-
thesis, I estimate the same demand system using two measures of the re-marriage
market as two distribution factors following the strategy explained in Section
2.4. Results are reported in Table 2.7 and distribution factors are standardised
around the mean. Columns (1) reports the estimated coeﬃcients for the share of
men and women that get married after a divorce and for total expenditure, while
column (2) reports the standard errors.
The test for unitary rationality is rejected again at 1%, meaning that the selected
distribution factors jointly have a significant eﬀect on the allocation of consump-
tion. We can note that the eﬀect on expenditure allocation is significant mainly
for food, child clothing and utilities, with a smaller eﬀect on education and to-
bacco and alcohol. A higher wedding share of husbands attributed to previous
divorces leads to a smaller share spent on food and a higher share of child cloth-
ing. Moreover, we cannot reject the collective rationality hypothesis (the p-value
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for the proportionality hypothesis is equal to 0.7219) providing evidence that the
eﬀect of the distribution factors is proportional across goods. However, the result
of the test might be due to the fact that the estimated coeﬃcients are not all
estimated with suﬃcient precision. The coeﬃcients on the share of weddings in
which new wives faced a previous divorce are significant for food and child cloth-
ing, with a smaller eﬀect on tobacco and alcohol. In addition, we can observe
that the eﬀect of each distribution factor has the negative sign of the eﬀect of
the other, showing that they could be correct measures of the bargaining power
of each spouse. The estimated coeﬃcients for total expenditure are in line with
the estimated coeﬃcients reported in Table 2.6.
2.5.1 Robustness checks
This Section discusses some validity tests to support the evidence presents pre-
viously. Firstly, in order to consistently estimate the model and to estimate the
unbiased responsiveness of budget shares to total expenditure, it is required that
IV robustness and exclusion restrictions are satisfied. One problem with such
strategy, which is common in literature, is that the exclusion restriction assumed
for total income may not be satisfied in the case labor incomes are endogenous
in the household’s decision to allocate consumption to diﬀerent goods and there
is no separability among labour and consumption decisions. In fact, if individual
preferences for leisure are not separable from consumption goods, total household
income (which includes labour income) doesn’t satisfy the exclusion restriction. In
order to support the exclusion restriction, I estimate the demand system includ-
ing labour supply dummy variables for wife and husband. Specifically I control
whether they worked for a wage in last 12 months. Table 2.8 presents the results
when controlling for husband and wife labour supply for wage and provides evid-
ence that controlling for labour supply has little eﬀect on the coeﬃcients for the
sex ratio and for expenditure. We need to note however that since the sample is
composed by recipients of financial assistance and the condition to be part of it
is to be unemployed, the proportion of individuals who worked for wages in the
previous 12 months was very low. In fact, only 15 percent of husbands and 4 per-
cent of wives worked for wages in the previous 12 months. It would be necessary
to observe labour supply in the informal sector, which is by definition, at least in
part, unobservable.
Following the strategy implemented byAttanasio and Lechene (2002), consisting
in instrumenting total expenditure using local variation in agricultural wage. I
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proceed by instrumenting total expenditure using variables that are reasonably
correlated with local variation in wages. Specifically, total expenditure is instru-
mented with regional unemployment and with main characteristics of migration
toward and from each municipality in the period 2006-2009, excluding the year
in which the expenditure data is collected (instruments included are migration
change in the period 2007 and 200915 and female share working in the agricultural
sector). First stage regressions are reported in Table 2.10. Results are robust to
alternative estimation strategies.
A second order of problems arises from the absence of data on sex ratios and
on divorce rates divided across diﬀerent ethnic groups. In fact, due to religious
diﬀerences, mixed weddings are rare and therefore a better measure of the distri-
bution factors would be ethnic-specific sex ratios and wedding shares. However,
the distribution of ethnic groups is geographically concentrated in specific muni-
cipalities. This clearly reduces the problem of absence of the ethnic-specific data
since data at municipality level is expected to be highly correlated with ethnic-
specific sex ratios, wedding and divorce rates. Moreover, to deal with the eﬀect of
a wrong definition of sex ratio and age classes, I have experimented with diﬀerent
definitions using available data. Given that the average age diﬀerence between
spouses in the sample is between 4 and 5 years and may be bigger then the con-
sidered age classes, I estimated the demand system using larger age groups sex
ratios by including contiguous age groups (upwards and downwards). Moreover,
even if the two measures are highly correlated, I have experimented by estimat-
ing the model using sex ratios at wife’s age, instead of husband’s age (Figure 2.4
shows the sample distribution of these two variables). Finally, in order to solve
the problem related to the geographically limited definition of sex ratio, I use
regional-level sex ratios instead of municipality level. In all these cases, results
are not dissimilar.
2.5.2 Endogeneity of sex ratio and divorce rates
This section is discussing whether sex ratios and divorce rates are picking up
diﬀerences in the distribution of power within the household or whether it is just
reflecting unobserved characteristics. This is particularly important since I find
that sex ratios with a higher percentage of women aﬀect intra-household alloc-
ation of expenditure through an increase in the expenditure share of education
15Migration change is defined as migrm =  migrm,2009   ( migrm,2008 + migrm,2007).
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and health and through a decrease of the share allocated to food.
I previously showed evidence that the sex ratio might be influenced by the la-
bour market, I need to consider the possibility that it is correlated through the
error term with unobservable terms that relate to labour market characteristics.
Firstly, one possibility is that prices varies across regions depending on sex ra-
tios (for instance, we may expect regions with prevalence of agriculture to have
lower prices for food and lower sex ratios) and in this case our strategy would
be biased by the correlation of the sex ratio with the error term. To control for
this issue I compute the median price at municipality level of the most costumed
item in the sample (bread) and I estimate the demand system by controlling for
the variation in prices. Results are presented in Column (3) of Table 2.8 and
show little eﬀect on the coeﬃcients of expenditure and of sex ratio. It is addi-
tionally reasonable to assume that prices are aﬀected only by a small variation
given the small dimension of the whole Macedonian market. Secondly, I con-
trol for internal migration to check whether households migrate in relationship to
changes in the labour market and I find that the migration of children between 0
and 14 years old account only for the 1 percent of the total migration, meaning
that households with children are not the individuals migrating. This suggests
that the majority of the migration flux is characterised by single workers (or by
households without children), which in turn influence the local marriage market
by aﬀecting sex ratios. While the eﬀect of the sex ratio on the bargaining position
of spouses is a possible explanation for its correlation with intra-household alloc-
ation of consumption, it is by no means the only possible explanation. Another
possible explanation supported by Grossbard-Shechtman and Treble (1993) tend
to favour the idea that sex ratios reflect characteristics of the labour market and
especially features of labour demand. For instance, if we assume that certain re-
gions have geographical characteristics that make them more feasible for “male”
sectors, such as agriculture, we would expect these regions to attract more men
and sex ratio would form endogenously with a higher proportion of men. In the
opposite direction, if certain regions would favour “female” sectors, we would ex-
pect sex ratios to endogenously form with a higher proportion of women. Note
that this eﬀect goes in the same direction as the marriage market hypothesis,
since regions with a higher share of men would have a higher number of hours
worked by husbands and then a higher share of income.
Thirdly, I proceed to estimate the demand system by instrumenting the sex ra-
tio using diﬀerent strategies. In order to look at the precise eﬀect of agriculture,
38
2. The Marriage market and intra-household allocation of expenditure 39
which typically capture more male workers and influence migration (which in turn
influence the sex ratio), the sex ratio is instrumented with the lagged number of
women working in agricultural in the municipality (normalised by the working
age female population). The information is provided by the Census of Agricul-
ture for the year 2007 (State Statistical Oﬃce, 2007). In a second specification,
I instrument the actual sex ratio with the lagged sex ratio computed using the
2002 Census data; the distribution of lagged sex ratio is compared to the actual in
Figure 2.4 (for completeness I report the sex ratios used, the one at husband age,
and the one at wife age). The rationale to use this strategy is that Macedonia
was hit by an armed conflict between the ethnic Albanian National Liberation
Army (NLA) militant group and the army of the Republic of Macedonia that
throughout 2001 stroked the north-western part of the country. One of the con-
flict consequences was a massive displacement of an estimated 74.000 people in
200116, which is a relevant number given an estimated population of around 2
million people. We can then claim that the sex ratio in 2002 might have been
at least partly exposed to an exogenous shock caused by the war. Results are
reported in Table 2.9, while the OLS first stage regressions of the sex ratio over
the instruments are reported in Table 2.10. The table shows that instrumenting
for sex ratio, the coeﬃcients on sex ratio tend to become smaller and insignific-
ant. This support the idea that sex ratios might actually be picking up as well
labour market characteristics, which would drive the interpretation of our results
toward the results in literature. However instrumenting for sex ratio leads to the
same conclusion in terms of rejecting the unitary model, even if the significance
of the test is weaker.
Similarly divorce rates and shares of new weddings where one partner has pre-
viously divorced present similar issues of endogeneity. In fact, local variation in
divorce rates might be picking up the eﬀect of (unobservable) diﬀerences in social
norms, which in turn aﬀect the relative divorce rates of men and women. We don’t
have a credible instrument picking up exogenous variation separately for both hus-
band’s and wive’s divorce rates and lagged data on divorce rates are currently not
available. Therefore estimates cannot be produced using an Instrumental Vari-
able estimation strategy. For this case, we rely on the intra-municipality variation
of ethnic composition and we need to assume that conditional on individual eth-
nic group, which should be capturing ethnic-related social norms, recent divorce
rates are exogenous to unobservable determinants of household expenditure de-
cisions. However, this would lead to biased estimates in case the divorce rates
16Figure for the Republic of Macedonia is provided by the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre (www.internal-displacement.org).
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of sex ratio (2002 versus 2010)
5a. Husband age
5b. Wife age
Note. The graphs show density estimations of the sample distribution of the sex ratio at wife
and husband age using two diﬀerent sources, the 2002 census and the 2010 Macedonian State
Statistical Oﬃce population statistics. Sex ratios are defined as the ratio between the number
of women and the total number of individuals in the municipality of residence of the household
and in the corresponding age group.
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are capturing unobservable characteristics that could determine the decision to
allocate resources to diﬀerent goods. One possible case of endogeneity, which
has already been discussed for the sex ratios, could be that divorce rates might
be linked to the labour market variation, which in turn might be linked to the
relative income shares of husbands and wives.
2.6 Conclusion
Understanding the “black box” called household is central in any policy initiat-
ive since it is fundamental to understand how individuals behave while being
part of a group. To do so it is important to study and understand the role of
intra-household distribution of decision power and how this impacts household
decisions. This chapter provided evidence on the role of the marriage market
in explaining how the bargaining position of each partner in expenditure choices
can depend on the relative position in the wedding market. This complements
evidence in the literature, that found empirical evidence on the role of the local
sex ratio on labour supply and on the intra-household behaviour, and contributes
with newly collected data from a developing country in which the empowerment
of women is at the core of its development policy. By using a measure of the bar-
gaining position of each partner in the re-marriage market, this chapter provided
evidence in favour of the collective model. Recent studies provided mixed evid-
ence about the eﬃciency assumption for household decision making, but it is
important to note that the specific environment in which the household is liv-
ing is central in drawing conclusions on the eﬃcient or ineﬃcient behaviour of
households.
In this chapter I used measures of both the marriage and the re-marriage mar-
ket to capture diﬀerences about these two variables. I find that sex ratios with
a higher percentage of women aﬀect intra-household allocation of expenditure
through an increase in the expenditure share of education and health and through
a decrease of the share allocated to food. This provides new evidence on the re-
lationship of sex ratio with labour market characteristics since we would expect
rarity of women to have a positive eﬀect on the decision power of women within
the household. Additionally, by focusing on the municipality-level share of wed-
dings in which the spouse had previously divorced from another partner, I find
evidence against the unitary rationality hypothesis and I provide evidence that is
consistent with the eﬀect of the sex ratio and in favour of the eﬃciency assump-
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tion.
Much work has to be done in order to understand individual behaviour within
households. The marriage market may not only explain the allocation of ex-
penditures within households, but it may be related to other outcomes, such as
domestic violence or educational choices (for a specific discussion on the role of
sex ratios on education choices in Macedonia, refer to Section 5.7.2). To study
the relationship between the marriage market and other household outputs is a
subject that need to be deepened.
In conclusion, one important point to be noted is that testing for the diﬀerent
versions of the collective model requires an exogenous source of variation in the
intra-household distribution of power. As this chapter shows, while we consider
measures of income, we might lead to incorrect conclusions due to the fact that
the estimates can be biased. For this reason, potential exogenous shocks have to
be researched and studied, in order to improve our understanding of how families
take decisions.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics on household structure, by type of municipality
Rural Urban Total
(1) (2) (3)
Household head characteristics
Age 44.891 44.865 44.877
(5.645) (6.138) (5.914)
Male 0.907 0.813 0.856
(0.291) (0.390) (0.351)
Household members 4.816 4.588 4.692
(1.133) (1.176) (1.161)
Number of children
0-6 y.o. 0.117 0.168 0.145
(0.352) (0.454) (0.411)
7-12 y.o. 0.475 0.418 0.444
(0.634) (0.618) (0.626)
13-18 y.o. 1.645 1.519 1.577
(0.673) (0.641) (0.659)
Ethnicity
Macedonian and others 0.399 0.504 0.456
(0.490) (0.500) (0.498)
Albanian 0.420 0.207 0.305
(0.494) (0.405) (0.460)
Turkish 0.144 0.082 0.110
(0.351) (0.274) (0.313)
Roma 0.037 0.207 0.129
(0.189) (0.405) (0.335)
Area of residence
East 0.225 0.351 0.293
(0.418) (0.477) (0.455)
Center 0.296 0.371 0.336
(0.457) (0.483) (0.473)
West 0.479 0.279 0.371
(0.500) (0.449) (0.483)
Living in Skopje 0.000 0.247 0.134
(0.000) (0.432) (0.340)
Note. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Urban and Rural areas are defined at Municipality
level using the Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce definition based on urbanisation and pre-
dominant type of economic activity. "Male" gender corresponds to code 1, while "Female" to
code 0. Children are reported as total number. Skopje is the main urban agglomeration and
capital city of Macedonia.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics on mothers and fathers, by type of municipality
Rural Urban Total
(1) (2) (3)
MOTHER
Age 41.730 42.085 41.922
(5.750) (6.421) (6.122)
Education:
No degree 0.005 0.017 0.012
(0.071) (0.130) (0.107)
Lower primary 0.215 0.162 0.186
(0.411) (0.369) (0.390)
Upper primary 0.535 0.461 0.495
(0.499) (0.499) (0.500)
Secondary school or more 0.147 0.260 0.208
(0.355) (0.439) (0.406)
FATHER
Age 45.317 45.497 45.414
(5.550) (5.823) (5.698)
Education:
No degree 0.046 0.050 0.048
(0.209) (0.219) (0.214)
Lower primary or less 0.124 0.134 0.129
(0.329) (0.340) (0.335)
Upper primary 0.538 0.445 0.488
(0.499) (0.497) (0.500)
Secondary school or more 0.288 0.366 0.330
(0.453) (0.482) (0.470)
Note. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Urban and Rural areas are defined at Municipality
level using the Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce definition based on urbanisation and pre-
dominant type of economic activity. "Male" gender corresponds to code 1, while "Female" to
code 0. Children are reported as total number. Skopje is the main urban agglomeration and
capital city of Macedonia.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics on household total expenditure and expenditure
shares
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max % non-
zeros
Monthly expenditure 22125.7 22742.9 2090.5 243742.6 .
Food 0.472 0.185 0.000 0.993 0.999
Cereals 0.152 0.105 0.000 0.787 0.967
Vegetables and Fruit 0.077 0.061 0.000 0.430 0.909
Meat 0.059 0.065 0.000 0.550 0.702
Fish 0.008 0.019 0.000 0.136 0.200
Oil and fats 0.044 0.033 0.000 0.248 0.932
Dairy 0.060 0.051 0.000 0.491 0.850
Turkish tea 0.004 0.015 0.000 0.121 0.114
Sugar, honey and salt 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.144 0.807
Chocolate and sweets 0.006 0.014 0.000 0.144 0.237
Coﬀe and tea 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.123 0.791
Beverages 0.015 0.024 0.000 0.221 0.473
Meals outside the household 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.263 0.050
Other food 0.012 0.018 0.000 0.174 0.479
Tobacco and alcohol 0.031 0.059 0.000 0.732 0.328
Tobacco 0.027 0.056 0.000 0.732 0.299
Alcohol 0.003 0.015 0.000 0.166 0.083
Clothing 0.047 0.043 0.000 0.256 0.814
Female 0.010 0.017 0.000 0.152 0.512
Male 0.010 0.017 0.000 0.190 0.504
Children 0.026 0.035 0.000 0.238 0.572
Education 0.130 0.223 0.000 0.934 0.852
Male 0.061 0.155 0.000 0.934 0.616
Female 0.069 0.168 0.000 0.925 0.573
Health 0.086 0.121 0.000 0.887 0.771
Wife 0.030 0.069 0.000 0.806 0.532
Husband 0.027 0.072 0.000 0.887 0.472
Children 0.023 0.063 0.000 0.662 0.358
Other 0.006 0.039 0.000 0.748 0.091
Utilities 0.141 0.086 0.000 0.837 0.991
Other 0.093 0.070 0.000 0.646 0.977
Home 0.074 0.053 0.000 0.443 0.972
Entertainment 0.009 0.025 0.000 0.294 0.240
Other expenses 0.011 0.042 0.000 0.628 0.213
Note. Monthly expenditure is expressed in Macedonian Denars (1 MKD = 0.015 GBP). Budget
shares are computed as expenditure on the category divided by total household expenditure
over the same time period. Budget shares for sub-categories are expressed as percentage of
total expenditure rather than percentage of macro-category expenditure.
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Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics on household total expenditure, consumption
and shares
Urban Rural
Expenditure Consumption Expenditure Consumption
Monthly value 20860.4 21212.6 23603.1 23528.9
(20095.4) (19924.9) (25426.6) (25555.5)
Food 0.476 0.478 0.468 0.460
(0.177) (0.169) (0.193) (0.184)
Tobacco and alcohol 0.038 0.037 0.022 0.021
(0.067) (0.060) (0.047) (0.046)
Clothing 0.045 0.049 0.049 0.054
(0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.046)
Education 0.118 0.115 0.144 0.144
(0.207) (0.202) (0.240) (0.240)
Health 0.082 0.081 0.090 0.089
(0.111) (0.108) (0.132) (0.129)
Utilities 0.148 0.145 0.134 0.135
(0.091) (0.090) (0.080) (0.082)
Other expenses 0.093 0.095 0.094 0.097
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.069)
Note. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Monthly value of expenditure and consumption is
expressed in Macedonian Denars (1 MKD = 0.015 GBP). Shares are computed as expenditure
(consumption) on the category divided by total household expenditure (consumption) over the
same time period.
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Table 2.6: Test of Individual Rationality using sex ratio
SUR FIML
(1) (2)
Coeﬀ. Std.error Coeﬀ. Std.error
Food
Sex ratio -0.199** 0.090 -0.189** 0.082
Expenditure -0.167*** 0.013 -0.136* 0.073
Clothing (female)
Sex ratio -0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.007
Expenditure -0.001 0.001 0.012*** 0.004
Clothing (male)
Sex ratio -0.020** 0.008 -0.019** 0.008
Expenditure -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
Clothing (children)
Sex ratio -0.032 0.037 -0.030 0.038
Expenditure -0.009*** 0.003 -0.000 0.015
Education
Sex ratio 0.279*** 0.081 0.231*** 0.082
Expenditure 0.257*** 0.013 0.098** 0.049
Health
Sex ratio 0.066 0.084 0.043 0.084
Expenditure 0.006 0.009 -0.070* 0.039
Tobacco and alcohol
Sex ratio -0.001 0.026 0.001 0.025
Expenditure 0.006 0.004 0.011 0.016
Utilities
Sex ratio -0.025 0.049 0.010 0.058
Expenditure -0.075*** 0.006 0.042 0.041
Observations 1268 1268
Unitary rationality test
 2(7) 25.89 20.85
Prob >  2 <0.001 0.004
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors
are clustered at municipality level. Model (1) is estimated by SUR, while model (2) is estimated
by instrumenting total expenditure with total income, square of total income, unemployment
and migration. The dependent variables are defined as budget share, e.g. amount spent on one
category divided by total expenditure. Expenditure is reported in logarithm. The sex ratio
is defined as the ratio of female to male population at husband’s age in the municipality of
residence.
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Table 2.7: Test of Individual and Collective Rationality using share of weddings
attributed to previous divorces
SUR FIML
(1) (2)
Coeﬀ. Std.error Coeﬀ. Std.error
Food
Wedding share (wife) 0.026* 0.015 0.025* 0.015
Wedding share (husband) -0.058*** 0.017 -0.054*** 0.016
Expenditure -0.172*** 0.012 -0.120* 0.066
Clothing (female)
Wedding share (wife) 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
Wedding share (husband) -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Expenditure -0.001 0.001 0.011*** 0.004
Clothing (male)
Wedding share (wife) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Wedding share (husband) -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Expenditure -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
Clothing (children)
Wedding share (wife) -0.016*** 0.005 -0.016*** 0.005
Wedding share (husband) 0.014** 0.006 0.015*** 0.006
Expenditure -0.009*** 0.002 0.002 0.011
Education
Wedding share (wife) -0.004 0.013 -0.001 0.016
Wedding share (husband) 0.025* 0.014 0.026* 0.015
Expenditure 0.259*** 0.014 0.090* 0.047
Health
Wedding share (wife) -0.004 0.009 -0.003 0.009
Wedding share (husband) 0.003 0.010 -0.002 0.010
Expenditure 0.005 0.009 -0.064* 0.038
Tobacco and alcohol
Wedding share (wife) -0.005* 0.003 -0.006* 0.003
Wedding share (husband) 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
Expenditure 0.006 0.005 0.013 0.014
Utilities
Wedding share (wife) 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.008
Wedding share (husband) 0.018*** 0.006 0.026*** 0.007
Expenditure -0.072*** 0.006 0.026 0.027
Observations 1268 1268
Unitary rationality test
 2(16) (Prob >  2) 84.88 (<0.001) 69.58 (<0.001)
Collective rationality test
 2(7) (Prob >  2) 5.85 (0.5568) 4.49 (0.7219)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors
are clustered at municipality level. Model (1) is estimated by SUR, while model (2) is estimated
by instrumenting total expenditure with total income, square of total income, unemployment
and migration. The dependent variables are defined as budget share, e.g. amount spent on one
category divided by total expenditure. Expenditure is reported in logarithm. Wedding shares
for husband and wife are defined as the share of new weddings in which the male (or female)
partner has been previously divorced and is defined for the period 2007-2009.
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Table 2.8: Total Expenditure, Labour supply and Prices
FIML FIML FIML
(1) (2) (3)
Coeﬀ. Std.error Coeﬀ. Std.error Coeﬀ. Std.error
Food
Sex ratio -0.189** 0.082 -0.185** 0.083 -0.205** 0.083
Expenditure -0.136* 0.073 -0.135* 0.075 -0.145** 0.071
Clothing (female)
Sex ratio -0.002 0.007 -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.007
Expenditure 0.012*** 0.004 0.012*** 0.004 0.011*** 0.004
Clothing (male)
Sex ratio -0.019** 0.008 -0.018** 0.008 -0.019** 0.008
Expenditure 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
Clothing (children)
Sex ratio -0.030 0.038 -0.027 0.038 -0.028 0.039
Expenditure -0.000 0.015 -0.001 0.015 -0.002 0.014
Education
Sex ratio 0.231*** 0.082 0.245*** 0.082 0.275*** 0.078
Expenditure 0.098** 0.049 0.098** 0.047 0.113** 0.044
Health
Sex ratio 0.043 0.084 0.023 0.081 0.027 0.084
Expenditure -0.070* 0.039 -0.071* 0.040 -0.070* 0.037
Tobacco and alcohol
Sex ratio 0.001 0.025 -0.003 0.025 0.001 0.025
Expenditure 0.011 0.016 0.010 0.015 0.013 0.015
Utilities
Sex ratio 0.010 0.058 0.012 0.059 0.002 0.059
Expenditure 0.042 0.041 0.045 0.041 0.040 0.039
Observations 1268 1268 1268
Labour supply 3 3
Price of bread 3
Unitary rationality test
 2(7) 20.85 20.50 24.95
Prob >  2 0.004 0.005 <0.001
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors
are clustered at municipality level. Model (1)-(3) are estimated by FIML by instrumenting total
expenditure with total income, square of total income, unemployment and migration. In Model
(2), dummy variables indicating whether the husband and wife have worked for wage in the
last 12 months. Model (3) adds a control for median price of bread at municipality level.
Expenditure is reported in logarithms. The sex ratio is defined as the ratio of female to male
population at husband’s age in the municipality of residence.
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Table 2.11: Descriptive statistics on household total expenditure and expenditure
shares
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Age of head 44.877 5.914 18.765 65.057
Male head 0.856 0.351 0.000 1.000
Household members 4.692 1.161 3.000 11.000
Members 0-6 y.o. 0.145 0.411 0.000 3.000
Members 7-12 y.o. 0.444 0.626 0.000 3.000
Members 13-18 y.o. 1.577 0.659 0.000 4.000
Members 19-29 y.o. 0.478 0.737 0.000 5.000
Members 30-39 y.o. 0.558 0.712 0.000 2.000
Members 40-49 y.o. 1.140 0.754 0.000 3.000
Members 50-59 y.o. 0.284 0.578 0.000 2.000
Members >= 60y.o. 0.068 0.289 0.000 2.000
Macedonian and others 0.456 0.498 0.000 1.000
Albanian 0.305 0.460 0.000 1.000
Turkish 0.110 0.313 0.000 1.000
Roma 0.129 0.335 0.000 1.000
East 0.293 0.455 0.000 1.000
Center 0.336 0.473 0.000 1.000
West 0.371 0.483 0.000 1.000
Living in Skopje 0.134 0.340 0.000 1.000
Region: Vardar 0.111 0.314 0.000 1.000
Region: Eastern 0.120 0.325 0.000 1.000
Region: Southwestern 0.131 0.338 0.000 1.000
Region: Southeastern 0.096 0.295 0.000 1.000
Region: Pelagonia 0.109 0.311 0.000 1.000
Region: Polog 0.131 0.337 0.000 1.000
Region: Northeastern 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000
Region: Skopje 0.225 0.418 0.000 1.000
Worked (husband) 0.153 0.360 0.000 1.000
Worked (wife) 0.040 0.195 0.000 1.000
Asset index -0.000 1.000 -3.816 2.799
Husband’s wage share 0.619 0.237 0.000 1.000
Sex ratio 0.918 0.114 0.480 1.263
Sex ratio (lagged, 2002) 0.917 0.113 0.527 1.272
Total Income 0.512 0.778 -3.656 15.260
Total Income (squared) 8674.407 81557.685 0.000 2328676.0
Asset index -0.000 1.000 -3.816 2.799
Unemployment rate 31.646 12.107 11.500 62.800
Migration change 7.420 59.404 -96.000 500.000
Female share working in agriculture 0.424 0.044 0.222 0.491
Female workers in agriculture 0.340 0.237 0.000 1.295
Note. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Urban and Rural areas are defined at Municipality
level using the Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce definition based on urbanisation and pre-
dominant type of economic activity. "Male" gender corresponds to code 1, while "Female" to
code 0. Children are reported as total number. Skopje is the main urban agglomeration and
capital city of Macedonia.
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Chapter 3
Validation of Subjective
expectations
3.1 Introduction
The availability of credible measures for factors entering the decision process
(i.e. expectations) is fundamental to estimate models of individual behaviour
under weaker assumptions (Manski, 2004). Collecting accurate and credible data
about subjective expectations turns to be important in data collection activities
that require the gathering of this kind of information. While the collection of
data about subjective expectations has been increasingly important in developed
countries, the topic gathered attention only recently in developing countries. This
is mainly due to the fact that questions related to probabilities might not be
fully understood or might require a higher burdensome when the average level
of education of respondents is low. In the other direction, data collected in
developing countries are central since they might partly relate to the presence of
market failures related to information and knowledge.
There is still no consensus in literature about the best practice to collect subject-
ive expectations in developing countries and there is need for improvements and
understanding on how to elicit subjective expectation. However, a growing and
recent research agenda (an introduction about the strategies and the experiences
about collecting expectations in developing countries is provided by Attanasio,
2009 and Delavande et al., 2010) provides important insights on how to design
and implement a strategy to collect information about subjective probabilities.
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In literature, data about expectation have been mainly collected by using non-
probabilistic methods (such as Likert scales) and more recently by using prob-
abilistic methods with or without visual aids. Even if Likert scales have proven
to be partially related to subjective probabilities (Delavande and Kohler, 2009),
non-probabilistic method might be problematic for inter-personal comparisons
since we can’t ascertain which is the quantity reported by the respondent, while
by eliciting subjective probabilities we might be able to recover the moments of
a distribution of interest. However, eliciting subjective probabilities might be
problematic in developing countries, since the concept of probability might not
be understood by respondents with a lower levels of education. For this reason,
asking directly about probabilities (for instance, in the case of a developed coun-
try like Dominitz and Manski (1997), who ask about the probability of being
employed in a future date in the US, and for a developing country like McKenzie
et al. (2007), who ask about income expectations conditional on migration versus
non-migration among Tongan migrants in New Zealand and Tongan residents)
might not return credible results.
This chapter analyses the validity of questions related to subjective expecta-
tions using the data collected among social financial recipients in the Republic
of Macedonia during the 2010 and 2012 data collection waves of the Macedo-
nian “Secondary School Conditional Cash Transfer” evaluation household survey.
Data on subjective expectations have been collected using the method proposed
by Guiso et al. (2002). Under distributional assumptions, this method allows
eliciting the subjective expected earning distribution for each respondent. Given
the low level of schooling of most respondents in the sample, it was important
to select a methodology that would have allowed eliciting a credible measure of
subjective expectations, while avoiding asking directly about probabilities. Fol-
lowing Attanasio et al. (2005), who collected income expectations in Colombia,
and Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009), who elicited income expectations of junior
high school students in Mexico, in the Republic of Macedonia, data about ex-
pectations on education returns from primary school and from secondary school
have been collected using a method that elicit subjective expectations without
directly using probabilistic terminology. Under both assumptions of having com-
pleted either primary or secondary school, it was asked about the minimum and
the maximum of what the child could have earned, and after computing a mid-
point, it was asked to report on a scale from 0 to 100 “how likely” the child would
have earned less (or more) than the mid-point. The questionnaire asks to the
household head (or its spouse in case of absence during the interview) informa-
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tion over the expected salary conditional on completion of primary or secondary
school for at least one adolescent child in the household (in the case that are
present two adolescents of diﬀerent gender the information is collected for both).
This chapter analyses the validity of the data by testing whether respondents
understand the question and use suﬃcient mental eﬀort to report their answers.
Using randomisation in the order of questions, I find that when asked about
the probability to earn less than a certain threshold and more than the same
threshold, respondents tend to reply with suﬃcient mental eﬀort only to the first
question they are asked.
The interesting feature of this data is that it has been collected in a developing
country, where evidence is still growing, and among its poorest quintiles (social
financial assistance recipients), where respondents have a low level of schooling
and have a lower experience in the formal labour market. In order to elicit
subjective probabilities, it was used a visual aid strategy composed by a 0-100
ruler, that was initially presented with an example linking the probability of rain
with the chosen scale (examples of more complex visual aids, such as the use of
stones and coﬀee beans are provided by Luseno John and Winnie, 2003; Lybbert
et al., 2007; Hill, 2006). The decision was linked to the fact that in the sample a
large part of households live in rural areas and that rain is often a problem related
to availability of utilities in urban areas. Section 3.2 describes the data and the
methodology chosen to elicit subjective expectations. Section 3.3 provides a series
of tests to validate the reported expectations.
3.2 Data
The data used in the chapter comes from a diﬀerent number of sources. The
main datasets are the Macedonian Household Surveys collected by the Ministry
of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP), which contains detailed information on
a variety of household information (demographics, expenditures, durable goods,
housing characteristics) and individual level information on household members
(education, health, labour supply). For children enrolled in secondary school, the
Household Survey is supplemented with administrative data about attendance
and performance at school. Additionally, I make use of diﬀerent aggregated data
at municipality level, supplied by Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce, to construct
measures of sex ratios, local labour market characteristics and other marriage
market indicators.
56
3. Validation of Subjective expectations 57
For the scope of CCT program evaluation, two household surveys were collected
during the Winter 2010, at the beginning of the program, and in Fall 2012,
after two years of implementation. The baseline survey was conducted between
November and December 2010, coinciding with the beginning of the first school
year in which CCT program became available. At baseline, households were
interviewed during the first two months of the program, rather than before the
start of the intervention. However, it is reasonable to believe that this timeline
had no eﬀect on baseline results, since the program implementation was very
slow at the beginning and the first payments were processed only in March-April
2010. In contrast, the survey was quick and the last interviews were carried out
by the end of December. In parallel with the household survey, administrative
data on student attendance and performance was collected by visiting secondary
schools and collecting school records. This allowed double-checking the validity
of self-reported information on school enrolment.
At baseline, a sample of eligible households was produced using the Ministry of
Labour and Social Policy’s electronic database of the recipients of all types of
financial assistance, which has been assembled during Summer 2010 along with
the implementation of the program. The population frame has been produced
using the hardcopy archives at Social Welfare Centres (SWCs), which are the
main territorial units for social welfare provision. There are 27 inter-municipal
SWCs and they function as the key public providers of professional services in
social work. The use of the electronic database for sampling allowed identifying
12481 SFA households with at least one child of secondary school age, from which
we drew a random sample1. The follow-up survey was collected during the Fall
of 2012. In order to minimise attrition, we made use of the detailed tracking
information collected at baseline2. This methodology proved to have worked
acceptably well during the follow-up data collection. In terms of SFA recipients,
1205 households were interviewed at baseline and, among those, 126 households
1We aimed for a sample size of 17 households eligible for the CCT (recipients of social and
financial assistance with children of secondary school age) per municipality, although in practice
there was some variation in this number due to the fact that in some municipalities the eligible
population was smaller then 17. For power calculations, we considered a power of 0.8 and
a significance level of 0.05. With 42 clusters per arm and an inter-cluster correlation of
0.25, using 17 households per municipality it would be possible to detect a diﬀerence
in expenditures in children’s education (or in any other item) of 0.33 of a standard
deviation and an increase in the proportion of students attending 85% or more of the
classes of roughly 10% points.
2We collected and updated contact information of at least two relatives or neighbours of the
surveyed households, including addresses and telephone numbers. This allowed us minimising
the risk of not finding the household in case they moved to another address or are not present
at home during the attempt to interview them and to limit attrition to non-response due to
refusal.
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were not found or refused to answer at follow-up, resulting in an attrition rate
of 11.7%. 5.8 presents some robustness checks related to attrition and provides
evidence that attrition at follow-up didn’t changed significantly the composition
of the sample for each treatment modality.
3.2.1 Subjective expectation module
Considering the low level of schooling among most of the respondents, it was fun-
damental to select a methodology that allowed eliciting a credible measure of sub-
jective expectations without mentioning directly the term “probability” (Attana-
sio et al., 2005; Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2009). The questionnaire asked parents
information over the expected income conditional on completion of primary or
secondary school (and conditional on being employed at age 25) for at least one
adolescent child in the household (in the case that two adolescents of diﬀerent
gender are present the information was collected for both). In order to collect
information on subjective expectations, the interviewer picked the youngest male
and female adolescent in the age range 10-17 years old (at baseline) and refer to
them in each question. The specific set of questions asked to the respondent is
the following:
1. Now imagine that your child completed only primary (secondary) school
and he/she finds a job. Try to imagine which possible job could he/she be
employed in and imagine which could be the maximum and the minimum
that he/she could earn, given
(a) In the worst of the cases, how much do you think he/she could earn
per month?
(b) In the best of the cases, how much do you think he/she could earn per
month?
2. Now using the ruler, could you indicate how likely it is that:
(a) he/she is going to earn less than [(2a) + (2b)]/2 Denars?
(b) he/she is going to earn more than [(2a) + (2b)]/2 Denars?
In order to elicit subjective probabilities, a 0-100 ruler was used as visual aid
and was initially presented using an example linking the chances of rain with the
58
3. Validation of Subjective expectations 59
chosen scale3. In order to reconstruct the probability density function, it is neces-
sary to consider distributions that can be identified using available information:
the lower (yL) and the upper (yU) bounds of the distribution and the reported
mass probability between yL and the midpoint (yL + yU)/2. Given the structure
of the collected information and assuming a specific class of distribution func-
tions4, we can construct the distribution of the expected income and calculate
its first moments5 (Guiso et al., 2002). Specifically, assuming that yL and yU are
the reported income in the worst and the best scenario and fY |E(y|Ei) is the as-
sumed continuous density function of the expected income conditional on being
employed, we can compute the expected value and the variance for the future
income:
E[Y |Ei = 1] =
ˆ yU
yL
y fY |E(y|Ei = 1) dy ⌘ y¯E (3.1)
V ar[Y |Ei = 1] =
ˆ yU
yL
(y   y¯E)2 fY |E(y|Ei = 1) dy (3.2)
Table 3.1 reports the response rates for the section about expectations. We can
note that response rates are high and above 90% for all type of questions. Re-
sponse rates are slightly higher for boys and for questions that involve a single
answer. When facing more complex questions, such as the ones to elicit sub-
jective expectations of the income distribution, response rates tend to be lower.
Additionally response rates are slightly higher at follow-up compared to baseline,
but the reasons are not clear (learning from the respondent, selection of the re-
spondents or higher experience from the interviewers).
3The precise text read by the interviewer is the following: We are now going to deal with
events in the future that may happen or not. We have a RULER with a scale from 0 to 10
which we will use to indicate how likely do you think one event might happen. For example: If I
ask you "How likely is it that tomorrow will rain?" and you are fully sure that it will rain, then
you’ll indicate 10. If, on the contrary, you think that it is not going to rain, you will indicate
0. In case you’re not sure whether it is going to rain or not, you will give me a low value in the
scale if you think that the event is not very likely, or a high value if you think it is very likely.
Let’s try now. "How likely is it that tomorrow will rain?"
4Among the distribution functions that are consistent with this setting are the step-wise
uniform distribution, the triangular distribution and the bi-triangular distribution. All the data
related to expectations reported in the chapter are generated assuming a triangular distribution,
since we allow for the extremes to have lower density.
5For simplicity, in the following analysis we won’t condition for education level. However,
all expectations and variances are conditional on completion of either primary or secondary
school.
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Table 3.1: Complete response rates for expectations related to schooling by gender
of the child
Baseline (2010) Follow-up (2012)
Female Male Female Male
Expectations for primary school 0.926 0.937 0.933 0.967
Expectations for secondary school 0.946 0.952 0.940 0.971
Expectations about employment 0.970 0.976 0.996 0.996
Probability to go to university 0.970 0.972 0.993 0.996
Note. An observation is considered complete if the respondent answers all requested inform-
ation to compute expectations. Response rates are restricted to recipients of Social Financial
Assistance and include all respondents (including resampled households at follow-up). Response
rates are divided by gender since some households report expectations for more than one child
when children in the age range for completing the expectations section have diﬀerent gender.
3.3 Testing the validity of subjective expectations
In order to understand whether collected answers are valid, it is important to
answer the following question: does individuals understand probability questions?
Are answers related to observable variables? How accurate are the answers? In
order to answer the first question, during the 2010 and 2012 data collection,
we followed a strategy similar to Attanasio et al. (2005). In each municipality,
households were randomly allocated into two groups: one group faced first the
question about how likely is to earn less (or equal) than the calculated mid-point
(we defined this group “X”) and the other who faces first the question about how
likely is to earn more than the calculated mid-point (group “Y”). We can then
test whether the sum of the sample means for each group sums up to one. Tables
3.2 and 3.3 compare the means of the reported probability in the two groups and
the sum of the means for the first answer and for the second answer reported by
the respondent. As we can note the first answer perform much better than the
second answer. When considering the first answer, for both boys and girls and for
primary and secondary school expectations, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of the sum being diﬀerent than 1 for most of the cases. The test performs much
better for expectations collected at baseline. However, if we consider the second
question answered, we reject the null hypothesis in all cases and the sum is
always significantly lower than 1. To support these results, I present a joint test
checking that for boys and girls, for the two rounds of data collection and for first
and second reported answer, the sum of the means of group “X” and “Y” is equal
to 1. In other words, I run Romano and Wolf (2005) procedure to jointly test
that each of the sum of the means presented in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 is equal
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to one, summing up to 48 hypothesis6. The individual and multiple hypothesis
tests show that while the first reported answer conform to probability theory, the
second answer tends to be significantly lower than one. A possible explanation is
that, during the second question, respondents tend to reduce their mental eﬀort
and, for this reason, the answers tend not to conform to probability theory.
Unlike many applications, the questionnaire ask both questions to each respond-
ent and allows then to test whether individual answers conform to probability
theory by summing up to one. In other words, given the event A “earning an
income between the minimum and the mid-point (included)”, its complement A¯
“earning an income between the mid-point and the maximum” and the event
B “being employed”, it is important to test whether the following condition is
respected:
P (A [ A¯|B) = P (A|B) + P (A¯|B) = P (A|B) + [1  P (A|B)] = 1
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of answers for event A (left panel) and for its
complement A¯ (right panels). In order to test whether answers conform to prob-
ability law, I first computed the sum of reported probabilities (P (A|B)+P (A¯|B))
and then tested whether they diﬀer from one7. Table 3.4 presents the distribu-
tion of the sum of reported probabilities for both primary school and secondary
school expectations. We can observe that the cases in which probabilities sum
up to one are ranging across the two data collection waves from a minimum of 44
percent to a maximum of 59 percent, depending on the precise category for which
expectations are collected (achieved educational level and gender of the child).
There is a strong tendency from respondents to report sums that are smaller than
one, with roughly only 10 percent of observations being larger than 1.
6The test is implemented using Romano and Wolf (2005) procedure with 5000 bootstrap
repetitions. The critical values generated through the procedure are the 90th, 95th and 99th
percentile of the empirical distribution of t˜, where t˜ is the maximum t-statistic in each iteration
testing, for each sum of the means, whether the coeﬃcient estimated through bootstrap is equal
to the coeﬃcient estimated in the main sample. Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 presents whether each
hypothesis is rejected and at which percentile.
7Mahajan et al. (2008) run a similar test by collecting subjective expectations about income
in India using 10 stones for the questions about likelihood to earn less than the mid-point and
other 10 stones to indicate the likelihood to earn more than the mid-point; they find that only
513 out of 1945 individuals answers with probabilities summing up to one, but the mean sum
of probabilities is equal to 1.13 (including all observations) or 1.06 (excluding answers equal to
0 and 1), that is encouraging given the fact that answers were limited to multiples of 0.1.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of expected income after under diﬀerent distributional
assumptions
Note. Panels titled “Primary school” presents probabilities related to the completion of primary
school only, while panels titled “Secondary school” presents probabilities related to the comple-
tion of secondary school.
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In order to understand how strong is the tendency of report sums smaller or
larger than one, I look at the mean sum of probabilities for the observations
that don’t conform to probability law and compare them to the mean for all
observations (Table 3.5). We can observe that the sum ranges from a minimum
of 0.61 (0.56) to a maximum of 0.70 (0.60) for the baseline (follow-up) in the
cases in which the sum is smaller than one. If we consider instead the few cases
in which the sum is larger than one, means ranges from 1.16 (1.17) to 1.21 (1.22)
for the baseline (follow-up). We find that in all cases, even if roughly half of
the respondents provides answers that sum up to one, the mean probability is
always significantly diﬀerent than one, suggesting that it might be reasonable to
use diﬀerent specifications to construct the probability distribution, such as using
rescaling of probabilities or using only the first answer. In Section “First answer
versus rescaling” I discuss how these two methods interact with distributional
assumptions, which are first introduced in the following section.
As showed in Section 3.3, when the respondent is asked about the probability
to earn below (or equal) and above a certain threshold, there is a possibility
that the respondent reduce its mental eﬀort during the second answer, such that
the reported probabilities do not sum up to one. It is therefore important to
understand whether using only the first answer or use both answers would lead
to fundamental diﬀerences to the subjective income distribution.
In order to test for diﬀerences, I use compare the eﬀect of choosing rescaling
versus using the first answer only by looking at the distribution of expected
income and its variance. Assuming that each respondent answers both questions
about earning below (pA) and above (pB) the mid-point, the first strategy is to
consider only the first question answered by the respondent (p¯ = pA) and then
compute the complement (1   p¯) as 1   pA. The second strategy is to use both
answers and rescale them in case the sum pA + pB is diﬀerent than one. In this
case, p¯ is simply determined by pA/(pA+pB).
Table 3.6 reports expected income for boys and girls at baseline and follow-up
computed under diﬀerent distributional assumption and using either a rescaled
probability or a first answer probability. If we look at the mean diﬀerence between
these two methods, we can note that diﬀerences are never significantly diﬀerent
than zero at baseline and rarely significant at follow-up. This provides evidence
that using diﬀerent methods do not lead to significant diﬀerences in computed
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of expected income comparing first answer and rescaling
Note. Expected income is computed using log-income. “Rescaled” expectations are computed by
rescaling the sum of reported probabilities to be equal to one, while “first answer” expectations
are computed using the first reported answer only. Expectations are restricted to recipients
of Social Financial Assistance and include all respondents (including resampled households
at follow-up). The two top panels show the expected income after completion of primary
school only at baseline and at follow-up, while the lower panels show the expected income after
completion of secondary school at baseline and follow-up.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of variance of income comparing first answer and rescal-
ing
Note. Variance of income is computed using log-income. “Rescaled” expectations are com-
puted by rescaling the sum of reported probabilities to be equal to one, while “first answer”
expectations are computed using the first reported answer only. Expectations are restricted
to recipients of Social Financial Assistance and include all respondents (including resampled
households at follow-up). The two top panels show the variance of income after completion of
primary school only at baseline and at follow-up, while the lower panels show the variance of
income after completion of secondary school at baseline and follow-up.
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expected incomes, even when considering diﬀerent distributional assumptions.
Additionally, we can compare the distributions of expected income and its vari-
ance for each diﬀerent method. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show that there are no
significant diﬀerences even when we consider the whole sample distribution.
3.4 Testing distributional assumptions
Given the structure of the collected information, assuming a specific class of
distribution functions allows constructing the distribution of the expected salary
and calculating its first moments. Specifically, assuming that a is the reported
salary in the worst case, b is the reported salary in the best case and fY (y) is the
assumed continuous density function of the expected salary for one respondent,
we can calculate the expected value and the variance using standard statistical
formulas:
E[Y ] =
ˆ b
a
y fY (y) dy = µ (3.3)
V ar[Y ] =
ˆ b
a
(y   µ)2 fY (y) dy (3.4)
In order to reconstruct the probability density function, it is necessary to consider
distribution that can be identified using the a, b and the reported mass probability
between a and the midpoint (a+ b)/2. Distribution functions that are consistent
with this setting are the step-wise uniform distribution, the triangular distribution
and the bi-triangular distribution. Figure 3.4 reports the sample distribution of
the expected income conditional on completing primary and secondary school at
baseline and follow-up using diﬀerent distributional assumptions. We can observe
that there is no strong diﬀerence between distributional assumptions for what
concerns the distribution of the expected income, both conditional on completing
primary and secondary school.
If we focus on the second moment of the distributions, we can note that diﬀer-
ences become more significant. Figure 3.4 reports the sample distribution of the
variance of income conditional on completing primary and secondary school at
baseline and follow-up using diﬀerent distributional assumptions (for clarity of
the graph, I present only the distribution using only the step-wise uniform and
the triangular distribution). An important characteristic to be researched among
distribution functions that can be assumed for the purpose of constructing the
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of expected income after under diﬀerent distributional
assumptions
Note. Expected income is computed using log-income and using diﬀerent distributional assump-
tions (step-wise, bi-triangular and triangular). The two top panels show the expected income
after completion of primary school only at baseline and at follow-up, while the lower panels
show the expected income after completion of secondary school at baseline and follow-up.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of variance of income under diﬀerent distributional as-
sumptions
Note. Variance of income is computed using log-income and using diﬀerent distributional as-
sumptions (step-wise and triangular). The two top panels show the variance of income after
completion of primary school only at baseline and at follow-up, while the lower panels show the
variance of income after completion of secondary school at baseline and follow-up.
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distribution of subjective income expectations is that the density is decreasing
while moving towards the extremes. This is the case that led the triangular
distribution to be used in all the application of the chapter. For this reason, we
clearly expect the distribution of variances to diﬀer between the two distributional
assumptions.
3.5 Perceived returns and individual characterist-
ics
In order to verify the validity of reported expectations, it is important to control
the relationship between the answers about minimum and maximum reported in-
come with observable characteristics of the household and the respondent. Table
3.7 and Table 3.8 present linear regressions of the minimum and maximum (log)
income reported by the respondent upon primary and secondary school comple-
tion and its diﬀerence (defined here as delta) on a series of individual and house-
hold characteristics. Expected income for male children are significantly higher
in both rounds of data collection and for both primary and secondary school out-
comes, but there is no significant diﬀerence across female and male children when
considering the diﬀerence. At the same time, education of the household head
has a role in explaining reported income, but with a diﬀerent pattern at baseline
and follow-up. While at baseline higher education lead to a lower expected in-
come after primary school, at follow-up lower education is correlated with lower
incomes while higher education of the household head is correlated with higher
incomes. To provide evidence that reported expectations are linked to monetary
returns in the labour market, I control for unemployment rate at regional level,
by dividing municipalities into (relatively) low and high unemployment. We can
note that larger unemployment in the year before the interview aﬀect negatively
reported incomes for both educational levels, providing evidence that in areas
with high unemployment respondents expect lower incomes.
Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 presents instead linear regressions of the expected (log)
income and variance reported by the respondent upon primary and secondary
school completion computed using triangular distribution and using the first re-
ported probability. Expected income for male children is significantly higher in
both rounds of data collection, but no significant diﬀerence is found for the vari-
ance of expected income. Similarly, education of the household head has a role
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in explaining reported income, but only marginally its variance. The variance of
expected income is correlated with ethnicity of the respondent and on whether
the area of residence in a rural area. For the baseline data, respondents of Al-
banian, Roma and Turk ethnic groups tend to report a lower variance, while at
follow-up the diﬀerence is weaker. At the same time, respondents who are res-
ident in rural areas tend to report a lower variance. Similarly for the minimum
and maximum expected income, we can note that, at baseline, larger unemploy-
ment in the year before the interview aﬀect negatively reported incomes for both
educational level, providing evidence that in areas with high unemployment re-
spondents expect lower incomes. However, unemployment rates don’t look to
significantly aﬀect the variance of the expected income. In conclusion, we can
note that having spent a larger amount of time as recipient of Social Financial
Assistance is correlated with lower expected incomes, but again no significant
correlation with its variance.
3.6 Conclusion
A growing branch of literature is focusing on the use of subjective expectations in
choice models. This requires advancements and a better understanding on how
to elicit subjective expectations, especially when focusing on developing countries
and when respondents have low levels of education. This is mainly due to the
fact that questions related to probabilities might not be fully understood or might
require a higher burdensome when the average level of education of respondents
is low. At the same time, subjective expectations in developing countries might
be central in individual and household choices since they might partly relate to
the presence of market failures related to information and knowledge.
There is still no consensus in literature about the best practice to collect subject-
ive expectations in developing countries and there is need for improvements and
understanding on how to elicit subjective expectation. For this chapter, data on
subjective expectations have been collected using the method proposed by Guiso
et al. (2002) which, under distributional assumptions, allows eliciting the sub-
jective expected earning distribution for each respondent. This chapter analysed
the validity of answers using the data collected among social financial recipients
in the Republic of Macedonia during the 2010 and 2012 data collection waves of
the Macedonian “Secondary School Conditional Cash Transfer” evaluation house-
hold survey. By using the randomisation in the order of questions and testing
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whether respondents understand the question and use suﬃcient mental eﬀort to
report their answers, this chapter showed that when asked about the probability
to earn less than a certain threshold and more than the same threshold, respond-
ents tend to reply with suﬃcient mental eﬀort only to the first question they
are asked. This suggests it would be sensible to use only the first information
reported by the respondent, specifically because complementary answers related
to probabilities tend to fail in their second component. At the same time, the
chapter provided evidence on the robustness of the method in relation to diﬀerent
distributional assumptions.
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Table 3.2: Testing for mean probability among groups to sum up to 1: first answer
Baseline (2010) Follow-up (2012)
Obs Mean
X
Mean
Y
Sum Obs Mean
X
Mean
Y
Sum
Expectations after primary school
Girls
All observations 676 .504 .518 1.021 861 .456 .478 .935**
(.024) (.032)†
Exclude 0 and 1 648 .506 .529 1.035 809 .455 .473 .928**
(.023) (.030)††
Exclude .5, 0 and 1 436 .507 .527 1.033 497 .437 .455 .893**
(.032) (.042)††
Boys
All observations 718 .513 .538 1.051** 962 .487 .488 .976
(.023)† (.029)
Exclude 0 and 1 704 .511 .540 1.052** 915 .483 .483 .965
(.023)† (.028)
Exclude .5, 0 and 1 493 .514 .537 1.052 543 .462 .451 .913**
(.032) (.041)†
Expectations after secondary school
Girls
All observations 674 .506 .530 1.036 863 .465 .477 .942**
(.024) (.027)††
Exclude 0 and 1 646 .509 .534 1.044* 810 .470 .474 .945**
(.023) (.025)††
Exclude .5, 0 and 1 434 .515 .548 1.063* 498 .451 .459 .910**
(.033) (.039)††
Boys
All observations 715 .502 .538 1.040* 962 .485 .488 .973
(.023) (.024)
Exclude 0 and 1 701 .502 .535 1.038 915 .479 .489 .968
(.023) (.023)
Exclude .5, 0 and 1 489 .504 .550 1.053 543 .465 .482 .947
(.033) (.038)
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis. Expectations are restricted to recipients of Social Fin-
ancial Assistance and include all respondents (including resampled households at follow-up).
Expectations are divided by gender since some households report expectations for more than
one child when children in the age range for completing the expectations section have diﬀerent
gender. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level and * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 represent
the statistical significance of a test of equality to one of the sum of probabilities. † 0.10 †† 0.05
††† 0.01 represent at which significance level the hypothesis of equality to one is rejected when
each hypothesis presented in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 are jointly tested. The test is implemented
using Romano and Wolf (2005) procedure with 5000 bootstrap repetitions. The critical values
generated through the procedure are the 90th, 95th and 99th percentile of the empirical distri-
bution of t˜, where t˜ is the maximum t-statistic in each iteration testing, for each sum of the
means, whether the coeﬃcient estimated through bootstrap is equal to the coeﬃcient estimated
in the main sample.
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Table 3.3: Testing for mean probability among groups to sum up to 1: second
answer
Baseline (2010) Follow-up (2012)
Obs Mean
X
Mean
Y
Sum Obs Mean
X
Mean
Y
Sum
Expectations after primary school
Girls
All observations 676 .354 .309 .663*** 861 .372 .346 .718***
(.024)††† (.020)†††
Exclude 0 and 1 644 .359 .323 .682*** 813 .385 .350 .735***
(.024)††† (.020)†††
Exclude .5, 0 and 1 463 .333 .299 .633*** 494 .360 .315 .675***
(.027)††† (.024)†††
Boys
All observations 718 .349 .331 .680*** 962 .365 .349 .714***
(.025)††† (.021)†††
Exclude 0 and 1 696 .352 .338 .689*** 921 .371 .355 .726***
(.025)††† (.021)†††
Exclude .5, 0 and 1 509 .331 .315 .647*** 565 .341 .328 .669***
(.028)††† (.028)†††
Expectations after secondary school
Girls
All observations 674 .391 .347 .738*** 863 .399 .378 .777***
(.023)††† (.019)†††
Exclude 0 and 1 642 .399 .366 .765*** 815 .419 .389 .808***
(.021)††† (.020)†††
Exclude .5, 0 and 1 461 .356 .319 .674*** 496 .363 .323 .686***
(.025)††† (.025)†††
Boys
All observations 715 .407 .369 .776*** 962 .407 .383 .790***
(.023)††† (.021)†††
Exclude 0 and 1 693 .413 .379 .792*** 920 .417 .396 .813***
(.022)††† (.020)†††
Exclude .5, 0 and 1 505 .378 .339 .716*** 564 .366 .328 .694***
(.026)††† (.024)†††
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis. Expectations are restricted to recipients of Social Fin-
ancial Assistance and include all respondents (including resampled households at follow-up).
Expectations are divided by gender since some households report expectations for more than
one child when children in the age range for completing the expectations section have diﬀerent
gender. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level and * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 represent
the statistical significance of a test of equality to one of the sum of probabilities. † 0.10 †† 0.05
††† 0.01 represent at which significance level the hypothesis of equality to one is rejected when
each hypothesis presented in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 are jointly tested. The test is implemented
using Romano and Wolf (2005) procedure with 5000 bootstrap repetitions. The critical values
generated through the procedure are the 90th, 95th and 99th percentile of the empirical distri-
bution of t˜, where t˜ is the maximum t-statistic in each iteration testing, for each sum of the
means, whether the coeﬃcient estimated through bootstrap is equal to the coeﬃcient estimated
in the main sample.
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Table 3.4: Distribution and shares for the sum of reported probabilities
Baseline (2010) Follow-up (2012)
Female Male Female Male
Expectations after primary school
Sum smaller than 1 314 302 366 376
(0.464) (0.421) (0.423) (0.389)
Sum equal to to 1 297 349 444 512
(0.439) (0.486) (0.513) (0.530)
Sum larger than 1 65 67 55 78
(0.096) (0.093) (0.064) (0.081)
Expectations after secondary school
Sum smaller than 1 255 268 312 321
(0.378) (0.375) (0.360) (0.332)
Sum equal to to 1 331 355 488 569
(0.491) (0.497) (0.563) (0.589)
Sum larger than 1 88 92 67 76
(0.131) (0.129) (0.077) (0.079)
Note. In parenthesis, I report the share of total observation in the category. Expectations are
restricted to recipients of Social Financial Assistance and include all respondents (including
resampled households at follow-up). Expectations are divided by gender since some households
report expectations for more than one child when children in the age range for completing the
expectations section have diﬀerent gender.
Table 3.5: Average sum of reported probabilities
Baseline (2010) Follow-up (2012)
Female Male Female Male
Expectations after primary school
Sum smaller than 1 0.618 0.641 0.560 0.566
(0.274) (0.254) (0.268) (0.260)
Sum larger than 1 1.208 1.175 1.200 1.172
(0.152) (0.100) (0.139) (0.120)
All observations 0.843 0.865 0.826 0.845
(0.291) (0.259) (0.293) (0.281)
Expectations after secondary school
Sum smaller than 1 0.644 0.697 0.565 0.593
(0.248) (0.222) (0.272) (0.259)
Sum larger than 1 1.168 1.170 1.209 1.216
(0.128) (0.099) (0.140) (0.152)
All observations 0.887 0.908 0.860 0.882
(0.254) (0.222) (0.283) (0.262)
Note. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Expectations are restricted to recipients of Social
Financial Assistance and include all respondents (including resampled households at follow-up).
Expectations are divided by gender since some households report expectations for more than
one child when children in the age range for completing the expectations section have diﬀerent
gender.
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Table 3.6: Comparison of expected income with first answer versus rescaling
under diﬀerent distributional assumptions
Step-wise uniform Bi-triangular Triangular
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Baseline (2010)
Expectations after primary school
Rescaled 8.482 8.541 8.480 8.541 8.502 8.563
[0.448] [0.464] [0.444] [0.459] [0.444] [0.456]
First answer 8.478 8.541 8.477 8.541 8.498 8.561
[0.450] [0.467] [0.446] [0.461] [0.446] [0.459]
Diﬀerence 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Expectations after secondary school
Rescaled 8.993 9.072 8.991 9.071 9.007 9.085
[0.349] [0.356] [0.346] [0.352] [0.346] [0.352]
First answer 8.992 9.070 8.990 9.070 9.006 9.084
[0.348] [0.355] [0.346] [0.351] [0.347] [0.352]
Diﬀerence 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Follow-up (2012)
Expectations after primary school
Rescaled 8.681 8.762 8.681 8.761 8.698 8.778
[0.336] [0.358] [0.332] [0.356] [0.329] [0.352]
First answer 8.680 8.762 8.679 8.761 8.699 8.780
[0.338] [0.358] [0.333] [0.355] [0.328] [0.350]
Diﬀerence 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.002* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Expectations after secondary school
Rescaled 9.122 9.191 9.121 9.190 9.135 9.204
[0.301] [0.312] [0.298] [0.307] [0.297] [0.309]
First answer 9.118 9.189 9.118 9.188 9.133 9.202
[0.304] [0.317] [0.300] [0.311] [0.297] [0.311]
Diﬀerence 0.003* 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Note. Standard deviations in brackets, standard errors in parenthesis. “Rescaled” expectations
are computed by rescaling the sum of reported probabilities to be equal to one, while “first
answer” expectations are computed using the first reported answer only. The diﬀerence is
computed for each observation as the diﬀerence between the “rescaled” and the “first answer”
values. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level and * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 represent
the statistical significance of a t-test for equality to zero of the diﬀerence. Expectations are
restricted to recipients of Social Financial Assistance and include all respondents (including
resampled households at follow-up). Expectations are divided by gender since some households
report expectations for more than one child when children in the age range for completing the
expectations section have diﬀerent gender.
75
3. Validation of Subjective expectations 76
Table 3.7: Maximum and minimum income and individual characteristic
(Baseline 2010)
Primary school Secondary school
Min Max Delta Min Max Delta
Male child 0.054** 0.068*** 0.002 0.093*** 0.090*** -0.001
(0.024) (0.025) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013)
Child age (years) 0.006 -0.000 -0.005 0.015*** 0.005 -0.009***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Male (head) 0.019 0.035 0.010 0.047 -0.038 -0.062
(0.069) (0.080) (0.044) (0.050) (0.059) (0.040)
Age head (less than 40 y.o.) -0.013 0.007 0.019 0.040 0.005 -0.032
(0.045) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.025) (0.025)
Lower primary (head) -0.024 -0.035 -0.004 -0.028 -0.079** -0.037
(0.053) (0.042) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.025)
Secondary school (head) -0.103** -0.079** 0.021 -0.048 -0.052* -0.001
(0.043) (0.040) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.020)
Albanian 0.111 -0.006 -0.112*** 0.009 -0.087 -0.096***
(0.079) (0.066) (0.039) (0.055) (0.059) (0.030)
Roma 0.046 -0.021 -0.086* 0.001 -0.092* -0.087**
(0.063) (0.054) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.037)
Turk 0.011 -0.024 -0.087* 0.064 0.048 -0.035
(0.074) (0.056) (0.045) (0.054) (0.049) (0.038)
Household members -0.002 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.018 0.016*
(0.023) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009)
Boys 13-18 y.o. 0.039 -0.005 -0.052** -0.005 -0.025 -0.026
(0.032) (0.029) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016)
Girls 13-18 y.o. 0.026 0.011 -0.041** 0.009 -0.002 -0.019
(0.034) (0.031) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) (0.015)
Father is present -0.131 -0.091 0.075 -0.134* -0.011 0.111**
(0.085) (0.083) (0.050) (0.072) (0.068) (0.050)
Mother is present 0.006 0.029 0.046 0.062 0.099 0.045
(0.093) (0.061) (0.057) (0.065) (0.061) (0.044)
Rural 0.070 -0.035 -0.112*** 0.040 -0.052 -0.091***
(0.054) (0.045) (0.032) (0.049) (0.047) (0.030)
Part of City of Skopje 0.043 -0.100 -0.135 0.018 -0.082 -0.074
(0.155) (0.143) (0.108) (0.098) (0.103) (0.081)
Wealth (low) -0.113** -0.077** 0.025 -0.047 -0.037 0.012
(0.048) (0.034) (0.038) (0.033) (0.031) (0.025)
Wealth (high) 0.044 -0.027 -0.068* 0.055* 0.006 -0.053**
(0.054) (0.046) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.026)
Time in Fin.Ass. (1-6 years) -0.017 0.032 0.048 -0.064* -0.039 0.022
(0.053) (0.047) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.023)
Time in Fin.Ass. (> 6 years) -0.084 -0.038 0.035 -0.065* -0.059* 0.001
(0.054) (0.048) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.025)
Unemployment (<=0.30) 0.220** 0.237*** 0.029 0.188** 0.265*** 0.089*
(0.109) (0.082) (0.058) (0.072) (0.068) (0.047)
Constant 8.239*** 8.790*** 0.554*** 8.630*** 9.160*** 0.515***
(0.199) (0.153) (0.130) (0.124) (0.127) (0.105)
Observations 1328 1354 1328 1364 1367 1364
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis (* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01). Expectations are restricted
to recipients of Social Financial Assistance and include all respondents (including resampled
households at follow-up). Minimum and maximum income are reported in logarithms. Un-
employment is computed at regional level for the year before the interview and ranges from
14.4 percent to 64.8 percent in 2009 and from 9.3 percent to 42.8 percent in 2011. Months
in Financial Assistance are reported by the respondent. Omitted categories include: Female
child, Macedonian and other ethnicities, Female head, Time in Financial Assistance (less than
1 year), Unemployment (larger than 30 percent). All specifications include regional dummies.
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Table 3.8: Maximum and minimum income and individual characteristic (Follow-
up 2012)
Primary school Secondary school
Min Max Delta Min Max Delta
Male child 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.000 0.078*** 0.077*** -0.002
(0.020) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010)
Child age (years) 0.006 0.005* 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Male (head) 0.043 0.034 -0.011 0.069* 0.010 -0.057*
(0.050) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.027) (0.034)
Age head (less than 40 y.o.) -0.066 0.045 0.102** 0.056* 0.059* 0.003
(0.055) (0.034) (0.043) (0.033) (0.031) (0.026)
Lower primary (head) -0.161*** -0.066** 0.097*** -0.070** -0.073** -0.005
(0.045) (0.031) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031) (0.023)
Secondary school (head) 0.035 0.048* 0.006 0.060** 0.061** -0.000
(0.032) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.029)
Albanian 0.047 0.031 -0.034 -0.005 -0.003 0.006
(0.051) (0.041) (0.042) (0.036) (0.037) (0.044)
Roma 0.065 0.003 -0.070* 0.004 -0.031 -0.035
(0.058) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.027)
Turk 0.064 -0.028 -0.091** 0.022 -0.038 -0.056*
(0.061) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.034) (0.031)
Household members 0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007)
Boys 13-18 y.o. 0.013 -0.005 -0.015 -0.003 -0.018 -0.014
(0.024) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014)
Girls 13-18 y.o. -0.011 -0.002 0.009 -0.025 -0.007 0.019
(0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013)
Father is present -0.161** -0.046 0.125*** -0.064 -0.019 0.042
(0.061) (0.051) (0.047) (0.050) (0.039) (0.046)
Mother is present -0.030 -0.036 -0.003 -0.075 -0.036 0.039
(0.072) (0.059) (0.063) (0.076) (0.070) (0.035)
Rural -0.028 -0.056 -0.031 -0.071 -0.088* -0.018
(0.055) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.038)
Part of City of Skopje 0.063 -0.022 -0.058 -0.044 -0.033 -0.000
(0.112) (0.107) (0.080) (0.067) (0.061) (0.060)
Wealth (low) 0.025 -0.030 -0.042* 0.020 0.016 -0.002
(0.038) (0.031) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.022)
Wealth (high) 0.073** 0.043 -0.031 0.017 0.037 0.021
(0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Time in Fin.Ass. (1-6 years) -0.045 0.017 0.060** -0.015 -0.012 0.002
(0.038) (0.032) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.023)
Time in Fin.Ass. (> 6 years) -0.096*** -0.072** 0.029 -0.075*** -0.090*** -0.016
(0.035) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Unemployment (<=0.30) -0.026 0.115* 0.039 0.160*** -0.032 -0.123***
(0.120) (0.060) (0.093) (0.053) (0.069) (0.046)
Constant 8.431*** 8.799*** 0.364*** 8.923*** 9.299*** 0.380***
(0.141) (0.097) (0.111) (0.123) (0.104) (0.088)
Observations 1415 1434 1415 1437 1442 1437
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis (* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01). Expectations are restricted
to recipients of Social Financial Assistance and include all respondents (including resampled
households at follow-up). Minimum and maximum income are reported in logarithms. Un-
employment is computed at regional level for the year before the interview and ranges from
14.4 percent to 64.8 percent in 2009 and from 9.3 percent to 42.8 percent in 2011. Months
in Financial Assistance are reported by the respondent. Omitted categories include: Female
child, Macedonian and other ethnicities, Female head, Time in Financial Assistance (less than
1 year), Unemployment (larger than 30 percent). All specifications include regional dummies.
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Table 3.9: Expected income moments and individual characteristic (Baseline
2010)
Primary school Secondary school
Mean Variance Mean Variance
Male child 0.055** -0.000 0.092*** 0.001
(0.023) (0.003) (0.018) (0.001)
Child age (years) 0.004 -0.001 0.009** -0.001**
(0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000)
Male (head) 0.040 0.002 0.016 -0.004
(0.061) (0.007) (0.043) (0.004)
Age head (less than 40 y.o.) -0.002 0.000 0.024 -0.003
(0.034) (0.005) (0.027) (0.003)
Lower primary (head) -0.016 -0.002 -0.050 -0.004*
(0.048) (0.005) (0.033) (0.002)
Secondary school (head) -0.100** 0.001 -0.049* -0.000
(0.039) (0.004) (0.028) (0.002)
Albanian 0.043 -0.015*** -0.039 -0.009***
(0.065) (0.005) (0.054) (0.003)
Roma -0.004 -0.012* -0.043 -0.009**
(0.054) (0.007) (0.045) (0.004)
Turk -0.029 -0.012** 0.048 -0.004
(0.066) (0.006) (0.050) (0.004)
Household members 0.004 0.001 0.011 0.001
(0.017) (0.002) (0.013) (0.001)
Boys 13-18 y.o. 0.010 -0.007** -0.024 -0.002
(0.027) (0.003) (0.019) (0.002)
Girls 13-18 y.o. 0.005 -0.006* -0.004 -0.001
(0.031) (0.003) (0.022) (0.002)
Father is present -0.105 0.007 -0.074 0.008
(0.073) (0.007) (0.063) (0.006)
Mother is present 0.036 0.009 0.106* 0.006
(0.071) (0.007) (0.058) (0.004)
Rural 0.006 -0.013*** -0.020 -0.008***
(0.047) (0.004) (0.046) (0.003)
Part of City of Skopje -0.035 -0.013 -0.023 -0.004
(0.127) (0.019) (0.086) (0.010)
Wealth (low) -0.151*** 0.005 -0.053* 0.002
(0.035) (0.005) (0.028) (0.002)
Wealth (high) -0.038 -0.009* -0.002 -0.003
(0.040) (0.005) (0.029) (0.003)
Time in Fin.Ass. (1-6 years) 0.019 0.005 -0.049 0.002
(0.046) (0.005) (0.035) (0.002)
Time in Fin.Ass. (> 6 years) -0.055 0.005 -0.065* 0.001
(0.047) (0.004) (0.034) (0.003)
Unemployment <=30 (0.096) (0.007) (0.068) (0.004)
Constant 8.547*** 0.033** 8.911*** 0.027**
(0.168) (0.015) (0.117) (0.010)
Observations 1328 1328 1364 1364
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis (* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01). Expectations are restricted
to recipients of Social Financial Assistance and include all respondents (including resampled
households at follow-up). Mean and variance of expected (log-)income are computed assuming
a triangular distribution and using the first reported probability. Unemployment is computed
at regional level for the year before the interview and ranges from 14.4 percent to 64.8 percent in
2009 and from 9.3 percent to 42.8 percent in 2011. Months in Financial Assistance are reported
by the respondent. Omitted categories include: Female child, Macedonian and other ethnicities,
Female head, Time in Financial Assistance (less than 1 year), Unemployment (larger than 30
percent). All specifications include regional dummies.
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Table 3.10: Expected income moments and individual characteristic (Baseline
2012)
Primary school Secondary school
Mean Variance Mean Variance
Male child 0.079*** -0.000 0.078*** -0.000
(0.017) (0.002) (0.015) (0.001)
Child age (years) 0.006* -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Male (head) 0.019 0.001 0.019 -0.003
(0.040) (0.004) (0.031) (0.003)
Age head (less than 40 y.o.) -0.000 0.010* 0.053* -0.000
(0.038) (0.005) (0.030) (0.002)
Lower primary (head) -0.115*** 0.010** -0.074** 0.001
(0.035) (0.004) (0.030) (0.002)
Secondary school (head) 0.049* -0.001 0.064*** 0.001
(0.026) (0.002) (0.021) (0.003)
Albanian 0.030 -0.005 -0.003 0.000
(0.037) (0.004) (0.030) (0.004)
Roma 0.030 -0.008 -0.013 -0.005*
(0.044) (0.005) (0.037) (0.003)
Turk 0.014 -0.010** -0.014 -0.004
(0.045) (0.004) (0.033) (0.003)
Household members 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.012) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
Boys 13-18 y.o. 0.002 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001
(0.020) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001)
Girls 13-18 y.o. -0.010 0.001 -0.014 0.001
(0.019) (0.002) (0.016) (0.001)
Father is present -0.065 0.010** -0.022 0.004
(0.049) (0.004) (0.037) (0.004)
Mother is present -0.018 -0.003 -0.050 0.005*
(0.055) (0.007) (0.070) (0.003)
Rural -0.039 -0.002 -0.079** -0.002
(0.042) (0.004) (0.039) (0.003)
Part of City of Skopje 0.030 -0.005 -0.053 -0.002
(0.085) (0.008) (0.060) (0.005)
Wealth (low) 0.033 -0.004 0.038 0.000
(0.029) (0.003) (0.024) (0.002)
Wealth (high) 0.047* -0.001 0.020 0.002
(0.027) (0.002) (0.027) (0.003)
Time in Fin.Ass. (1-6 years) 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.032) (0.003) (0.028) (0.002)
Time in Fin.Ass. (> 6 years) -0.078*** 0.001 -0.080*** -0.001
(0.028) (0.003) (0.023) (0.002)
Unemployment <=30 (0.075) (0.004) (0.052) (0.003)
Constant 8.597*** 0.016 9.128*** 0.007
(0.102) (0.013) (0.106) (0.007)
Observations 1415 1415 1437 1437
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis (* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01). Expectations are restricted
to recipients of Social Financial Assistance and include all respondents (including resampled
households at follow-up). Mean and variance of expected (log-)income are computed assuming
a triangular distribution and using the first reported probability. Unemployment is computed
at regional level for the year before the interview and ranges from 14.4 percent to 64.8 percent in
2009 and from 9.3 percent to 42.8 percent in 2011. Months in Financial Assistance are reported
by the respondent. Omitted categories include: Female child, Macedonian and other ethnicities,
Female head, Time in Financial Assistance (less than 1 year), Unemployment (larger than 30
percent). All specifications include regional dummies.
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Chapter 4
Parental perceived returns to
schooling and human capital
investment
4.1 Introduction
While taking decisions about human capital investment, it is reasonable to believe
that students and/or their parents face situations of limited or imperfect inform-
ation about their future income possibilities and, as Manski (2004) noted, it is
realistic to believe that individuals make schooling decisions based on subjective
expectations rather than actual schooling returns, which have been extensively
used and estimated in literature mainly using earning data. In absence of data on
expectations, non-verifiable assumptions on expectations are needed, while there
is little reason to believe that individuals with similar information form their
expectations in the same way.
This chapter makes use of an unique dataset on subjective expectations about
returns to secondary school education collected in Macedonia along with the CCT
program evaluation and contributes to the growing literature linking educational
choices with information about perceived returns to schooling in developing coun-
tries, where the issue of perceived returns is particularly important for developing
countries, in which measured returns are high, but schooling tend to remain low
(Jensen 2010, Attanasio and Kaufmann 2009). If learning about future income is
happening locally by observing neighbours or friends, there is a larger chance of
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segregation in expectations; for instance, in rural areas, individuals might learn
only about returns in agricultural-specific activities, rather than learning about
returns in urban areas, where jobs related to higher levels of schooling are most
probably be found. I provide evidence that ex-ante parental expectations are
important in explaining schooling decisions for children.
While literature provides evidence on heterogeneity of expected returns to school-
ing, the use of subjective expectations in choice models has been limited in lit-
erature since data of this type has become only recently and because there is
widespread belief that subjective data are flawed by cognitive biases. One type
of such bias attributed to subjective expectation data is the cognitive disson-
ance, i.e. the tendency of respondent to report expectations that conform to
their decisions rather than the real expectation (Festinger, 1962). Evidence on
this type of cognitive bias is still scarce in economics literature. Mullainathan
and Washington (2009) find evidence of cognitive dissonance in political support
of candidates by comparing opinions on voting-age eligibles versus non-eligible
after the presidential elections and providing evidence that eligibles tend to have
higher polarisation than non-eligibles. In relation to subjective expectations re-
lated to schooling, Zafar (2011) provides instead evidence against cognitive biases
in expectation reporting by comparing expectations on a diﬀerent set of outcomes
related to undergraduate major choice before and after the decision is taken. This
chapter contributes to this branch of literature by providing evidence against cog-
nitive dissonance by making use of the longitudinal dimension of the dataset and
by analysing the updating process of expectations. In this chapter, cognitive dis-
sonance would aﬀect the updating of expectations such that expectations linked
to choices made during the two data collection point would be systematically re-
vised upward and the expectations for the educational option not taken would be
systematically revised down. I provide evidence that respondents do not revise
their expectations in such a way, but that the updating of expectations follows a
similar pattern across individuals with diﬀerent educational choices. This makes
the results of the chapter robust to cognitive biases.
Section 4.2 presents a theoretical framework to describe how parental expectations
aﬀect investment in children’s human capital. Section 4.3 describes the empirical
strategy and Section 4.4 presents the data used in the chapter. Section 4.5 shows
the main results and presents the robustness checks.
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4.2 Enrolment model with subjective expectations
Following a Beckerian approach to schooling decision, we model secondary school
enrolment as a choice based on the discounted streams of future income depend-
ing on the achieved level of schooling and on schooling cost1. Given the static
nature of the data, we will model the decision process as a two-period model: in
the first period each parent decide whether to have his child enrolled in secondary
school facing a schooling cost or having his child out of school working with only
primary school completed. In the second period, the child will earn an income
depending on whether he enrolled in secondary school in the first period. The
cost is characterised by a component that depends on individual and household
characteristics, ci, and by a random component, ✏i, which is assumed to be fol-
lowing a log-normal distribution lnN (0,  ✏) such that ci✏i > 0. Additionally, the
model assumes that costs ci✏i scale the utility deriving from the income achieved
with the completion of secondary school.
Given that the decision is made before period 1 and there is uncertainty on
the future streams of income, each parent will decide depending on subjective
expectations over future income conditional on educational choices. We assume
that each parent has paternalistic altruism, caring about the income of the child,
and that the parental utility function has a CRRA functional form in income:
U(yj) =
y1  j
1    (4.1)
where yj is the income earned by the child and j = p (j = s) indicates that the
highest level of schooling completed is primary (secondary) school. The decision
problem of parent i is then defined by the following maximisation problem
max
 i2[0,1]
 i[ i
U(ys)
ci✏i
] + (1   i) (1 +  i)U(yp) (4.2)
where  i is the time discount rate and  i is equal to 1 if the parent enrols the child
in secondary school and equal to zero if he doesn’t enrol the child. Assuming that
income subjective expectations are distributed with probability density f iYs(ys)
if secondary school is completed and f iYp(yp) if primary school is completed, we
can observe that the child will be enrolled in secondary school ( ⇤i = 1) if the
1A detailed derivation of the results is presented in 4.6.
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(discounted) expected utility from the completion of secondary school is larger
than the (discounted) expected utility from the completion on primary school
only:
 i
1
ci✏i
ˆ
Ui(ys) f
i
Ys(ys) dys > (1 +  i)
ˆ
Ui(yp) f
i
Yp(yp) dyp (4.3)
Assuming that income after having completed the school level j follows a log-
normal distribution lnN (µj,  2j ), we can write the expected utilities for each
educational level as
E[U(yj)] =
ˆ +1
0
Ui(yj)f
i
Yj(yj) dyj
=
1
1    exp

(1   )
✓
µj +
 2j (1   )
2
◆ 
By substituting for the expected utilities in equation (4.3) and taking logs, we
can write the condition for enrolling the child in secondary school as
  ⌘ ln  i
1 +  i
  c˜+ (1   )µs+ (1   )
2
2
 2s   (1   )µp 
(1   )2
2
 2p > ✏˜i (4.4)
where c˜ ⌘ ln c and ✏˜ ⌘ ln ✏ and ✏˜ ⇠ N(0,  ✏). Using   and the symmetry of
the distribution of ✏˜i, we can therefore write the probability of the child to be
enrolled in secondary school as
Pr [ i = 1 | ] = Pr [  > ✏˜i |µ,  ,X]
= 1  F✏˜ ( ) = F✏˜ (  )
where F✏˜ (✏˜) is the cumulative distributive function of the Gaussian distribution
N(0,  ✏). We can now analyse how the probability to be enrolled in secondary
school, Pr [ i = 1 | ] , is aﬀected by the first two moments characterising the
subjective distribution of income conditional on completing primary or second-
ary school. First of all, if we look at the eﬀect of changing the means of these
distributions, it is straightforward to note that increasing the mean of expected
income conditional on completing primary school reduces the probability to be
enrolled. On the contrary, increasing the mean of expected income after sec-
ondary school increases the probability of being enrolled. Clearly, keeping fixed
the expected income having completed primary school and all other variables, if
individual i expects to receive a slightly higher income after completing second-
ary school education, he will have a higher incentive to invest in schooling. The
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derivative of the probability to be enrolled with respect to µs is then positive.
These results are summarised by the following derivative:
@Pr [ i = 1 | ]
@µp
=  g✏ [  ] (1   ) < 0 (4.5)
@Pr [ i = 1 | ]
@µs
= g✏ [  ] (1   ) > 0 (4.6)
Given the characteristics of the data, which allow eliciting a measure of variance
of the distribution of subjective expectations over future income, we can look at
the eﬀect of a change in the variances ( 2p and  2s) to the probability to be enrolled
in secondary school. An increase in the variance of the distribution of subjective
expectations over future income having completed primary school will decrease
the probability to be enrolled in secondary school. On the contrary, an increase
in the variance for the distribution of income having completed secondary school
( 2s) will increase the probability to be enrolled.
@Pr [ i = 1 | ]
@ 2p
=  g✏ [  ] (1   )
2
2
< 0 (4.7)
@Pr [ i = 1 | ]
@ 2s
= g✏ [  ] (1   )
2
2
> 0 (4.8)
For brevity, the model is designed assuming that the parent knows the uncon-
ditional (in terms of employment) distribution of income, however in the data,
all information on expected future income is expressed conditional on being em-
ployed. However, a change in the probability of being employed after having
completed secondary school can be interpreted as an increase of the income con-
ditional on completing secondary school, all else equal. We would therefore expect
to observe an increase in the probability of being enrolled when the probability
of finding the job after completing secondary school becomes larger.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
Following Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009), this chapter presents probit regres-
sions about the probability of having completed or being enrolled in secondary
school to parental perceived returns to schooling, both in monetary and in em-
ployment terms 2. Since in this setting we cannot relate schooling decisions to
2A diﬀerent approach is to estimate a full dynamic optimisation model of current schooling
decisions as a function of current and future benefits. See Keane and Wolpin (1997); Attanasio
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the whole probability distribution of future earnings, I assume that such distri-
bution can be proxied by a few moments of the parental (subjective) distribution
at age 25 of earnings for their children, conditional on completing the two main
educational achievements for children in the targeted households (primary and
secondary school). Additionally, it is important to note that schooling decisions
are observed two years later (when the follow-up database has been collected,
in 2012) compared to the moment in which subjective expectations have been
collected (during baseline, in 2010).
To model the probability for child i living in municipality m of being enrolled in
secondary school in 2012,  im,2012 (where  im,2012 is equal to 1 if enrolled and 0
otherwise), this chapter uses a latent index model of individual and municipality
level characteristics and information about the parental perceived return to sec-
ondary school. Specifically, this chapter estimate the probability to be enrolled
using the following model
 im,2012 = 1
,
 ⇤im,2012 = ↵ +  0 · ExpIncPrimi,2010 +  2 · ExpIncSeci,2010 +
+
2X
j=1
⌧j · V arIncij,2010 +X 0i  +M 0m⌘ + ✏im > 0 (4.9)
where ExpIncPrimim,2010 is the expected income at age 25 conditional on com-
pletion of primary school only, ExpIncSecim,2010 is the expected income at age
25 conditional on completion of secondary school, V arIncijm,2010 is the variance
of future income conditional on completion of education level j (j = 1 indicates
completion of primary school only, while j = 2 indicates completion of secondary
school), Xi is a vector containing individual and household characters and Mm
is a vector of municipality characteristics which influence schooling decisions. As
discussed in the previous section, we would expect that a higher perceived return
to secondary school would increase the probability for the child to be enrolled in
secondary school, while for a given return a higher expected income conditional
on completion of primary school only would lead to lower probability. To control
for other characteristics of parental perception of the returns to secondary school,
we include in the model information about the return in terms of employment
et al. (2012).
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probability. Therefore I extend equation 4.9 estimating the following model
 ⇤im,2012 = ↵ +  0 · ExpIncPrimi,2010 +  2 · ExpIncSeci,2010 +
+
2X
j=1
⌧j · V arIncij,2010 +
2X
j=1
 j · PrWorkij,2010 +
+X 0i  +M
0
m⌘ + ✏im > 0 (4.10)
where PrWorkijm,2010 is the perceived probability the child will find a job at age
25 conditional on completion of education level j. It is important to control for
the perceived employment possibilities since the expected return is conditional
on being employed.
4.4 Data
The data used in the chapter comes from a diﬀerent number of sources. The
main datasets are the Macedonian Household Surveys collected by the Ministry
of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP), which contains detailed information on
a variety of household information (demographics, expenditures, durable goods,
housing characteristics) and individual level information on household members
(education, health, labour supply). For children enrolled in secondary school, the
Household Survey is supplemented with administrative data about attendance
and performance at school. Additionally, I make use of diﬀerent aggregated data
at municipality level, supplied by Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce, to construct
measures of sex ratios, local labour market characteristics and other marriage
market indicators.
For the scope of CCT program evaluation, two household surveys were collected
during the Winter 2010, at the beginning of the program, and in Fall 2012,
after two years of implementation. The baseline survey was conducted between
November and December 2010, coinciding with the beginning of the first school
year in which CCT program became available. At baseline, households were
interviewed during the first two months of the program, rather than before the
start of the intervention. However, it is reasonable to believe that this timeline
had no eﬀect on baseline results, since the program implementation was very
slow at the beginning and the first payments were processed only in March-April
2010. In contrast, the survey was quick and the last interviews were carried out
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by the end of December. In parallel with the household survey, administrative
data on student attendance and performance was collected by visiting secondary
schools and collecting school records. This allowed double-checking the validity
of self-reported information on school enrolment.
At baseline, a sample of eligible households was produced using the Ministry of
Labour and Social Policy’s electronic database of the recipients of all types of
financial assistance, which has been assembled during Summer 2010 along with
the implementation of the program. The population frame has been produced
using the hardcopy archives at Social Welfare Centres (SWCs), which are the
main territorial units for social welfare provision. There are 27 inter-municipal
SWCs and they function as the key public providers of professional services in
social work. The use of the electronic database for sampling allowed identifying
12481 SFA households with at least one child of secondary school age, from which
we drew a random sample.
The follow-up survey was collected during the Fall of 2012. In order to minimise
attrition, we made use of the detailed tracking information collected at baseline3.
This methodology proved to have worked acceptably well during the follow-up
data collection. In terms of SFA recipients, 1205 households were interviewed at
baseline and, among those, 126 households were not found or refused to answer
at follow-up, resulting in an attrition rate of 11.7%.
For the purpose of this chapter, I restrict the sample to children in all Social
Financial Assistance households born from 1993 to 1998, for which data about
subjective expectations are available at baseline. Table 4.1 presents the main
descriptive statistics on child and household characteristics.
In order to collect information about the parental perceived returns to educa-
tion a specific section of the questionnaire was designed. Considering the low
level of schooling among most of the respondents, it was fundamental to select a
methodology that allowed eliciting a credible measure of subjective expectations
3We collected and updated contact information of at least two relatives or neighbours of the
surveyed households, including addresses and telephone numbers. This allowed us minimising
the risk of not finding the household in case they moved to another address or are not present
at home during the attempt to interview them and to limit attrition to non-response due to
refusal.
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without mentioning directly the term “probability” (Attanasio et al., 2005; At-
tanasio and Kaufmann, 2009). The questionnaire asked parents information over
the expected income conditional on completion of primary or secondary school
(and conditional on being employed at age 25) for at least one adolescent child in
the household (in the case that two adolescents of diﬀerent gender are present the
information was collected for both). In order to collect information on subjective
expectations, the interviewer picked the youngest male and female adolescent in
the age range 10-17 years old (at baseline) and refer to them in each question.
Section 3.2.1 presents in details the methodology selected for eliciting subjective
expectations. Chapter 3 presents instead a series of validity tests.
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics about parental subjective expectations
in the sample of reference. In terms of income expectations, returns to secondary
school range from 50.2 percent for girls in rural areas to 54.6 percent for boys
in rural areas. Returns are higher for boys in both urban and rural areas, but
the gap is larger for rural areas. In terms of probability of employment, the
return is higher in urban areas rather than rural. It is interesting to note that
for girls in urban areas attending secondary school has a larger return in terms
of employment compared to boys.
In order to compare parental expected income and market returns, Figure 4.1
presents a comparison between the sample distribution of expected income con-
ditional on completion of primary or secondary school with the Macedonian na-
tional average net wage for the correspondent education group. For both boys
and girls the average sample expected income is lower than the national average.
It is however important to note that no national data is currently available to
compute average wages at age 25 for diﬀerent education group, while the only
available comparison is with the whole working population. It is therefore not
possible to conclude whether parents over- or under-estimate market returns to
schooling.
4.5 Results
This section presents the estimates of Equations 4.9 and 4.10 for the sample of
children in all Social Financial Assistance households born from 1993 to 1998, for
which data about subjective expectations are available at 2010. In all specifica-
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Figure 4.1: Comparison between expected income and market (net) wages
Panel A. Boys
Panel B. Girls
Note. The figure presents the sample distribution of expected (log)-income conditional on com-
pleting primary or secondary school, the national average net wage for the correspondent edu-
cation group in 2010 (dotted line) and the correspondent sample mean in USD (solid line). It
is important to note that expected income is asked for age 25, while average wages are reported
for the whole population. Data about wages has been made available by the Macedonian State
Statistical Oﬃce.
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tions, the dependent variable is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the child
is enrolled or has completed any secondary school at the beginning of the school
year 2012/2013 and is equal to 0 otherwise. Controls include gender and age of
the child, education, gender and age of the household head, ethnicity, religion,
household size and number of children, household asset group and distance from
the closest school4 and indicator dummies for households living in rural areas
and in the capital city Skopje. Year and semester of birth dummies and Regional
dummies are included.
Table 4.4 shows the estimates of Equations 4.9 and 4.10 for the whole sample us-
ing a probit model. If we look at how ex-ante expectations matter for enrolment,
returns to secondary school are significantly positive only for the component of
expected income conditional on the completion of secondary school. Doubling the
expected income conditional on completion of secondary school lead to an increase
of 20.7 percent in the probability of being enrolled in secondary school. When
we control for measures associated to the variance of expected income, we don’t
find any significant eﬀect, while the coeﬃcients associated with expected income
are robust. Additionally, controlling for the probability of being employed at the
age of 25 after completing primary or secondary school, shows that part of the
eﬀect of higher expected income conditional on completion of secondary school
is captured by a higher probability to be employed when completing secondary
school. The coeﬃcients are robust when controlling for individual and municip-
ality characteristics. This result is consistent with the recent literature providing
evidence that perceived returns are important to explain how individuals take
educational choices (Jensen, 2010; Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2009).
In order to control how the relationship between ex-ante parental expectations
and secondary school enrolment is heterogeneous in child and household charac-
teristics Equation 4.10 is estimated separately for boys and girls in urban and
rural areas. Table 4.5 shows the estimates of the model and provides evidence of
gender diﬀerences, especially when comparing rural and urban areas. Expected
income conditional on completing secondary school is particularly important for
girls in urban areas, while for boys important determinants of schooling are the
expected income conditional on completing primary school and the probability of
being employed after secondary school. These results shows that the decision to
4In order to construct a measure of distance from the household dwelling to the secondary
school, I make use of geographic coordinates collected for each household and for each secondary
school in the country. I compute road distance and time required to reach the school by car for
each school in the country, in order to identify the closest secondary school.
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Figure 4.2: Relation between parental perceived returns to schooling and marriage
status
Note: The graph shows the local polynomial smooth of the probability to be married in 2012
on the perceived parental return to schooling at 2010. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if the
girl is married in 2012 and 0 otherwise. In 2010 none of the girls is married.
enrol children in school is fundamentally diﬀerent between boys and girls. One
obvious reason is that boys and girls are aﬀected by diﬀerent local labour mar-
kets, which might make choices particularly responsive to expected returns under
certain conditions. Another reason is that parental expectations might be related
to other choices, especially for girls. If we look at the probability to be married
for girls in the sample, we can note that expected return is a particularly strong
predictor of the probability to be married within two years from reported data
(see Figure 4.2).
Firstly, parental expectations might directly reflect the chances to go to secondary
school, so that wealthier households would report higher returns to compensate
for the fact that they can aﬀord sending their children to school. Since most
household adult members are unemployed, we cannot rely on income since at the
moment of the interview the respondent’s only oﬃcial source of income is the
social assistance benefit. In this case, it is very diﬃcult to observe household’s
long run economic status, which is the main determinant of important choices
like human capital investment.
Direct costs of attending school are often associated with the enrolment decision,
especially when considering poor households. In Macedonia, as previously ex-
plained, up to secondary school, public education is free, therefore issues related
to tuition and enrolment costs are not a concern in this study. In addition, recip-
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ients of Social Financial Assistance are entitled to free books. However, we need
to consider transportation and living costs related to attending school, which rely
directly on the accessibility of the school from the location where the household
live. In order to understand how budget constraints relates to the decision to
enrol in secondary school, I estimate Equation 4.10 for children in households
from diﬀerent asset groups. To allocate households in diﬀerent groups I follow
Filmer and Pritchett (2001) using principal-component approach and information
collected on assets owned by the household to compute an asset index proxying
wealth5. I make use of the rich information about household asset ownership
collected in 2010 to build an ex-ante wealth index and divide households into
three groups depending on the percentile position in distribution of the index.
Table 4.6 presents estimates the estimates for each sub-group. Expected income
conditional on completing secondary school is particularly important for children
in households with low or middle level of assets, showing that households that
are relatively poorer (conditional on being in a homogenous sample, e.g. all
households are recipients on Financial Assistance) have higher responsiveness to
expected income compared to the households with higher wealth. If we look at
the probability of employment after secondary school the eﬀect is instead ambigu-
ous, since it is driving enrolment in households with either low or high assets,
while the coeﬃcient is not significant for the households with middle assets.
4.5.1 Unconditional versus conditional expectations
So far I have considered expectations conditional on being employed. However,
we noted that enrolment decisions depend as well on the probabilities of being
employed after each education level. As a robustness check, I will then use jointly
the information on the (point) expectation of the probability of employment con-
ditional on completion of primary or secondary school and the expected income
for the same educational level to compute unconditional income expectations
(conditional only on the completed school degree). However, no information is
available on the expected income in case the child is not going to be employed at
age 25 and therefore we will need to build diﬀerent unconditional expectations
based on diﬀerent assumptions about unemployment income. In this section, we
will consider two levels of unemployment income equal to 1000 MKD (around
12.9 GBP) and 3000 MKD (around 38.6 GBP) per month6
5See 5.8 for details on how the index was built and for robustness checks.
6Social Financial Assistance benefit is computed as a percentage of the average net salary of
workers in Macedonia during the previous year. The percentage depends on the number of the
family members: for 1 member families 13.59% of the basis for calculation (in 2013, 2841 MKD
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Assuming that, in case on unemployment at age 25, each child would earn a
fix amount yUN provided from any sort of financial assistance (state or family)
and independent from the completed level of education7, we can then combine
conditional expected income to obtain the unconditional expected income. For
each level of education j, we can then write the expected income as
E[yj] = pE[yj|Ei = 1] + (1  p)E[yj|Ei = 0]
= p y¯j,E + (1  p) yUN (4.11)
where p is the probability of being employed and Ei is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the child will be employed and 0 otherwise. In addition, us-
ing the (observed) variance of income conditional on employment (V ar[yj|Ei =
1] = E[y2j |Ei = 1]   y¯2j,E) and the assumption of fixed unemployment income
(V ar[yj|Ei = 0] = 0), we can compute the variance of the expected income:
V ar[yj] = E[y
2
j ]  E[yj]2
= pE[y2j |Ei = 1] + (1  p)E[y2j |Ei = 0]  E[yj]2
= p
⇥
E[y2j |Ei = 1] + y¯2j,E
⇤
+ (1  p) y¯2UN   E[yj]2
= pV ar[yj|Ei = 1] + p (1  p) (y¯j,E   yUN)2 (4.12)
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for unconditional expected returns and
incomes (and its variances) using two hypothesis for the unemployment income
(1000 MKD and 3000 MKD). Similarly to Table 4.4, Table 4.7 presents the es-
timates of Equations 4.9 and 4.10 for the whole sample using a probit model, but
using unconditional expectations based on diﬀerent assumptions relative to un-
employment income. If we look at how ex-ante expectations matter for enrolment,
returns to secondary school are significantly positive only for the component of
expected income conditional on the completion of secondary school. Doubling the
expected income conditional on completion of secondary school lead to an increase
of 15 to 26 percent in the probability of being enrolled in secondary school. At the
same time, doubling the expected income conditional on completion of primary
school only lead to a decrease 10 to 21 percent in the probability of being enrolled
or around 37 GBP); for 2 members families 17.46% (in 2013, 3650 MKD or around 47 GBP);
for 3 members families 23% (in 2013, 4808 MKD or around 62 GBP); for 4 members families
28.58% (in 2013, 5974 MKD or around 77 GBP); for 5 and more members families 33.34% (in
2013, 6969 MKD or around 90 GBP).
7This assumption might be restrictive since the expected income in case of unemployment
might vary by level of education in case it is generated by activities in the informal sector
rather than state assistance. However, we don’t have enough information to develop further
this diﬀerence.
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in secondary school. When we control for measures associated to the variance
of expected income, we don’t find any significant eﬀect, while the coeﬃcients as-
sociated with expected income are robust. Results provide evidence that using
unconditional expectations rather than conditional lead to similar conclusions on
the importance of expected income for enrolment. However, as previously dis-
cussed, this is based on assumptions relative to the expected income conditional
on unemployment, which might not be perceived as certain.
4.5.2 Robustness checks
While we showed that subjective expectations are important for explaining edu-
cation demand and heterogeneous program eﬀects, we need to control whether we
are measuring subjective returns associated to schooling or whether reported ex-
pectations are capturing other variables and incentives. This sub-section aims at
showing that subjective expectations play an important role in explaining second-
ary school enrolment even after controlling for several indicators that could have
generated omitted variable bias. Firstly, parental expectations might directly re-
flect the chances to go to secondary school, so that wealthier households would
report higher returns to compensate for the fact that they can aﬀord sending their
children to school. Secondly, subjective returns could be aﬀected by direct costs
associated with distance to school and with availability of better schools. This is
particularly important since direct costs of attending school are often associated
with the enrolment decision, especially when considering poor households. In
Macedonia, as previously explained, up to secondary school, public education is
free, therefore issues related to tuition and enrolment costs are not a concern in
this study. Thirdly, reported returns might be correlated with unobserved taste
heterogeneity. These issues are treated in details in Section 5.7.2. Results show
that the relation between the probability of enrolment and perceived returns to
secondary school is robust to check for endogeneity. In order to understand the
role of distance to school on enrolment and its relation with perceived returns,
Tables 4.8 presents some sensitivity analysis of the coeﬃcients on subjective ex-
pectations. We can note that controlling for distance to school has very little
eﬀect on the coeﬃcients on perceived returns. Additionally, the coeﬃcient on
distance to school (measure in hours and standardised) is negative but not signi-
ficant, showing that direct costs might not be strong determinants of secondary
schooling. This result is consistent when looking at diﬀerent measures of dis-
tance to school. In conclusion, Table 4.9 compares the coeﬃcient by estimating
the model using a linear probability model versus a probit model. Results are
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Figure 4.3: Change in expected return from baseline to follow-up
Note. Change is expected return is defined as the diﬀerence between the monetary return to secondary school
education collected in 2012 and the one collected in 2010 for the same child. “Primary-Secondary” refers to
children that went from being in primary school in 2010 to being enrolled or having completed secondary school
in 2012. “Primary-Primary” refers to children that were enrolled or had completed primary school in 2010 and
their status is unchanged in 2012.
robust to the two estimation methods, before and after controlling for individual
characteristics.
4.5.3 Cognitive dissonance bias
One of the main reasons why subjective expectations have not been used in
choice models is that they might suﬀer from cognitive dissonance, i.e. respondents
reports expectations that are consistent with their decisions. If the collected data
suﬀer from cognitive dissonance we would therefore face the following situation.
Imagine that E⇤[Y |Ei = 1, J ] is the real expected income conditional on being
employed after having achieved education level j, while E[Y |Ei = 1, J ] is the
reported expectation. Data would suﬀer from cognitive bias if an individual who
opted to enrol in education J = j (in our case, secondary school) would report
expectations such that the expected income consistent with the decision is higher
than the real expectations. We would therefore have the following case:
E[Y |Ei = 1, J = j] > E⇤[Y |Ei = 1, J = j] (4.13)
Using subjective expectations aﬀected by cognitive dissonance in choice models
would therefore upward bias our estimates. In order to test for cognitive dis-
sonance, I make use of the panel dimension of the dataset and I compare the
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Figure 4.4: Change in expected probability of being employed at age 25 from
baseline to follow-up
Note. The change in expected probability of being employed is defined as the diﬀerence between the probability
of being employed after having completed primary school (left panel) or having completed secondary school
(right panel) collected in 2012 and the one collected in 2010 for the same child. “Primary-Secondary” refers to
children that went from being in primary school in 2010 to being enrolled or having completed secondary school
in 2012. “Primary-Primary” refers to children that were enrolled or had completed primary school in 2010 and
their status is unchanged in 2012.
expectations reported at 2010 and the expectations for the same child reported
at 2012, after a decision is taken. Zafar (2011) provides a similar evidence against
cognitive dissonance in his study on major choice and subjective expectations by
comparing expectations before and after the decision in taken. I compare the ex-
pectations associated to children whose highest educational level achieved at 2010
is primary school (independently from the grade they have achieved) and it is un-
changed at 2012, with children whose highest educational level achieved at 2010 is
primary school and whose highest educational level achieved at 2012 is secondary
school (independently from the grade they have achieved). In presence of cognit-
ive dissonance we would expect expectations for children who transitioned from
primary to secondary school to have a positive diﬀerence compared to the chil-
dren who didn’t transition from primary to secondary. Figure 4.3 presents the
distribution of the change in expected return from secondary school education
(defined as the diﬀerence between the expected return at 2012 and the expected
return at 2010), while Figure 4.4 shows the change in probabilities to be em-
ployed after primary and secondary school. In both cases, I cannot reject the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions (see Table 5.11). This test
would be invalid in the case in which parental expectations reported at baseline
are already consistent with the enrolment decision of their children. This might
be related to the fact that some students are already enrolled in secondary school
at the time in which we collect subjective expectation. However, the decision to
enrol at baseline is not permanent, since the cases of drop outs are high and the
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cost to enrol is relatively low (see Section 5.7.2).
To complement this test, I compare the reported expected return for children in
primary school age and for children in secondary school age (older than 15) by
looking at diﬀerences across age. Panel A of Figure 4.5 shows estimates of two
local polynomial regressions of the return to secondary schooling for the children
in primary school age (younger than 15) and for the children in secondary school
age (older than 15). By comparing means at the cut-oﬀ point of 15 years old, we
can observe that there is no significant diﬀerence across the two groups. Similarly,
Panel B presents a local polynomial smooth for the returns to schooling in terms
of employment. Both figures provides evidence that parents with children in
primary school age at baseline had similar expectations compared with children
in secondary school age, even when comparing children at the margin.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter makes use of an unique dataset on subjective expectations about
returns to secondary school education collected in Macedonia along with the
CCT program evaluation and contributes to the growing literature linking educa-
tional choices with information about perceived returns to schooling in developing
countries. The setting allows observing information on schooling decisions and
on ex-ante parental perceived returns to secondary school (measured two years
before the decision that is object of the study).
I provide evidence that ex-ante parental expectations are important in explaining
secondary schooling decisions for children. Additionally, important diﬀerences
exists across gender. This chapter shows that expected income conditional on
completing secondary school is particularly important for girls’ enrolment, while
boy’s enrolment is mainly driven by expected income conditional on completing
primary school and by the probability of successfully finding a job after secondary
school. However, since intra-household gender diﬀerences might be one of the
drivers of gender inequality, future research needs to deepen the understanding of
how parental expectations interact with other decisions, such as early weddings,
which are clearly linked to human capital accumulation.
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Figure 4.5: Local polynomial regression for Expected Returns by age of the child
Panel A. Returns to schooling in monetary terms
Panel B. Returns to schooling in employment terms
Note. The Figure present local polynomial regressions (at diﬀerent bandwidth) around the cut-
oﬀ age of 15, which divides the age group 12-17 years old into a primary school age group and a
secondary school age group. Panel A presents the return to secondary school, computed as the
diﬀerence between expected incomes after primary and secondary school (reported in logarithms
and computed using triangular distribution). Panel B presents the return to schooling in
employment terms, defined as the diﬀerence in the probability to find a job after secondary
and after primary school. 95% confidence interval is represented using dotted lines, while
the local regression is represented by the solid line. Age is determined from date of birth at
December 31st 2010 and is expressed in years as a continuous variable.
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Additionally this chapter provides evidence on the absence of cognitive dissonance
bias in self-reported income expectations. In this chapter, cognitive dissonance
would aﬀect the updating of expectations such that expectations linked to choices
made during the two data collection point would be systematically revised upward
and the expectations for the educational option not taken would be systematic-
ally revised down. By making use of the longitudinal dimension of the data on
subjective expectation, I provide evidence that respondents do not revise their
expectations following a cognitive dissonance pattern, but that the updating of
expectations follow a similar pattern across individuals with diﬀerent educational
choices.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics on child and household characteristics
Urban Rural
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Age 17.39 17.36 17.31 17.31
(1.604) (1.684) (1.608) (1.690)
Male household head 0.807 0.795 0.892 0.888
(0.395) (0.405) (0.311) (0.316)
Education of household head
Lower primary or less 0.182 0.144 0.193 0.181
(0.387) (0.352) (0.395) (0.386)
Upper primary 0.512 0.540 0.583 0.572
(0.501) (0.499) (0.494) (0.496)
Secondary school or more 0.305 0.316 0.224 0.247
(0.461) (0.466) (0.418) (0.432)
Age (head) 46.25 46.46 46.75 46.80
(5.330) (5.934) (5.473) (5.604)
Ethnicity
Macedonian 0.477 0.513 0.336 0.367
(0.500) (0.501) (0.473) (0.483)
Albanian 0.228 0.221 0.452 0.447
(0.420) (0.415) (0.499) (0.498)
Roma 0.214 0.190 0.0386 0.0465
(0.411) (0.393) (0.193) (0.211)
Turkish 0.0912 0.0875 0.178 0.140
(0.288) (0.283) (0.383) (0.347)
Muslim 0.526 0.490 0.726 0.684
(0.500) (0.501) (0.447) (0.466)
Household members 4.596 4.688 4.873 4.884
(1.260) (1.331) (1.246) (1.264)
Number of children 2.519 2.605 2.726 2.763
(0.966) (1.075) (1.015) (1.104)
Asset group
Low 0.291 0.274 0.402 0.400
(0.455) (0.447) (0.491) (0.491)
Middle 0.295 0.300 0.344 0.363
(0.457) (0.459) (0.476) (0.482)
High 0.414 0.426 0.255 0.237
(0.493) (0.495) (0.437) (0.426)
Distance from closest school (hours) 0.157 0.150 0.307 0.306
(0.254) (0.244) (0.222) (0.223)
Note. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Characteristics are reported in 2012 for children
born from 1993 to 1998 and for which data about subjective expectations are available in 2010.
Sample includes children born from Asset groups are defined by using principal component
analysis and using indicators of asset and land ownership at the time in which expectations
are reported. The distance from school is determined using geo-coordinates of households and
schools and by computing road distance in terms on time from the household dwelling to the
closest school teaching a Macedonian program.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of parental subjective expectations
Urban Rural
Boys Girls Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income expectations
Return to secondary school 0.520 0.519 0.546 0.502
(0.341) (0.318) (0.373) (0.332)
Expected income (prim.) 8.566 8.513 8.550 8.494
(0.478) (0.427) (0.448) (0.436)
Expected income (sec.) 9.086 9.032 9.095 8.996
(0.355) (0.330) (0.339) (0.338)
Var. income (prim.) 0.0232 0.0242 0.0192 0.0197
(0.0305) (0.0332) (0.0265) (0.0253)
Var. income (sec.) 0.0155 0.0152 0.0133 0.0146
(0.0206) (0.0177) (0.0206) (0.0210)
Probability of employment
Return to secondary school 0.273 0.284 0.253 0.253
(0.215) (0.210) (0.198) (0.207)
Prob. of employment (prim.) 0.218 0.185 0.242 0.218
(0.206) (0.189) (0.183) (0.181)
Prob. of employment (sec.) 0.491 0.471 0.494 0.470
(0.229) (0.222) (0.196) (0.193)
Observations 1022 1022 1022 1022
Note. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Returns to secondary school are computed assuming
a triangular distribution. Return in terms of probability of employment is defined as diﬀerence
between the probability of being employed conditional on completing secondary school and
conditional on completing primary school.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of parental subjective expectations using uncon-
ditional returns
Urban Rural
Boys Girls Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment income: 1000 MKD
Return to secondary school 0.692 0.717 0.689 0.647
(0.465) (0.488) (0.462) (0.435)
Expected income (prim.) 7.305 7.231 7.320 7.264
(0.460) (0.394) (0.377) (0.356)
Expected income (sec.) 7.981 7.935 7.999 7.901
(0.589) (0.552) (0.483) (0.464)
Var. income (prim.) 1.325 0.945 1.375 1.101
(2.161) (1.769) (1.997) (1.788)
Var. income (sec.) 4.521 4.485 4.863 4.478
(2.905) (2.867) (2.740) (2.762)
Unemployment income: 3000 MKD
Return to secondary school 0.397 0.395 0.400 0.357
(0.273) (0.285) (0.265) (0.236)
Expected income (prim.) 8.159 8.119 8.163 8.138
(0.245) (0.202) (0.206) (0.185)
Expected income (sec.) 8.545 8.504 8.558 8.489
(0.358) (0.334) (0.291) (0.277)
Var. income (prim.) 1.325 0.945 1.375 1.101
(2.161) (1.769) (1.997) (1.788)
Var. income (sec.) 4.521 4.485 4.863 4.478
(2.905) (2.867) (2.740) (2.762)
Observations 1022 1022 1022 1022
Note. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Returns to secondary school are computed assuming
a triangular distribution. Return in terms of probability of employment is defined as diﬀerence
between the probability of being employed conditional on completing secondary school and
conditional on completing primary school.
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Table 4.6: Enrolment regression and parental perceived returns, by asset group
Dep.var.: Enrolled or completed secondary school
Low Middle High
Expected income (prim.) -0.127 -0.080 0.052
(0.132) (0.083) (0.055)
Expected income (sec.) 0.304** 0.237** -0.032
(0.149) (0.097) (0.074)
Var. income (prim.) -0.988 0.313 0.946
(1.394) (0.873) (0.590)
Var. income (sec.) -3.522 0.663 0.989*
(2.333) (1.036) (0.555)
Prob. of employment (prim.) -0.378 -0.124 -0.061
(0.263) (0.097) (0.105)
Prob. of employment (sec.) 0.498** 0.075 0.259**
(0.216) (0.115) (0.106)
Regional and birthyear dummies 3 3 3
Controls 3 3 3
Observations 345 328 286
Note. Marginal eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parenthesis. ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable that is equal to 1 if the child is enrolled or has completed any secondary school at
the beginning of the school year 2012/2013 and is equal to 0 otherwise. Returns to schooling
and expected incomes are computed assuming a triangular distribution and using log-income.
Where indicated, I include controls for Gender and age of the child, education, gender and age
of the household head, ethnicity, religion, household size, number of children, rural and Skopje
dummies, household asset group and distance from the closest school. Year and semester of
birth dummies and Regional dummies are included. Asset groups are defined by using principal
component analysis and using indicators of asset and land ownership at the time in which
expectations are reported.
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Table 4.8: Enrolment regression, parental perceived returns and distance to school
Dep.var.: Enrolled or completed secondary school
Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3)
Expected income (prim.) -0.027 -0.027 -0.040
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
Expected income (sec.) 0.190** 0.190** 0.161**
(0.076) (0.076) (0.075)
Var. income (prim.) -0.178 -0.172 -0.179
(0.533) (0.533) (0.529)
Var. income (sec.) 0.308 0.308 0.440
(0.695) (0.697) (0.691)
Prob. of employment (prim.) -0.225* -0.225 -0.177
(0.137) (0.137) (0.110)
Prob. of employment (sec.) 0.269** 0.269** 0.223**
(0.107) (0.107) (0.108)
Distance to school -0.004 -0.126
(0.018) (0.085)
Regional and birthyear dummies 3 3 3
Distance to school 3 3
Controls 3
Observations 1022 1022 1022
Note. Marginal eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parenthesis. ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable that is equal to 1 if the child is enrolled or has completed any secondary school at
the beginning of the school year 2012/2013 and is equal to 0 otherwise. Returns to schooling
and expected incomes are computed assuming a triangular distribution and using log-income.
Where indicated, I include controls for Gender and age of the child, education, gender and age
of the household head, ethnicity, religion, household size, number of children, rural and Skopje
dummies, household asset group and distance from the closest school. Year and semester of
birth dummies and Regional dummies are included. Asset groups are defined by using principal
component analysis and using indicators of asset and land ownership at the time in which
expectations are reported. Distance from the closest school is computed using geo-coordinates
and is standardised.
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Table 4.9: Enrolment regression and diﬀerent estimation method
Dep.var.: Enrolled or completed secondary school
OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expected income (prim.) -0.024 -0.025 -0.027 -0.040
(0.048) (0.043) (0.058) (0.057)
Expected income (sec.) 0.160** 0.114** 0.190** 0.161**
(0.063) (0.057) (0.076) (0.075)
Var. income (prim.) -0.092 0.011 -0.178 -0.179
(0.463) (0.468) (0.533) (0.529)
Var. income (sec.) 0.244 0.047 0.308 0.440
(0.567) (0.650) (0.695) (0.691)
Prob. of employment (prim.) -0.180 -0.129 -0.225* -0.177
(0.115) (0.089) (0.137) (0.110)
Prob. of employment (sec.) 0.214** 0.155* 0.269** 0.223**
(0.089) (0.085) (0.107) (0.108)
Regional and birthyear dummies 3 3 3 3
Controls 3 3
Observations 1022 1022 1022 1022
Note. Marginal eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parenthesis. ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable that is equal to 1 if the child is enrolled or has completed any secondary school at
the beginning of the school year 2012/2013 and is equal to 0 otherwise. Returns to schooling
and expected incomes are computed assuming a triangular distribution and using log-income.
Where indicated, I include controls for Gender and age of the child, education, gender and age
of the household head, ethnicity, religion, household size, number of children, rural and Skopje
dummies, household asset group and distance from the closest school. Year and semester of
birth dummies and Regional dummies are included. Asset groups are defined by using principal
component analysis and using indicators of asset and land ownership at the time in which
expectations are reported.
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Appendix 4.A
Proof for Section 4.2
The decision problem of parent i is defined by the following maximisation prob-
lem:
max
 i2[0,1]
 i[ i
U(ys)
ci✏i
] + (1   ) (1 +  i)U(yp)
where  i is the time discount rate and  i is equal to 1 if the parent enrols the child
in secondary school and equal to zero if he doesn’t enrol the child. Assuming that
income subjective expectations are distributed with probability density f iYs(ys)
if secondary school is completed and f iYp(yp) if primary school is completed, we
can observe that the child will be enrolled in secondary school ( ⇤i = 1) if the
(discounted) expected utility from the completion of secondary school is larger
than the (discounted) expected utility from the completion on primary school
only:
 i
1
ci✏i
ˆ
Ui(ys) f
i
Ys(ys) dys > (1 +  i)
ˆ
Ui(yp) f
i
Yp(yp) dyp
where yj follows a log-normal distribution lnN(µj,  j) and Ui(yj) is a CRRA
utility function in income. Therefore the expected value for ys is equal to
E[U(yj)] =
ˆ +1
0
Ui(yj)f
i
Yj(yj) dyj
=
1p
2⇡ j
ˆ +1
0
y1  j
1   
1
yj
exp
"
 (ln yj   µj)
2
2 2j
#
dyj
We can now apply the transformations ln yj = xj ) 1yj dyj = dxj and y
1  
j =
exp ((1   ) ln yj) to rewrite
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E[U(xj)] =
1p
2⇡ j
ˆ +1
 1
exp ((1   ) xj)
1    exp
"
 (xj   µj)
2
2 2j
#
dxj
=
1
1   
1p
2⇡ j
ˆ +1
 1
exp
"
(1   ) xj   (xj   µj)
2
2 2j
#
dxj
=
1
1   
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ˆ +1
 1
exp

2 2j (1   ) xj   x2j   µ2j + 2xjµj
2 2j
 
dxj
=
1
1   
1p
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ˆ +1
 1
exp
"
 x2j + 2xj
⇥
µj +  2j (1   ) xj
⇤  µ2j
2 2j
#
dxj
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1
1    exp
"⇥
µj +  2j (1   )
⇤2   µ2j
2 2j
#
1p
2⇡ j
·
·
ˆ +1
 1
exp
"⇥
xj  
 
µj +  2j (1   )
 ⇤2
2 2j
#
dxj
=
1
1    exp
"⇥
µj +  2j (1   )
⇤2   µ2j
2 2j
#
=
1
1    exp

(1   )
✓
µj +
 2j (1   )
2
◆ 
We can now use the result for the expected utility to rewrite the condition for
the child to be enrolled in secondary school ( ⇤i = 1):
 i
1 +  i
1
ci✏i
exp

(1   )
✓
µs +
 2s (1   )
2
◆ 
> exp

(1   )
✓
µp +
 2p (1   )
2
◆ 
Taking logs of both sides we can rewrite and rearranging we obtain
  ⌘ ln  i
1 +  i
  c˜i + (1   )µs + (1   )
2
2
 2s   (1   )µp  
(1   )2
2
 2p > ✏˜i
where c˜i ⌘ ln ci and ✏˜i ⌘ ln ✏i. We can note that since ✏ follows a lognormal
distribution, then ✏˜ follows a Gaussian distribution,✏˜ ⇠ N(0,  ✏). Using   and
the symmetry property of the distribution of ✏˜i, we can then write the probability
of the child to be enrolled in secondary school as
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Pr [ i = 1 | ] = Pr [  > ✏˜i |µ,  ,X]
= 1  F✏˜ ( ) = F✏˜ (  )
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Chapter 5
Who wears the trousers in the
family?
5.1 Introduction
A large body of research shows that Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs
in the developing world have been beneficial for human capital investments in
children among poor households1. However, the vast majority of these programs
transfer money to women in the household, keeping uncertainty on whether the
delivered eﬀect is due to an increase of resources or to a behavioural change related
to their use. The understanding of these mechanisms is particularly important
in countries where the empowerment of women may have important indirect im-
plications on children’s human capital investment, especially through behavioural
changes within households.
At the same time, decisions to invest in human capital are likely to depend on
expected costs and benefits of schooling. It is therefore reasonable to believe
that the eﬀect of CCT programs transferring money to women rather than men
should vary with parental expected returns to schooling2. This is particularly
important in environments where limited or imperfect information about future
income possibilities are a deeper issue. Still, it is unclear how the link between
the identity of the recipient receiving a cash transfer and the perceived returns
to schooling in the family might influence human capital investments in their
1Fiszbein and Schady (2009) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on the eﬀects
of Conditional Cash Transfers.
2I focus only on benefits, since the role of costs should be symmetric.
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children.
This chapter studies the eﬀect on children’s human capital investment of chan-
nelling cash transfers to women versus household heads when parental3 perceived
returns to schooling are heterogeneous across households. I study this eﬀect in
the context of the CCT for Secondary School education in the Republic of Mace-
donia, the first CCT program to be implemented in the Balkan region. This is
a national program providing cash transfers to poor households conditional on
secondary school attendance of their children. What makes this program unique
is that this is the first nationally implemented study to randomise cash transfers
to the household head versus the mother of the child. The CCT provides an
exogenous variation in the share of resources controlled by mothers that can be
studied to determine whether channelling resources to women has an impact on
children’s human capital investment. To understand whether this eﬀect is vary-
ing depending on perceived returns to schooling, I collected a unique dataset on
parental expectations of children’s future income possibilities and employment
probability under diﬀerent educational achievements4. This allowed uncovering
the large heterogeneity characterising parental perceived returns to schooling.
I find that targeting CCT payments to mothers had a small and not statistically
significant eﬀect on child enrolment in secondary school. However, when ex-ante
parental perceived returns to schooling are suﬃciently large, channelling resources
to women led to an increase in enrolment and achievement rates. This eﬀect is
associated with an increase in individual expenditure shares on education for the
children in this group. For children in the higher tercile of the parental perceived
returns, individual expenditure shares increased by roughly 4 percent. These
findings support the idea that households tend to invest more in children when
the payment is transferred to mothers, but only when the perceived returns to
schooling are large enough to justify the investment. In order to understand
the joint eﬀect of channelling transfers to mothers and high parental perceived
returns to schooling on human capital investment, we need to disentangle the
relationship between each of the two components with the decision to invest in
children.
3Throughout the chapter I will consider parental expectations as the shared expectations of
both parents. A test about about this hypothesis is discussed in the Appendix.
4Since the aim of the Macedonian CCT program is to increase the low secondary school
enrolment of children in poor households, in the chapter I focus on the return of completing
secondary school versus completing only primary school.
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The majority of educational and health-related social programs have targeted wo-
men in the past using the justification that mothers have stronger preferences for
child education and health, but evidence about this mechanism is still lacking5.
Policy interventions shifting the relative income of women versus men within
households have proven to have an eﬀect on diﬀerent family decisions (Lundberg
et al. (1997) and Ward-Batts (2008) use the 1979 UK Reform of Child benefits,
Attanasio and Lechene (2002) and Bobonis (2009) use Mexican Progresa). How-
ever, there is little experimental evidence on the diﬀerential eﬀect of targeting a
payment to mothers or fathers when the objective is to subsidise education. Re-
cently Benhassine et al. (2013) studied an unconditional (labeled) cash transfer
for primary school attendance in Morocco using an experimental design. They
compare payments made to fathers versus a more standard modality of payments
made to mothers and they find very little eﬀect of targeting fathers versus moth-
ers. However, the program object of the study is based in Morocco, where the
vast majority of the population is muslim. Similarly, Akresh et al. (2012) studied
the eﬀect of diﬀerent CCT modalities on preventative health visits in rural Burk-
ina Faso and they find no eﬀect of targeting payments to women. It is reasonable
to believe that targeting women might generate diﬀerent outcomes depending on
the social norms that characterise the household, which are strong determinants
of the relative power distribution across household members. In Macedonia, this
is particularly important since the heterogeneity in our sample, in terms of reli-
gions and ethnicities6, allows studying the eﬀect of targeting payment to mothers
in a very diverse environments.
Results suggest that one possible channel through which targeting payments to
mothers aﬀect human capital investment is through a diﬀerential allocation of re-
sources within the household. This is supported by the literature, which provides
evidence that targeting payments to mothers could lead to a distinct impact
through a shift in relative decision power within the household, resulting in a
diﬀerential allocation of expenditures. A large body of research reports evidence
that the amount of resources that each household member contributes to the
family aﬀects its allocation of expenditures (for a literature review, see Duflo,
2005). However, there is no clear consensus on the precise mechanism through
which households take decisions and allocate consumption when receiving a cash
transfer. Evidence on collective models suggests that targeting payments to a
5The other reason is that women have a lower participation in the labour market and there-
fore have more available time to collect the payment and fulfil administrative procedures.
6The sample includes households from Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish and Roma ethnicities.
At the same time across ethnicities, I observe variation in religion (christian orthodox and
muslim).
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precise household member might result in diﬀerent outcomes7 if individuals have
diﬀerent preferences and the targeted payment aﬀects the relative decision power
within the household. At the same time, evidence suggests that women have
diﬀerent preferences over consumption than men, favouring public goods rather
than private goods (Thomas, 1990; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Lundberg et al.,
1997; Doss, 2006; Ward-Batts, 2008). This chapter contributes to this branch of
literature by providing evidence that channelling resources to women might in-
deed change the allocation of expenditures.
In CCTs the presence of a conditionality gives parents incentives, such as monit-
oring of school attendance, that might have additional indirect eﬀect on education
and that might depend on who is entitled to receive the cash transfer. Diﬀerent
studies provide evidence that conditionality is beneficial, since it might gener-
ate the incentive to improve performance in order to achieve the conditionality
(De Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011; Baird et al., 2012;
Akresh et al., 2012). This might translate in a diﬀerential incentive on monitoring
of child enrolment and attendance and on a diﬀerential incentive to invest more
time (or less) with the child. However, this chapter provides evidence against
diﬀerential eﬀects related to the conditionality of targeting mothers. I find no
impact on the frequency in which parents monitor their children and on the
amount of time they spend with them. One possible reason is that for children
of secondary school age, this mechanism might not be relevant since parents have
smaller control or influence over them.
Human capital investments in children are likely to be influenced not only by
whether who control resources in the household is more prone to invest on it, but
also by how parents value its costs and benefits. It is realistic to believe that par-
ents make schooling decisions for their children based on subjective expectations
rather than actual schooling returns (Manski, 2004), which have been extensively
used and estimated in literature mainly using earning data. In absence of data on
expectations, non-verifiable assumptions on expectations are needed, while there
7I will discuss in the chapter the alternative of targeting diﬀerent adults in the household.
However, an alternative strategy would be to target directly children, especially beyond a certain
age, but there is little or no evidence on the eﬀect of such targeting in developing countries.
Ashworth et al. (2002) studied the eﬀect of targeting children for the Education Maintenance
Allowance (EMA) in the United Kingdom, which provides a cash subsidy to young people aged
16–19 from poor households to avoid drop-outs before the end of compulsory education. At
the piloting stage of the program, diﬀerent variants of the program were tested and among
other one was comparing the targeting of parents versus the targeting of children. The authors
find that the eﬀect on participation was twice as large when the subsidy was paid to young
individuals.
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is little reason to believe that individuals with similar information form their ex-
pectations in the same way. Instead, the availability of subjective expectations
allows eliciting ex-ante beliefs given information that parents have at the time of
decision making, allows controlling for the heterogeneity in people’s expectations
and on ex-ante perceptions of employment risk. This chapter allows testing for ef-
fect heterogeneity of targeting payments to women by directly eliciting subjective
returns to schooling at the beginning of the program.
Most of the early chapters linking perceived returns to schooling to educational
choices focused on developed countries, while only recently the attention turned
to developing countries. This is particularly important since, among poor house-
holds, the decision of investing in human capital might be strictly related to
expectations, due to the fact that budget constraints might be more binding.
Evidence shows that in developed countries individuals have fairly correct ex-
pectations of returns to schooling8, while there is still little evidence on how
returns to schooling are perceived in developing countries. In such environment,
it is reasonable to believe that students and parents are not well-informed about
future returns to schooling. This might be related to a scarce availability of
information about earnings, especially when informal labour markets are large.
Perceived returns are particularly important for developing countries since meas-
ured returns are high, but schooling tend to remain low. As noted by Jensen
(2010), in the Dominican Republic around 80-90% of youths complete primary
school, but only 25% to 30% complete secondary school, compared to a secondary
school return of over 40%. In his study, he finds that 8th grade pupils underes-
timate the returns to schooling, while informing a random set of children about
the average returns to schooling significantly increase their perceived returns and
the attained years of schooling. Similarly, Nguyen (2008) finds that informing
a random subset of children in Madagascar about their returns to schooling in-
creased attendance and test scores. Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) for Mexico
finds that higher expected returns are related to higher college attendance. These
studies provide evidence that perceived expected returns are heterogeneous even
across comparably similar groups. If learning about future income is happening
8Freeman (1971) and Betts (1996) were among the first to collect individual information
among college undergraduates about earnings for diﬀerent categories of jobs. Smith and Powell
(1990) collected college seniors’ income expectations for the first year of their job and after 10
years. Similarly, Blau (1990) collected college seniors’ information about initial, after 10 years
and after 20 years if they were to stay in the same occupation after leaving school. Dominitz
and Manski (1996) provided the first computer-assisted interview to collect information among
high school and college students.
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locally by observing neighbours or friends, there is a larger chance of segregation
in expectations; for instance, in rural areas, individuals might learn only about
returns in agricultural-specific activities, rather than learning about returns in
urban areas, where jobs related to higher levels of schooling are most probably
be found. Consistently with this literature, I show that parental perceived re-
turns are particularly important determinants of secondary schooling decisions in
Macedonia.
Whether information matters for educational choices might depend as well on
whose information we are considering. This chapter focuses on parental expect-
ations without distinguishing between mother and father since information is
collected when both parents are present. There is no evidence in literature that
justifies diﬀerences in perceived returns to schooling across partners and I be-
lieve it is reasonable to assume partners are sharing the same information set.
In contrast, it would not be reasonable to assume that parents have the same
expectations of their children. Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) provide evidence
for college enrolment in Mexico by using responses about schooling returns from
mothers and from children and find that there are significant diﬀerences between
male and female children. Mother’s expectations are important for female enrol-
ment into college, while they don’t matter for male children. Giustinelli (2011)
provides evidence instead on whether major choice for high school students de-
pends on parental versus child expectations.
The chapter is organised as follow. In Section 2, I present the theoretical frame-
work. In Section 3, I present the Macedonian CCT for Secondary School Educa-
tion and the research design. In Section 4, I present the data used in the chapter
and the way diﬀerent measures are constructed. In Section 5 I present the em-
pirical strategy and the results of the chapter, while in Section 6 I present the
robustness checks.
5.2 Theoretical framework
Targeting payments to diﬀerent household members has indirect implications for
the welfare analysis of human capital investment on children. This section illus-
trates how the eﬀect of channelling resources to women within a household can
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be studied in a collective household framework9. I consider a static version of a
collective model for the decision to either consume or invest in child education for
a household composed by two decision-makers (mother and father, indicated by
the subscript m and f) and their child. The household decides how to allocate
income (y) between consumption (c), which includes private and public consump-
tion, and human capital investment for their child (h). Individual d preferences
are represented by a twice continuously diﬀerentiable utility function Ud(c, h),
which I assume is separable in consumption and human capital investment. I
assume therefore that the utility function for each decision maker is defined by
Ud(c, h) = u(c) + vd(r · h) (5.1)
where r is the return (in terms of utility) of the human capital investment. I am
therefore assuming that both parents have the same preferences for consumption,
while they have diﬀerent tastes for human capital investment. In addition, I
assume the household faces uncertainty on the return to human capital investment
and, for simplicity, I assume that the rate of return can be either low or high, r =
(rL, rH). The probability assigned to the higher return is ⇡H , while the probability
assigned to the lower return is ⇡L = 1 ⇡H . Information is shared among parents,
so that mother and father in the household share the same expectation for the
rate of return to human capital investment. We can therefore define the expected
utility derived by each parent from consumption and human capital investment
by
EUj(c, h) = u(c) + ⇡L · vj(rL · h) + ⇡H · vj(rH · h) (5.2)
Following the literature on collective households, I assume that the decisions made
by the household are Pareto-eﬃcient (Chiappori, 1992). The household decision
to allocate income to either consumption or human capital investment is therefore
defined by the following maximisation problem:
max
c,h
(1   ) [u(c) + E [vf (r · h)]] +   [u(c) + E [vm(r · h)]]
subject to y   c+ p · h
c   c¯ (5.3)
9The main reference is Blundell et al. (2005), who extend a general collective model with
labour supply to allow for the presence of public goods expenditures.
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where the Pareto weight   2 [0, 1] reflects the weight of the mother in the house-
hold, d c¯ is a minimum consumption which is necessary for the household be-
fore investing in human capital and p is the (relative) price for human capital
investment. Since the program object of the study is a Conditional Cash Trans-
fer, we would expect non-linearities in the budget set due to the presence of a
conditionality linked to the reception of the educational subsidy. In fact, the
introduction of a subsidy for all households would lowers the price of education
p, but in the presence of a conditionality the reduction would only be faced by
households whose children attend a number of classes lager than the program’s
minimum requirement (85 percent). However, baseline analysis of attendance
showed that the conditionality imposed by the program was only partially bind-
ing; in fact, at baseline, only 8 percent of children attending school was attending
less than 85 percent of classes and 60 percent was attending 95 percent. or more
classes (Armand and Carneiro, 2013). Since the minimum attendance is generally
non-binding in the data, modelling the programme as a decrease in the price of
education services is therefore considered an adequate approximation.
With an interior solution, the maximisation problem lead to the following first
order condition:
(1   ) ⇥⇡L · rL · v0f (rL · h) + ⇡H · rH · v0f (rH · h)⇤+
  [⇡L · rL · v0m(rL · h) + ⇡H · rH · v0m(rH · h)] = p · u0 (y   p · h)(5.4)
If we define  d = (⇡LrL·v0d(rL·h)+⇡HrH ·v0d(rH ·h))/u0(c) as the marginal willingness to pay
for the human capital investment for each parent, we can rewrite the optimality
condition (5.4) as:
(1   ) ·  f +   ·  m = p (5.5)
The eﬃciency condition for human capital investment takes the standard Bowen-
Lindahl-Samuelson form for public good expenditures. Parents will invest in
human capital up to the point in which the weighted sum of the (expected)
marginal willingness to pay for human capital investment of father and mother
is equal to the price of education.
How does the Macedonian CCT program relate to this setting? The targeting of
mothers versus household heads changes parental relative income and therefore
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provides an exogenous change in the Pareto weight  . If we indicate wf and wm
as the contribution to household income attributed to the mother and the father
in the family, the CCT program generates an exogenous change in the relative
income in the household, wf/wm. We are implicitly assuming that the direction
of the derivative is positive in municipalities where the payments are made to
mothers (since   indicates the weight associated to mother’s utility function) and
negative in municipalities where the payments are made to household heads. We
are therefore assuming that
@ 
@
⇣
wf
wm
⌘ > 0 (5.6)
in the municipalities where the payments is targeted to mothers.
Since the CCT program provides an exogenous shift in the Pareto weight, we are
therefore interested in understanding how such a change towards one household
member or the other would aﬀect the decision to invest on the child. Using
Implicit Function theorem, we can derive the change in h induced by a change in
 10:
@h
@ 
=
⇡L · rL ·
 
v0m(rL · h)  v0f (rL · h)
 
+ ⇡H · rH ·
 
v0m(rH · h)  v0f (rH · h)
 
D
(5.7)
where D > 0. Targeting women is beneficial for human capital investment if they
have stronger preferences for child education, e.g. @h@  > 0 if v
0
f (h) < v
0
m(h) for any
h. If we observe a positive increase in investment in human capital in municipal-
ities where the payments are made to women, we would expect that this is driven
by a change in the Pareto weight induced by the program. Additionally, the
model indicates that this would attributable to a diﬀerent sensitivity of the mar-
ginal propensity to pay for child education compare with respect to consumption
among decision makers. The size of the eﬀect depends on preference diﬀerences
among parents and on the cost/benefit of human capital investment (the relative
price for education and the expected returns). The intuition behind this res-
ult is that when expected returns are small both parents have small incentives
to invest. Once the return becomes larger the incentives to invest on education
become stronger for the parent who has stronger preferences for human capital in-
vestment. When expected returns are suﬃciently large both parents have strong
10A detailed derivation is provided in the 5.8.
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incentives to invest in human capital. We would therefore expect to observe a
diﬀerential eﬀect on human capital investment only when subjective expectations
are suﬃciently large to compensate for reductions in consumption.
5.3 The Macedonian CCT for Secondary School
Education
5.3.1 Background
The Republic of Macedonia is a country of roughly 2 million inhabitants at the
centre of the Balkan region, in South-Eastern Europe. It is classified as an upper
middle income country, registering in 2012 a GDP per capita of 4,568$ in current
USD and 11,700$ in PPP11. From the education perspective, overall, the country
is achieving good levels of primary school completion, with a gross (adjusted)
enrolment rate in primary school equal to 98 percent in 201012. At the same time,
it is slightly under-performing on secondary school completion rates in comparison
to the average among developing countries in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA)
region. In 2010, Macedonia registered a gross secondary school enrolment of 90
percent and a net rate of 84 percent (compared to 92 and 85 percent in the ECA
region). However, if we focus on the poorest share of the population, secondary
school achievement is significantly lower, putting at risk the skill formation of
the children with higher probabilities to face the consequences of child poverty in
their lives. Net enrolment rates in secondary school age among Social Financial
Assistance (SFA) recipients were 67% for girls and 65% for boys at the beginning
of the school year 2009/2010, roughly 20 percentage points smaller than the
country average.Figure 5.2 shows the share of children in SFA households who
are either enrolled or have completed any secondary school program (two, three or
four-year) by age of the child. This shows that among poor households, children
tend to enter secondary school later (the curve has a positive slope from 15 to
16 years old) and the achievement rate for higher ages is considerably smaller,
providing evidence of a high rate of drop-outs.
Before introducing the program, it is important to summarise the Macedonian
education system (see Figure 5.3 for a graphical summary). Students access
11Based on The World Bank classification and databank.
12Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
Institute for Statistics.
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secondary school after the completion of primary education, which is oﬀered from
6 to 15 years old on a three three-year cycles with classroom teaching in grades 1-
5 and subject teaching in grades 6-9. Secondary education, which is compulsory
and free of charge in public schools, is divided into specialised (languages and
science-mathematics) preparatory schools oﬀering four-year programs, general
education and art secondary school oﬀering three or four-year programs, and
vocational education schools oﬀer two-, three-, or four-year programs. At the end
of preparatory schools and general secondary education, students sit the matura
exam, but there are also final exams at the end of three- and four-year vocational
education programs.
5.3.2 The program
The Macedonian “Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) for Secondary School Edu-
cation” is a social protection program aiming at increasing secondary school en-
rolment and completion rate among children in the poorest households of the
population. It was first implemented by the Macedonian Ministry of Labour and
Social Policy in Fall 2010 and provided cash transfers to poor households condi-
tional on having children in school-age attending secondary school at least 85% of
the time. In order to target poor households, the Ministry of Labour and Social
Policy decided to oﬀer the program to the beneficiaries of the Social Financial
Assistance (SFA) benefit, which is the most significant income support program,
accounting for around 0.5 percent of GDP and 50 percent of total spending on
social assistance (Verme, 2008). SFA is a mean-tested monetary transfer granted
to people who are fit for work, are socially not provided for and cannot support
themselves. The amount paid for SFA is equivalent to the diﬀerence between
household income and the social assistance amount determined for the house-
hold, depending on household size and time spent in SFA, varying from 1 825
MKD (around 40 USD) for one-member household to 4 500 MKD (around 98
USD) for households with 5 or more members. It is considered as the benefit of
last resort, meaning it is provided after other benefits if the household income is
still below a certain living standards threshold. It is mainly collected by house-
holds in the poorest tail of the income distribution; in 2009, the World Bank13
reports that total SFA benefits are collected for 55 percent by the poorest quintile,
22 percent by the second poorest quintile and 11 percent to the middle quintile.
13I make reference to the “Project Appraisal Document - Report No: 47195-MK” between
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the World Bank.
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The total annual amount of the subsidy provided by the CCT if all conditions are
met is 12 000 MKD (roughly 240 USD) to be paid in quarterly instalments. Cash
transfers refer to the school quarters that constitute a school year, which follows
the following division in quarters: from September to October, from November to
December, from mid-January to March and from April to mid-June. CCT pay-
ments are made immediately after the school quarter is completed and data about
attendance is checked. Therefore, the payments are scheduled at the following
times: December, February, May and July.
The management of the CCT program was integrated within the social protection
system and conditionality is controlled using a national software. Secondary
schools enters attendance data at the end of each period and Social Welfare
Centres (SWC), which are the administrative bodies managing payments for all
benefits of financial assistance, issue the payment if the conditionality is met.
Compliance with local guidelines governing the gender of the recipient is therefore
easy to ensure, given that the full CCT management is computerised and the
payments are processed depending on the family composition originally entered
in the social protection system. The payment is processed via nominal cheques,
which can be cashed in at banks or post oﬃces14.
5.3.3 Research design
The objective of the program was to increase the enrolment and attendance of
children in secondary school age among poor households. In a first impact eval-
uation of the program, Armand and Carneiro (2013) compared the evolution in
outcomes of SFA recipients from the pre-CCT to the post-CCT period to the
evolution of outcomes for recipients of a similar type of Social Assistance and
ineligible for CCT during the same period and found that after two years of its
implementation the CCT had led to an increase in secondary school attendance
among 15-19 years old children by roughly 6.5 percentage points. This is a sub-
stantial impact, given that average enrolment is close to 65% for this group. At
the same time, they find that the eﬀect of the program is driven only by en-
rolment, while the program had no eﬀect on attendance. Was such an increase
in enrolment equal among payment modalities or was there a beneficial eﬀect of
targeting mothers versus household head? Even if on average the program had
14Starting from the third year of the CCT, which is not considered in this chapter, payments
have been processed using transactional accounts only, which allow a stronger enforcement of
the payment modality.
123
5. Who wears the trousers in the family? 124
no impact on attendance, would targeting mothers increase the outcome in that
dimension too?
When first considering the implementation of a program to fight the low Macedo-
nian enrolment rates among poor households, the government of Macedonia faced
very specific design challenges and considered that gender-targeted transfers could
have played a central role in educational choices since women empowerment is
an important issue in the country. In 2011, the World Bank reported that the
ratio of female-to-male labour force participation was 62 percent, smaller than
the average of developing countries in the ECA region (68 percent). The ratio
is presumably much more significant when considering the poorest share of the
Macedonian population. For this reason, changing the identity of who controls
the resources within the household was thought as having potentially dramatic
consequences for household decision-making.
An experiment was then designed to test whether gender-targeted transfers could
generate diﬀerential results. For this purpose, recipients of the cash transfer were
randomised allowing payments to be received by either the the mother of the
child or the household head, who is generally male15. The CCT program defines
“Household Head” the person in the household that is registered at the Social
Welfare Centre (SWC) for Social Financial Assistance. According to the rulebook
for acquiring the right to Financial Assistance, the Household Head is determined
by the following ordered rules: if there is an employed person in the household,
the household head would be the employed person; if there is a pensioner, the
household head would be the pensioner; if no employed person or pensioner exist
in the household, the household head is the unemployed person representing the
household; for all other households, the SWC selects the Household Head as the
person representing the household.
Randomisation of the payment modality was done at municipality level using
stratification by population size. The Republic of Macedonia is divided into 84
municipalities, which were first divided into 7 groups depending on population
size and then randomised into two groups, one of which has 42 municipalities
15Looking at the Baseline data, among Social Financial Assistance recipients, in non-single
parent households, in 90% of households the household head is the male partner (and father
of children eligible for the CCT). In single parent households, the household head is the male
partner only in 32% of households. Non-single parent households represent 88% of Social
Financial Assistance households.
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Figure 5.1: Program timescale and data collection
and where the payment of the transfer is done to the mother of the child, and
the other which also has 42 municipalities and where the payment is transferred
to the household head, regardless of gender. Panel A of Figure 5.4 presents the
randomisation of treatment modalities across Macedonian municipalities.
5.4 Data
The data used in the chapter comes from a diﬀerent number of sources. The
main datasets are the Macedonian Household Surveys collected by the Ministry
of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP), which contains detailed information on
a variety of household information (demographics, expenditures, durable goods,
housing characteristics) and individual level information on household members
(education, health, labour supply). For children enrolled in secondary school, the
Household Survey is supplemented with administrative data about attendance
and performance at school. Additionally, I make use of diﬀerent aggregated data
at municipality level, supplied by Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce, to construct
measures of sex ratios, local labour market characteristics and other marriage
market indicators.
For the scope of CCT program evaluation, two household surveys were collected
during the Winter 2010, at the beginning of the program, and in Fall 2012,
after two years of implementation. The baseline survey was conducted between
November and December 2010, coinciding with the beginning of the first school
year in which CCT program became available. At baseline, households were
interviewed during the first two months of the program, rather than before the
start of the intervention. However, it is reasonable to believe that this timeline
had no eﬀect on baseline results, since the program implementation was very
slow at the beginning and the first payments were processed only in March-April
2010. In contrast, the survey was quick and the last interviews were carried out
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by the end of December. In parallel with the household survey, administrative
data on student attendance and performance was collected by visiting secondary
schools and collecting school records. This allowed double-checking the validity
of self-reported information on school enrolment. Figure 5.1 shows the timescale
of the program implementation and of the data collections.
At baseline, a sample of eligible households was produced using the Ministry of
Labour and Social Policy’s electronic database of the recipients of all types of
financial assistance, which has been assembled during Summer 2010 along with
the implementation of the program. The population frame has been produced
using the hardcopy archives at Social Welfare Centres (SWCs), which are the
main territorial units for social welfare provision. There are 27 inter-municipal
SWCs and they function as the key public providers of professional services in
social work. The use of the electronic database for sampling allowed identifying
12481 SFA households with at least one child of secondary school age, from which
we drew a random sample16.
The follow-up survey was collected during the Fall of 2012. In order to minimise
attrition, we made use of the detailed tracking information collected at baseline17.
This methodology proved to have worked acceptably well during the follow-up
data collection. In terms of SFA recipients, 1205 households were interviewed at
baseline and, among those, 126 households were not found or refused to answer
at follow-up, resulting in an attrition rate of 11.7%. 5.8 presents some robustness
checks related to attrition and provides evidence that attrition at follow-up didn’t
changed significantly the composition of the sample for each treatment modality.
Table 5.2 presents the main characteristics at baseline of the household and the
children in the sample, comparing the two diﬀerent treatment groups. Households
16We aimed for a sample size of 17 households eligible for the CCT (recipients of social and
financial assistance with children of secondary school age) per municipality, although in practice
there was some variation in this number due to the fact that in some municipalities the eligible
population was smaller then 17. For power calculations, we considered a power of 0.8 and
a significance level of 0.05. With 42 clusters per arm and an inter-cluster correlation of
0.25, using 17 households per municipality it would be possible to detect a diﬀerence
in expenditures in children’s education (or in any other item) of 0.33 of a standard
deviation and an increase in the proportion of students attending 85% or more of the
classes of roughly 10% points.
17We collected and updated contact information of at least two relatives or neighbours of the
surveyed households, including addresses and telephone numbers. This allowed us minimising
the risk of not finding the household in case they moved to another address or are not present
at home during the attempt to interview them and to limit attrition to non-response due to
refusal.
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are composed by 4.7 members and have on average 0.7 boys and 0.78 girls in
the age category 13-18 years old. Household heads are male in 90 percent of
households and have a low level of education with half having completed upper
primary only and 20 percent having completed lower primary or not having a
degree. Almost half of the sample lives in rural municipalities, while 14 percent
of sampled households lives in the main urban area18, which is the capital city of
Skopje. If we look at living conditions, we can note that almost all households
have access to a private toilet, but for only 45 percent the toilet is connected to
sewerage and in only 76 percent of cases households have access to a connection
to public water. If we turn our attentions at the structure of consumption, we
can notice that households consume roughly 12 percent in education, compared
to a 60 percent share in food. As an indicator of the disadvantaged situation of
these households, we can underline that the consumption share for tobacco and
alcohol is roughly 6 percent. In a comparison of the mothers and fathers, we
can note that mothers are on average 42 years old and relatively younger than
fathers, which are on average 45 years old. In addition, mothers are relatively
less educated than fathers, with roughly 30 percent having achieved only lower
primary or less, compared to a 20 percent for fathers. If we look instead at
children, we can note that average age at baseline was 15.30 years old and among
sampled children 57.4 percent was enrolled in secondary school and 34.1 percent
was already enrolled in secondary school.
On most dimensions, the samples in municipalities where the payments are made
to mothers and where the payments are made to household heads are balanced at
baseline. While we find some unbalanced variables, normalised diﬀerences never
exceeds 0.25, which is the limit suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)
beyond which a linear specification is not appropriate. In order to control for
such imbalances, in addition to individual and municipality controls, I include
in any specification the baseline value of the dependent variable and the mean
dependent variable at baseline for the correspondent age group.
18I use the Macedonian administrative definition of rural area as defined by the Law on
Territorial Organisation of the Local Self-Government (OG 55/2004, 12/2005). According to the
Law, municipalities are defined as “rural” if they have a seat in a village and “urban” if they have
a seat in town. Towns are defined as “compactly built up residential areas with a population
exceeding 3000, has a developed structure of various economic activities, above 51% of the
employees are working in the secondary and tertiary sector, has an urban physiognomy of zones
for residence, recreation and green area (parks), town square, street infrastructure, communal
services and acts as a functional centre for the surrounding populated places”. Villages are
defined as “mono-functional populated areas, in which one business activity is prevalent and
whereas the area has agricultural physiognomy and function”.
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5.4.1 Subjective expectations of schooling returns
To the purpose of collecting information on the heterogeneity in subjective ex-
pectations, during both baseline and follow-up data collection, a specific section
was filled for each male and female youngest adolescent (aged 10 up to 17) in
the household. This resulted in a total of 1455 children (750 boys and 705 girls)
selected to answer the section, of which 136 didn’t complete the section (char-
acterising non-response rate of 9.35 percent), 111 where attrited at follow-up19
and 120 were too young to be enrolled in secondary school at follow-up. Among
those, for the purpose of the study, I select the children that are in secondary
school age at the time of the follow-up (14-19 years old, including age 14 and 19
to allow for children to enter secondary school earlier or stay longer due to not
passing a grade) and I restrict the sample to only households where both parents
are present. These results in 920 children that will be object of the study.
A description of the module used to collect information on subjective expectations
of schooling returns is provided in Section 3.2.1. In the chapter, in order to build
expected income and variance, I assume a triangular distribution and I make use
of only the first probability reported by the respondent. Chapter 3 analyses the
diﬀerences between distributional assumptions and the choice of using diﬀerent
reported probabilities. All the results are robust to these assumptions.
The sample provides evidence that expected income and returns are greatly het-
erogeneous across individuals. Figure 5.5 reports the sample distribution of ex-
pected income for diﬀerent levels of completed education, divided by gender.
As we can notice both expected income after primary and secondary school are
similar for boys and girls, but the main characteristics is that in the sample house-
holds have largely heterogeneous expectations. Table 5.3 presents the descriptive
statistics for subjective expectations and a comparison among diﬀerent treat-
ment groups. I cannot identify any significant diﬀerence across groups, providing
evidence that at baseline, expectations were balanced among diﬀerent treatment
modalities. Additionally, in relation to the complexity of this section of the ques-
tionnaire, a possible issue is the presence of missing values. Panel B of Table
H1 reports the estimated diﬀerence in the probability of having a missing value
for expectations at baseline. For each child in the household that was selected
in order to collect subjective expectations, the dependent variable is a dummy
19Attrition didn’t generate significant diﬀerences driven by the treatment modality. 5.8 dis-
cusses the checks related to attrition bias in detail.
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variable equal to one if data is missing due to incomplete reporting or to refusal
and is equal to zero if the data is complete. Columns 1-2 and 4-5 are estimated
using OLS, while Column 3 and 6 are estimated using a Probit model. The coef-
ficient is very close to zero, stable across specifications and never significant. The
treatment doesn’t seem to influence the chance of having a missing data in the
expectation section, even when considering a extended (14-19 years old) versus a
reduced sample (15-18 years old).
5.5 Empirical strategy
The evaluation design for the comparison of alternative CCT modalities allows
examining diﬀerences in outcomes by comparing households living in municipal-
ities with diﬀerent payment modalities. Since the municipalities were allocated
at random to diﬀerent payment modalities, they should be identical (on average)
on all their other characteristics, observed or unobserved. Therefore, a simple
comparison across municipalities will give us the impact on enrolment  im of im-
plementing one versus another payment modality. Let Mim be an indicator that
takes value 1 if household i lives in municipality m where payments are done to
the mother of the child and equal to 0 if payments are instead done to the head of
household. In order to estimate the eﬀect of diﬀerent modalities on the enrolment
I estimate the following Probit model:
 im,2012 = ↵ +  MMim +  0 · ExpRetim,2010 +  2 · ExpIncPrimim,2010
+
2X
j=1
⌧j · V arIncijm,2010 + (5.8)
+
2X
j=1
 j · PrWorkijm,2010 +X 0im  +  im,2010 + ✏im (5.9)
where ExpRetim,2010 is the expected return to secondary school, ExpIncPrimim,2010
is the expected income when completing only primary school, V arIncijm,2010 are
the variances of income when completing educational level j, PrWorkijm,2010 are
the probabilities to be employed at age 25 when completing educational level j,
Xim is a vector of individual, household and municipality characteristics and "im
is a residual. Educational levels considered are j = 1 if the only primary school is
completed and j = 2 if secondary school is completed. The impact on enrolment
of paying the mother of the child as opposed to paying the head of household
is given by  M . In order to control for potential imbalances in the outcomes of
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interest at baseline, I estimate Equation 5.9 by including the observed value of
the dependent variable at baseline,  ⇤im,2010 in the model.
In order to check for heterogeneity in the impact of the payment modality in
the subjective returns to schooling, I compute indicator variables identifying the
quantile of the sample distribution to which the individual return belong to and
I estimate the following model by interacting the indicator variable with the
payment modality indicator:
 im,2012 = ↵ +  M,LMim ·DLim,2010 +  M,MMim ·DMim,2010 +  M,HMim ·DHim,2010 +
+⌘L ·DLim,2010 + ⌘H ·DHim,2010 +  2 · ExpIncij,2010 +
+
2X
j=1
⌧j · V arIncijm,2010 +
2X
j=1
 j · PrWorkijm,2010 +
+X 0im  +  im,2010 + ✏im (5.10)
where DLim,2010, DMim,2010 and DHim,2010 are indicator variables for the return being
in the lowest, middle and higher tercile.
A similar specification is used to analyse the eﬀect heterogeneity in the subjective
expectations of returns to schooling in terms of employment. In this case, I look at
the interaction between the treatment indicator variable and the subjective gain
in the probability of being employed after completing secondary school. This is
defined as the diﬀerence between the subjective probability of being employed at
age 25 after having completed secondary school and the subjective probability
of being employed at age 25 after having completed primary school only, e.g.
PrWorki2m,2010   PrWorki1m,2010.
5.6 Results
This section presents the results of the chapter. In all specifications I include
controls for gender, age and education of mothers and fathers, ethnicity and
religion of the household, household size, number of female and male children
in age 14-19 (extended secondary school age) and age 6-13 (primary school age)
and municipality controls (rural and capital city dummies). Year and semester
of birth dummies and Regional dummies are included in all specifications. For
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clarity, all tables related to the eﬀect of paying mothers versus household heads
omit all estimated coeﬃcients for controls diﬀerent than subjective expectations.
The large set of outcomes studied in the chapter raises concerns about multiple
inference, i.e. the probability of erroneously rejecting at least one null hypothesis
of no impact naturally increases with the number of outcomes considered. To deal
with multiple inference, all significance levels are adjusted following Romano and
Wolf (2005).
5.6.1 Resource ownership and schooling outcomes
In order to understand how targeting (conditional) cash transfers to mothers
versus household heads lead to diﬀerential outcomes, Table 5.4 shows the es-
timates of the enrolment regressions specified by Equations 5.9 and 5.10. The
dependent variable is equal to one if the child is either enrolled or has completed
any secondary school. The model is estimated using a linear index Probit model
and allows controlling for baseline average of the dependent variable.
We can note that in municipalities where payments were targeted to women, at
the beginning of the school year 2012/2013 there is no significant diﬀerence in
term of enrolment/achievement in secondary school when considering the sample
as a whole. Since we are interested in analysing the heterogeneity in the eﬀect on
ex-ante expectations, Panel B presents the results for the interactions with the
subjective returns to schooling, while Panel C presents the interaction with the
return in the probability of being employed. If we look at the eﬀect for children
with diﬀerent expected returns, we can note that targeting mothers provides a
significant positive eﬀect for the highest tercile of the distribution of returns to
schooling, where the probability of being enrolled or having completed secondary
school is 9.8 percent higher. If we look instead at the heterogeneity in the return
in terms of employment, we find a significant positive eﬀect for children in the
middle tercile of the return distribution. For this children, targeting payments
to mothers leads to an increase in the probability to enrol in secondary school
of 10.5 percentage points. It is important to note that, when controlling for
heterogeneity in ex-ante expectations, the coeﬃcient in the lowest tercile is close
to zero and not significant. This provides evidence that targeting mothers is
beneficial, but only if parental perceived returns are suﬃciently large. I don’t
find any significant diﬀerence of targeting mothers versus household head for
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children whose pre-program expectations were low.
What mechanism is driving an increase in the probability to be enrolled in school
when targeting women in households with high expected returns? In the next
sub-sections, I will compare possible mechanisms through which targeting women
can be beneficial for school achievement.
5.6.1.1 Expenditure shares
In order to understand the mechanism driving a larger school achievement in
municipalities where the payments are made to women, I estimate the eﬀect of
the payment modality on individual expenditure shares20. Individual expenditure
shares on education are defined as the ratio between monetary expenditure on
education for the child and total household expenditure. Expenditure on educa-
tion includes school fees, uniforms, school supplies, textbooks, additional courses
and other expenses, transportation and meals at school. While up to secondary
school, public education is free, cost such as transportation and living costs are
still important to determine whether children go to school or drop-out.
Table 5.5 presents the estimates of a linear regression of individual shares on the
payment modality indicator and its interactions with ex-ante returns to schooling
and ex-ante returns in terms of employment. Results show that while we cannot
identify a significant eﬀect for the whole sample, in municipalities were payments
are made to mothers, a significant diﬀerence in individual shares is found, but
only for children whose ex-ante expectations presented larger returns to schooling,
both in monetary and employment terms. For children in the highest tercile of the
distribution of expected returns, targeting mothers increase individual shares by
3.8 percent compared to targeting household heads. Similarly, an increase of 3.9
percent in found for children in the highest tercile of the distribution of returns
to schooling in terms of employment. This is consistent with the idea that tar-
geting women would improve educational achievement by switching expenditures
towards public goods, such as education, if women have stronger preferences for
this good compared to men. These results are consistent with estimation using
correction for attrition (see 5.8 for a discussion about attrition).
20?? describes how expenditure data have been collected and how it is structured.
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If we look at boys and girls diﬀerently, we can observe that this eﬀect is mainly
driven by higher monetary returns to schooling for girls and higher returns in
terms of employment for boys. Table 5.6 provides estimates of the eﬀect on
individual expenditure shares by estimating the model separately for boys and
girls. The results are consistent with the idea that boys and girls have diﬀerent
issues related to schooling and the entrance in the labour market. Results might
be explained by the fact that girls tend to go to school more often if their parents
perceive they can obtain a higher monetary return, while for boys targeting of
resources is mainly driven by gains in the probability of being employed at age
25.
5.6.1.2 Monitoring and time use
The conditionality introduced by the CCT might interact with parental incentives
related to child attendance. Parental behaviour might change in response to who
is receiving the CCT transfer if parents increase their monitoring of schooling
activities in a diﬀerent way. In other words, are payment delivered to mothers
providing better outcome in terms of secondary school achievement because moth-
ers tend to monitor better their children and control whether they are attending
to school21?
To this purpose, we collected at baseline and at follow-up information on the
frequency in which parents talk to children about school. We collected this in-
formation for the youngest adolescent enrolled in primary school and for the
youngest adolescent enrolled in secondary school during the year previous to the
interview (the two years for the follow-up). Table 5.7 presents the estimates of
the eﬀect of payment modalities on the probability for the parents to talk to
children about school on a daily basis22. Results show no eﬀect on parental mon-
itoring. This is consistent with the findings on the overall impact of the CCT
21Additionally, I find no diﬀerence among treatment modalities related to whether parents
are more informed or have a better knowledge of the program where payments are made to
the mother versus the household head. I don’t test this hypothesis jointly with the others.
In order to answer this question, we asked the respondent to answer some specific questions
about the program characteristics, and specifically whether they heard about the program
name, whether they know the conditionality, whether they are aware of the total amount of
the CCT transfer, whether the know which groups are eligible, which school level is targeted
and whether they know how many instalments are paid. I cannot identify a precise pattern of
diﬀerence across the two groups, providing evidence that the program modality didn’t generate
substantial diﬀerences in the way people understand and know about the program.
22Similar results are obtained if we control for the probability to talk to children monthly,
yearly or never.
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on attendance, showing a zero impact and providing evidence that monitoring of
school attendance might not be central for the Macedonian case (Armand and
Carneiro, 2013). In fact, at baseline only 8 percent of children attending school
was attending less than 85 percent of classes and 60 percent was attending 95
percent or more classes.
Another mechanism through which parents might invest diﬀerentially on children
is through time spent with children. To this purpose, we collected information
on the amount of time spent by both parents the day before the interview on
diﬀerent activities. Table 5.8 presents the results for the total time (expressed as
share of the day) spent by both mothers and fathers with their children23. Results
show very little eﬀect on the way parents allocate their time in municipalities with
diﬀerent payment modalities. This provides additional evidence that targeting
mothers do not change significantly the way parents monitor the schooling or the
way parents spend time with their children. This might due to the fact that the
program is targeting children older than 15 years old, an age category in which
human capital investment through time spent with them might not be relevant.
5.7 Robustness checks
5.7.1 Expectations and enrolment in Secondary School
The first question we need to answer in this section is whether subjective expect-
ations do correlate with schooling outcomes or in other words we need to control
whether subjective returns to schooling matter in explaining education demand.
Table 5.9 presents the coeﬃcients on subjective expectations for the model (5.9).
The dependent variable is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the child is
enrolled or has completed any secondary school at the beginning of the school
year 2012/2013 and is equal to 0 otherwise. If we look at how ex-ante expecta-
tions matter for enrolment, returns to secondary school are significantly positive
only for the component of expected income after completion of secondary school.
When we control for measures associated to the variance of expected income, we
don’t find any significant eﬀect, while the coeﬃcients associated with expected
income are robust. Additionally, controlling for the probability of being employed
at the age of 25 after completing primary and secondary school, shows that both
23Similar results are found if we analyse the share of the day spent helping children studying
or on leisure activities with children.
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variables explain secondary school enrolment. If parents expected a high prob-
ability of employment after primary school, the probability of having completed
or being enrolled in secondary school two years after is lower, while the oppos-
ite is true for expectations of employment after secondary school. This result
is consistent with the recent literature (Jensen, 2010; Attanasio and Kaufmann,
2009) which provides evidence that perceived returns are important to explain
how individuals take educational choices.
5.7.2 Endogeneity of reported expectations
While we showed that subjective expectations are important for explaining edu-
cation demand and heterogeneous program eﬀects, we need to control whether we
are measuring subjective returns associated to schooling or whether reported ex-
pectations are capturing other variables and incentives. This sub-section aims at
showing that subjective expectations play an important role in explaining second-
ary school enrolment even after controlling for several indicators that could have
generated omitted variable bias. Firstly, parental expectations might directly re-
flect the chances to go to secondary school, so that wealthier households would
report higher returns to compensate for the fact that they can aﬀord sending
their children to school. Since most household adult members are unemployed,
we cannot rely on income since at the moment of the interview the respondent’s
only oﬃcial source of income is the social assistance benefit. In this case, it is
very diﬃcult to observe household’s long run economic status, which is the main
determinant of important choices like human capital investment. One possible
solution proposed by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) is to use principal-component
approach and information collected on assets owned by the household to compute
an asset index proxying wealth24. I make use of the rich information about house-
hold asset ownership collected at baseline to build a pre-program wealth index
and divide households into three groups depending on the percentile position in
distribution of the index.
While Column (1) in Table 5.10 present estimates of the subjective expecta-
tions coeﬃcients in model 5.9 controlling only for individual and municipality
characteristics, Column (2) reports the same estimates by controlling for house-
hold pre-program wealth. Results suggest that controlling for household wealth
doesn’t aﬀect significantly the coeﬃcients on expectations. This is supported by
24See 5.8 for details on how the index was built and for robustness checks.
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the fact that expected returns are equally distributed across wealth groups (see
Figure 5.6). In other words, children in households with low wealth tend not
to enrol in secondary school, but among those the ones associated with higher
returns have higher probability to go to school. This result is consistent with
using expenditure data to rank households, rather than asset information.
Secondly, subjective returns could be aﬀected by direct costs associated with
distance to school and with availability of better schools. This is particularly
important since direct costs of attending school are often associated with the
enrolment decision, especially when considering poor households. In Macedonia,
as previously explained, up to secondary school, public education is free, therefore
issues related to tuition and enrolment costs are not a concern in this study.
In addition, recipients of Social Financial Assistance are entitled to free books.
However, we need to consider transportation and living costs related to attending
school, which rely directly on the accessibility of the school from the location
where the household live. Secondary schools are built in main towns and cities
in the largest municipalities, therefore for children living in smaller villages, the
accessibility to a secondary school might be the main reason for early drop-outs
and, perhaps, for low expected returns.
For this reason, I compute distance from secondary school as a proxy to capture
costs associated with transportation and living costs. Figure 5.4 presents the geo-
graphical distribution of secondary schools (distinguishing among schools oﬀering
only courses in Macedonian language and school oﬀering course in Albanian and
Turkish) and of sampled households, along with the road network. In order to
construct a measure of distance from the household dwelling to the secondary
school, I make use of geographic coordinates collected for each household and for
each secondary school in the country. I compute road distance and time required
to reach the school by car for each school in the country, in order to identify
the closest secondary school. In addition, in order to check for the robustness
of the measure, I perform the same method using the closest school providing a
program taught in the same ethnic language of the household and by the type of
the program oﬀered25. Results are summarised in Table 5.1.
In order to check for school quality, information on the main characteristics of the
schools were collected. In particular, information was collected about the number
25 I diﬀerentiate schools oﬀering preparatory high school programs versus any other programs.
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Table 5.1: Distance from secondary school
Distance from Mean Standard deviation
...closest school 9.610 (9.615)
...closest school of same ethnicity 13.277 (16.179)
...closest preparatory high school 10.260 (9.657)
Note. Distances are reported in kilometres. Closest distance is computed as the minimum
distance from the dwelling of the household to the closest available school using the available
road network.
of students, the number of classes, the number of teachers and a series of supply-
side indicators related to the school building (for example, the number of toilets
available or whether the school has a gym) and to the learning oﬀer (for example,
the number of computers available or whether the school provides classes in a sci-
ence lab). To control for local school quality, I construct the teacher-to-student
ratio and the suspension rate for violent behaviour in the closest school to the
household. Column (3) in Table 5.10 present estimates of the subjective expect-
ations coeﬃcients in model 5.9 adding controls for distance to the closest school
and for the teacher-to-student ratio in the closest school. The coeﬃcients are ro-
bust even after controlling for these measures, providing evidence that measures
related to direct costs associated to schooling and to school quality do not aﬀect
reported expectations.
Another concern related to using subjective expectations in schooling models
is that reported returns might be correlated with unobserved taste heterogen-
eity. In this case, in order to test for the robustness of the estimates, I check
whether subjective expectations encompass monetary returns related to comple-
tion of primary or secondary school that are not directly related to the increase
in productivity associated to schooling. For instance, reported returns to sec-
ondary school might include higher returns in the marriage market (Attanasio
and Kaufmann, 2009) or might be correlated with returns in the crime market.
Both are outside options that could have important consequences on schooling
decisions and, in both cases, reported expectations might be diﬀerent from the
monetary returns linked to an increase in human capital. For this purpose, I
construct measures of the marriage market and the crime market to control for
this relationship. In Column (4) of Table 5.10 a Probit model for the enrolment
decision is estimated by controlling for a marriage market indicator. I use male
and female population at municipality level to build sex ratios in the age group
10-24 years old. In Column (5) I additionally control for the local characteristics
of the juvenile crime market. I control for the local variation in the number of
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convictions and reported crimes for juvenile perpetrators (younger than 18 years
old) in the period before the data collection (2007-2010)26 and by normalising it
by the municipality population. In both cases, we can observe that controlling for
measures related to the marriage and the crime market do no aﬀect the estimates
significantly.
5.7.3 Cognitive dissonance bias
One of the main reasons why subjective expectations have not been used in
choice models is that they might suﬀer from cognitive dissonance, i.e. respondents
reports expectations that are consistent with their decisions. If the collected data
suﬀer from cognitive dissonance we would therefore face the following situation.
Imagine that E⇤[Y |Ei = 1, J ] is the real expected income conditional on being
employed after having achieved education level j, while E[Y |Ei = 1, J ] is the
reported expectation. Data would suﬀer from cognitive bias if an individual who
opted to enrol in education J = j (in our case, secondary school) would report
expectations such that the expected income consistent with the decision is higher
than the real expectations. We would therefore have the following case:
E[Y |Ei = 1, J = j] > E⇤[Y |Ei = 1, J = j] (5.11)
Using subjective expectations aﬀected by cognitive dissonance in choice models
would therefore upward bias our estimates. In order to test for cognitive dis-
sonance, I make use of the panel dimension of the dataset and I compare the
expectations reported at 2010 and the expectations for the same child reported
at 2012, after a decision is taken. Section 4.5.3 provides evidence that parents
with children in primary school age at baseline had similar expectations com-
pared with children in secondary school age, even when comparing children at
the margin. This provides evidence that cognitive dissonance bias is not an issue.
26I use the Macedonian State Statistical Oﬃce definitions for adult and juvenile perpetrator
of a crime. Adult perpetrator of crime is a person who has committed crime and who at the
time of committing the crime had reached 18 years of age, and has committed the crime as:
executor, accomplice, initiator or assistant. Convicted person is an adult person recognised as
responsible, against whom penal measures have been imposed. Juvenile perpetrator of crime
is a perpetrator of crime who at the time of the execution of the crime had reached the age of
14, but not yet the age of 18 and has preformed the crime as: executor, accomplice, initiator
or assistant. Reported juvenile is a juvenile against whom the legal procedure after the filed
charges was not raised (the charge was rejected), against whom the proceeding has been stopped
or a proposal has been applied for announcing a penalty or educational measure. Convicted
person is a juvenile perpetrator of crime against whom with a Court decision a legal sanction
has been pronounced-juvenile imprisonment or educational measures.
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5.8 Conclusion
Decisions about human capital investment for children are particularly important
in developing countries, where there is tendency to underinvest due to market fail-
ures related to information, such as incomplete or asymmetric information. At the
same time there is still no consensus about the decision processes of households,
which are central in determining human capital investments for the children. It is
therefore important to study how intra-household resource control and subject-
ive expectations for the returns to schooling interact to determine human capital
investment decisions. In this chapter, in order to identify the causal eﬀect of
a change in intra-household resource ownership on household decisions, I made
use of a randomised experiment linked to a secondary school conditional cash
transfer in the Republic of Macedonia and of information on subjective returns
to schooling. The conditional cash transfer provides an exogenous shock to intra-
household resource ownership by targeting payments to mothers versus household
heads. The chapter provides evidence that targeting cash transfers to mothers has
a beneficial eﬀect, but only for households were ex-ante expectations presented
higher returns to schooling, both in monetary and employment terms. I provide
evidence that for these children, individual expenditure shares for education are
higher where payments are targeted to mothers.
These findings suggest that in order to understand the role of each member in
familial interactions is key to clarify how these relates to subjective expectations.
This is particularly important in developing countries since perceived returns to
education are often are below the market returns. Additionally, as I showed in the
chapter, individuals have largely heterogeneous expectations related to education
and the perceived returns do correlate with future choices and outcomes. If
shifts in parental expectations have indirect impacts on the decision to invest
on human capital, then much work need to be done in order to understand how
subjective expectations form, how they evolve over time and how they interact
with individual and collective choices.
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Figure 5.2: Enrollment curve among Social Financial Assistance recipients (15-19
years old)
Note: The graph represents the share of children which are enrolled in 2, 3 or 4-year secondary
school programs among Social Financial Assistance households. This is based on author’s
calculation using the baseline household survey and using sampling weights based on Social
Financial Assistance population updated at summer 2010.
Figure 5.3: Educational system in Macedonia
Note: Conditional Cash Transfer is targeting children who are in Social Financial Assistance
families and who haven’t completed secondary school up to age 23. Access to secondary school
is provided upon completion of primary school. Access to university is possible only after
completion of general and artistic secondary school. We don’t consider here religious education.
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Figure 5.4: Randomisation of treatment across municipalities and distribution of
secondary schools and sampled households
Panel A. Randomisation of treatment across municipalities
Panel B. Secondary schools and sampled households
Note. The Macedonian administrative division includes 8 regions and 84 municipalities. Ran-
domisation of the payment modality was done at municipality level and using stratification
by population size, dividing municipalities into 7 groups. Households and secondary schools
presented in the map are computed using geo-coding data collected at follow-up. Red dots rep-
resent secondary schools providing educational programs only in Macedonian language, while
green dots show secondary schools providing programs in Albanian or Turkish (in addition to
Macedonian). In blue, the main and secondary road network.
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Figure 5.5: Sample distribution of expected income after primary and secondary
school by gender
Note. Left panel shows the sample distribution of the expected income after primary school,
while the panel on the right shows the expected income after secondary school. Income is
reported in logarithms and expected income is computed using triangular distribution.
Figure 5.6: Expected return to education by asset group
Note. Left Panel presents the return to secondary school, computed as the diﬀerence between
expected incomes after primary and secondary school (reported in logarithms and computed
using triangular distribution). Right Panel presents the return to schooling in employment
terms, defined as the diﬀerence in the probability to find a job after secondary and after primary
school. Asset groups (low, medium and high) are computed using principal component analysis
on asset ownership at baseline and by dividing the distribution of the asset index derive for the
first principal component into three terciles.
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Table 5.2: Baseline descriptive statistics, by treatment status
All Household
head
Mother Diﬀ. Norm.
diﬀ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household characteristics
Household members 4.718 4.701 4.734 0.0334 0.0209
[1.127] [1.151] [1.103] (0.125)
Mother characteristics
Age 42.06 42.01 42.11 0.100 0.0125
[5.689] [5.873] [5.502] (0.487)
Schooling (years) 7.105 7.117 7.092 -0.0252 -0.005
[3.257] [3.131] [3.383] (0.331)
Father characteristics
Age 45.43 45.24 45.64 0.399 0.0532
[5.302] [5.350] [5.253] (0.469)
Schooling (years) 8.047 7.923 8.173 0.251 0.060
[2.933] [3.001] [2.860] (0.297)
Expenditures
P.c. monthly expenditure 8136.4 8150.4 8122.0 -28.45 -0.003
[7888.4] [7832.0] [7957.2] (797.4)
Education share (girls) 0.0616 0.0613 0.0619 0.001 0.003
[0.159] [0.156] [0.163] (0.016)
Education share (boys) 0.0599 0.0592 0.0607 0.00145 0.001
[0.148] [0.146] [0.149] (0.015)
Food share 0.485 0.479 0.491 0.0126 0.0501
[0.178] [0.179] [0.177] (0.019)
Child characteristics
Age 15.30 15.32 15.28 -0.041 -0.0174
[1.645] [1.585] [1.704] (0.096)
Male 0.531 0.531 0.531 0.001 0.001
[0.499] [0.500] [0.500] (0.024)
Enrolled in primary school 0.574 0.587 0.561 -0.0260 -0.0372
[0.495] [0.493] [0.497] (0.036)
Enrolled in secondary school 0.341 0.321 0.361 0.0403 0.0600
[0.474] [0.467] [0.481] (0.030)
Ind. exp. share on education 0.0390 0.0410 0.0371 -0.004 -0.0279
[0.0976] [0.0999] [0.0954] (0.009)
Note. Standard deviations in brackets, standard errors in parenthesis. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Diﬀerence in Column (4) is computed as (3)-(2). The standard
errors on the diﬀerences are estimated from running the corresponding least squares regression
allowing for the errors to be clustered at municipality level and controlling for strata dummies.
The normalised diﬀerence is computed following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and allowing
clustering at municipality level. Per capita monthly expenditure is expressed in Macedonian
Denars. Individual expenditure share on education is computed as expenditure on education
for each child divided by total household expenditure.
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Table 5.3: Baseline descriptive statistics of Expectations, by treatment status
All Household
head
Mother Diﬀ. Norm.
diﬀ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Primary school expectations
Lower bound 8.197 8.209 8.185 -0.0249 -0.0328
[0.536] [0.528] [0.544] (0.0625)
Upper bound 8.822 8.842 8.802 -0.0405 -0.0693
[0.412] [0.388] [0.434] (0.0507)
Expected income 8.532 8.548 8.516 -0.0321 -0.0506
[0.448] [0.430] [0.466] (0.0531)
Variance income 0.0222 0.0227 0.0216 -0.00106 -0.0252
[0.0297] [0.0308] [0.0287] (0.00373)
Prob. to find a job 0.216 0.209 0.223 0.0147 0.0544
[0.191] [0.174] [0.206] (0.0252)
Secondary school expectations
Lower bound 8.784 8.783 8.785 0.00260 0.00478
[0.385] [0.371] [0.399] (0.0529)
Upper bound 9.301 9.320 9.283 -0.0376 -0.0746
[0.356] [0.335] [0.376] (0.0526)
Expected income 9.060 9.070 9.050 -0.0199 -0.0410
[0.343] [0.318] [0.367] (0.0495)
Variance income 0.0150 0.0162 0.0139 -0.00231 -0.0796
[0.0205] [0.0224] [0.0183] (0.00249)
Prob. to find a job 0.481 0.492 0.471 -0.0219 -0.0724
[0.214] [0.225] [0.202] (0.0262)
Return to secondary school 0.528 0.522 0.534 0.0122 0.0250
[0.344] [0.338] [0.351] (0.0458)
Note. Standard deviations in brackets, standard errors in parenthesis. *** denotes signific-
ance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Diﬀerence in Column (4) is computed as (3)-(2). The
standard errors on the diﬀerences are estimated from running the corresponding least squares
regression allowing for the errors to be clustered at municipality level and controlling for strata
dummies. The normalised diﬀerence is computed following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and
allowing clustering at municipality level. Returns to secondary school are computed assuming
a triangular distribution.
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Table 5.4: Enrolment regression and interaction with returns to schooling
Dep.var.: Enrolled or completed secondary school
Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3)
A. No interaction
Payment to mother 0.061
(0.032)
B. Interaction with return to schooling
Payment to mother * Return (1st tercile) 0.017
(0.046)
Payment to mother * Return (2nd tercile) 0.046
(0.056)
Payment to mother * Return (3rd tercile) 0.098**
(0.035)
C. Interaction with return to schooling in terms of employment
Payment to mother * Return (1st tercile) -0.006
(0.055)
Payment to mother * Return (2nd tercile) 0.105**
(0.033)
Payment to mother * Return (3rd tercile) 0.066
(0.047)
Observations 920 920 920
Note. Marginal eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parenthesis. ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Significance level adjusted for multiple
hypothesis testing (Romano and Wolf, 2005). In Panel A, I estimate Equation 5.9, while
in Panels B and C I estimate Equation 5.10 using interactions with returns to schooling in
monetary terms and in terms of employment. The dependent variable is an indicator variable
that is equal to 1 if the child is enrolled or has completed any secondary school at the beginning
of the school year 2012/2013 and is equal to 0 otherwise. Returns to schooling and expected
incomes are computed assuming a triangular distribution and using log-income. I include
controls for gender, age and education of mother and father, ethnicity, religion, household size,
number of female and male children in age 14-19 and age 6-13, rural and Skopje dummies. Year
and semester of birth dummies and Regional dummies are included.
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Table 5.5: Eﬀect on Individual expenditure shares on Education
Dep.var.: Ind. expenditure share on education
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
A. No interaction
Payment to mother 0.012
(0.011)
B. Interaction with return to schooling
Payment to mother * Return (1st tercile) -0.011
(0.018)
Payment to mother * Return (2nd tercile) 0.015
(0.018)
Payment to mother * Return (3rd tercile) 0.038*
(0.014)
C. Interaction with return to schooling in terms of employment
Payment to mother * Return (1st tercile) -0.016
(0.016)
Payment to mother * Return (2nd tercile) 0.019
(0.014)
Payment to mother * Return (3rd tercile) 0.039*
(0.015)
Observations 911 911 911
Note. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parenthesis. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Significance level adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing
(Romano and Wolf, 2005). In Panel A, I estimate Equation 5.9, while in Panels B and C I
estimate Equation 5.10 using interactions with returns to schooling in monetary terms and in
terms of employment. The dependent variable is computed as the ratio between the education
expenditure on the children and the total expenditure of the household. Returns to schooling
and expected incomes are computed assuming a triangular distribution and using log-income. I
include controls for gender, age and education of mother and father, ethnicity, religion, house-
hold size, number of female and male children in age 14-19 and age 6-13, rural and Skopje
dummies. Year and semester of birth dummies and Regional dummies are included. Return
in terms of employment is defined as the diﬀerence between the probability of being employed
after secondary school and the probability for being employed after primary school at age 25.
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Table 5.7: Eﬀect on the Probability to talk to children about school daily
Dep.var.: Talked to children about school (daily)
Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3)
A. No interaction
Payment to mother -0.006
(0.017)
B. Interaction with return to schooling
Payment to mother * Return (1st tercile) -0.019
(0.039)
Payment to mother * Return (2nd tercile) -0.023
(0.025)
Payment to mother * Return (3rd tercile) 0.016
(0.016)
C. Interaction with return to schooling in terms of employment
Payment to mother * Return (1st tercile) -0.030
(0.028)
Payment to mother * Return (2nd tercile) -0.012
(0.025)
Payment to mother * Return (3rd tercile) 0.020
(0.025)
Observations 663 663 663
Note. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parenthesis. In Panel A, I estimate
Equation 5.9, while in Panels B and C I estimate Equation 5.10 using interactions with returns to
schooling in monetary terms and in terms of employment. The dependent variable is computed
as the ratio between the education expenditure on the children and the total expenditure of
the household. Returns to schooling and expected incomes are computed assuming a triangular
distribution and using log-income. I include controls for gender, age and education of mother
and father, ethnicity, religion, household size, number of female and male children in age 14-19
and age 6-13, rural and Skopje dummies. Year and semester of birth dummies and Regional
dummies are included. Return in terms of employment is defined as the diﬀerence between the
probability of being employed after secondary school and the probability for being employed
after primary school at age 25.
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Table 5.9: Correlates of Secondary School enrolment at follow-up
Dep.var.: Enrolled or completed Sec. school
Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3)
Expected income (primary) -0.055 -0.065 -0.017
(0.048) (0.054) (0.058)
Expected income (secondary) 0.186*** 0.192*** 0.137*
(0.068) (0.069) (0.078)
Variance of income (primary) -0.315 -0.324
(0.542) (0.547)
Variance of income (secondary) 0.275 0.478
(0.738) (0.742)
Probability of employment (primary) -0.260**
(0.115)
Probability of employment (secondary) 0.281***
(0.107)
Individual controls 3 3 3
Municipality controls 3 3 3
Observations 920 920 920
Note. Marginal eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parenthesis. The
dependent variable is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the child is enrolled or has
completed any secondary school at the beginning of the school year 2012/2013 and is equal to 0
otherwise. Returns to schooling and expected incomes are computed assuming a triangular dis-
tribution and using log-income. Distance from School is computed as distance from the closest
school providing educational program in the same ethnic language of the individual. I include
controls for gender, age and education of mother and father, ethnicity, religion, household size,
number of female and male children in age 14-19 and age 6-13, rural and Skopje dummies. Year
and semester of birth dummies and Regional dummies are included.
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Appendix 5.A
A collective model with human capital investment
The household decision to allocate income to either consumption (c) or human
capital investment (h) is defined by the following maximisation problem:
max
c,h
(1   ) [u(c) + E [vf (r · h)]] +   [u(c) + E [vm(r · h)]]
subject to y   c+ p · h
c   c¯ (5.12)
where the Pareto weight   2 [0, 1] reflects the weight of the mother in the house-
hold, p is the (relative) price for human capital investment and where c¯ is a
minimum (subsistence) consumption which is required for the household before
investing in human capital, r is the rate of return of the investment in human
capital which is unknown to parents. I assume that the return can have either
a low value (rL) or a high value (rH) and that both parents share the same ex-
pectations, attributing a probability ⇡H to the higher return and a probability
(1  ⇡H) to the lower return.
With an interior solution, the problem lead to the following first order condition:
(1   ) ⇥(1  ⇡H) rL · v0f (rL · h) + ⇡HrH · v0f (rH · h)⇤+
  [(1  ⇡H) rL · v0m(rL · h) + ⇡HrH · v0m(rH · h)] =
= p · u0 (y   p · h)(5.13)
If we define  d = ((1 ⇡H)rL·v0d(rL·h)+⇡HrH ·v0d(rH ·h))/u0(c) as the marginal willingness
to pay for the human capital investment for each parent, we can rewrite the
optimality condition (5.13) as:
(1   ) ·  f +   ·  m = p (5.14)
Using Implicit Function theorem we can derive the derivative of human capital
investment with respect to a change in the Pareto weight, @h@  . This is equal to
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the following expression:
@h
@ 
=
(1  ⇡H) · rL ·
 
v0m(rL · h)  v0f (rL · h)
 
+ ⇡H · rH ·
 
v0m(rH · h)  v0f (rH · h)
 
D
(5.15)
where
D =   (1   )  p2 · U 00 (y   hp) + ⇡H · r2H · v00f (rH · h) + (1  ⇡H) · r2L · (v00f (rL · h) +
    p2 · U 00 (y   hp) + ⇡H · r2H · v00m(rH · h) + (1  ⇡H) · r2L · v00m(rL · h)  =
=   p2 · U 00 (y   hp)  (1   )  (1  ⇡H) · r2L · v00f (rL · h) + ⇡H · r2H · v00f (rH · h) 
    (1  ⇡H) · r2L · v00m(rL · h) + ⇡H · r2H · v00m(rH · h) 
Since D is positive, @h@  is larger than zero if v
0
f (r · h) < v0m(r · h) for any h⇥ r.
Appendix 5.B
Attrition and missing values
In this Appendix, I present some robustness checks related to sample bias related
to attrition and missing expectation values. Panel A of Table H1 reports the
estimated diﬀerence in attrition rate for SFA households across treatment modal-
ities. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the household
was interviewed only at baseline and equal to zero if the household was inter-
viewed at baseline and follow-up. In Column 1 I estimate the diﬀerence across
treatment modalities by controlling only for regional dummies, while in Columns
2 and 3 I control for household characteristics. Columns 1 and 2 are estimated
using OLS, while Column 3 is using a Probit model. The coeﬃcient is roughly
equal to 2 percent and stable across specifications, but is never significant. This
provides evidence that the 2-year attrition is not explained by being resident in
municipalities where the payments are made to mothers rather than the other mu-
nicipalities. We can observe that attrition is mainly driven by Roma households,
households living in Skopje and families where the father has upper primary edu-
cation. I observe lower levels of attrition among Macedonian households. Among
most of dimensions there are no significant statistical diﬀerences between attrited
households and non-attrited households. Similar conclusion can be drawn when
we look at child-level characteristics.
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In order to control for robustness of the results to attrition, Table H2 present
the estimates for the eﬀect on individual expenditure shares comparing the un-
weighted results with the weighted results using inverse probability weighting.
In the latter case weights are the inverse on the estimated probability of being
interviewed at baseline and follow-up (see Wooldridge 2002). This method al-
lows increasing the weight of observations with a higher attrition at follow-up.
I generate weights using estimates from Column 3 in Table H1. The weights
are generated using a Probit regression of an indicator variable being equal to
1 if the observation was interviewed at baseline, but was missing at follow-up
and 0 otherwise on a series of observable individual, household and municipality-
level characteristics. From the regression, I compute predicted probabilities and I
computed weights by taking the inverse of one minus the predicted probabilities.
Panel B of Table H1 reports the estimated diﬀerence in the probability of having
a missing value for expectations at baseline. For each child in the household that
was selected in order to collect subjective expectations, the dependent variable
is a dummy variable equal to one if data is missing due to incomplete reporting
or to refusal and is equal to zero if the data is complete. Columns 1 and 2 are
estimated using OLS, while Column 3 is using a Probit model. The coeﬃcient is
very close to zero and stable across specifications, but is never significant. The
treatment doesn’t seem to influence the chance of having a missing data in the
expectation section.
Appendix 5.C
Construction of the wealth index
In order to control for pre-program household wealth, I construct an asset index
using factor analysis (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001) by exploiting the information
available at baseline. Following the Filmer-Pritchett (FP) procedure, I compute
asset ownership or access to resources by using indicator variables for whether
the household own the good (or has access to a resource) and I compute indicator
weights by using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). As suggested by McK-
enzie (2005), I make use of only the first factors produced by PCA to represent
the wealth index and I consider a wide range of asset variables to avoid issues re-
lated to clumping and truncation27. The variables used to build the index are the
27Clumping occurs when the wealth index has limited variation (e.g. it groups households
into a limited number of groups), while truncation occurs when there is limited variation in
asset ownership.
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following: durable goods property28, access to utilities (public water, sewerage,
electricity, phone line), type of dwelling and type of property, use of shared toilet,
land property and livestock ownership. I group variables in which ownership is
limited to very few households (smaller than 30 households in the sample). Figure
H1 presents the distribution of the resulting wealth index. The first component
explains roughly 11% of the total variation and the distribution has limited issues
related to high skewness and kurtosis. In order to show internal coherence of the
wealth index, I split the measure into three groups depending on the tercile of
the distribution. I indicate these groups by low, middle and high wealth. Table
H3 shows the share of households owning a specific asset and compares them by
using the three wealth groups computed through PCA. We can observe that as
the wealth quantile increases, households do own better assets and do have better
access to utilities, suggesting that PCA methodology provides a credible method
for grouping households into wealth groups.
Appendix 5.D
Testing for male versus female expectations
Throughout the paper we have assumed that parental expectations aﬀect human
capital investment, but we haven’t been able to distinguish between male and
female partner expectations. The reason is that most of the interviews are car-
ried out with both partners present. However, in order to test for equality of
expectations, I selected all households where both male and female partners were
part of the family at baseline and I conditioned on having the female partner
present during the interview. This allows comparing the answers for households
where the female partner is alone and where both partners are present.
Table H4 presents descriptive statistics for households in which the male part-
ner is absent during the interview and households in which the male partner is
present. The interviewers were originally instructed to arrange interviews where
both partners were present and, if not possible, with at least the presence of
the household head. Therefore whether the male partner is a household head is a
28We collected information on several durable goods that the household could have owned.
The variables used in the construction of the index are indicator variables equal to one if the
household own at least one item of the good and zero otherwise. We collected information on
the following items: cooker and stove (by type of fuel), boiler, refrigerator, washing machine,
iron, sewing, vacuum cleaner, air conditioning, radio and tv, video recorder, personal computer,
phone and mobile phone, musical instrument, bicycle, car and motorbike.
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strong predictor of his presence during the interview. At the same time, a younger
male partner, households living in Skopje and household with a relatively higher
wealth have a higher probability to be present during the interview. To control
for diﬀerences in reported expectations Table H5 presents the results of regres-
sions on return to schooling, variance of income and probability for the child to
be employed at age 25 on a dummy variable indicating whether the male partner
is present at the interview. To account for observable diﬀerences among these
groups, the diﬀerence is conditional on household and individual characteristics.
It emerges that the presence of the male partner slightly increase the return to
schooling, but no significant diﬀerence is recorded. Additionally controlling for
observable characteristics doesn’t have a strong impact on the coeﬃcients. This
is however a sub-optimal test, since the presence of the husband cannot account
for unobservable diﬀerences linked to the presence of the male partner during
the interview, but provides a first evidence on the equality of expectations across
partners.
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Figure H1: Wealth index distribution
Note: The wealth index is computed using Principal Component Analysis following Filmer and
Pritchett (2001). The index is built using information on durable good ownership, access to
utilities, type and property of the dwelling, land property and livestock ownership.
Table H1: Treatment modality, attrition and missing expectations
15-19 years old 15-18 years old
OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Attrition
Payment to mother 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.018 0.014 0.011
(0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021)
B. Missing expectation at baseline
Payment to mother 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.018 -0.021 -0.023
(0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018)
Individual characteristics 3 3 3 3
Regional dummies 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 1233 1233 1233 795 795 795
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at
10%. In Panel A, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the household has been interviewed at
baseline, but not at follow-up and 0 if it has been interviewed in both waves. In Panel B, the
dependent variable is equal to one if the child has been selected for the expectations section
(younger male and female child in age category older than 10 and younger than 18) and the data
is missing for incomplete reporting or refusal and is equal to 0 is the child is selected and the
information is complete. Columns 1 and 4 are OLS regressions on the treatment dummy and the
regional dummies only, Columns 2 and 5 control for household and individual characteristics
and Columns 3 and 6 use Probit estimation (marginal eﬀects are reported). Individual and
household characteristics include age, gender, gender of head, education of head, age of head,
indicator dummies for level of assets, household size and number of female and male children, an
indicator variable whether the household lives in a urban settlement and an indicator variable
whether the household lives in Skopje.
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Table H3: Share of households owning an asset, by type of good and wealth
quantile
Wealth quantile
Lower Middle Higher All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Characteristics of the dwelling
Owner of the dwelling 0.475 0.507 0.521 0.501
Public water available 0.552 0.781 0.948 0.760
Electricity available 0.938 0.988 0.998 0.974
Telephone line available 0.306 0.465 0.621 0.464
Toilet connected to sewerage 0.172 0.413 0.773 0.452
Toilet connected to septic tank 0.274 0.346 0.214 0.278
Toilet not connected to sewerage or latrine 0.118 0.053 0.003 0.059
Toilet not shared with other households 0.918 0.948 0.965 0.944
Asset ownership
Solid fuel cooker 0.915 0.973 0.766 0.885
Electric or gas cooker 0.286 0.701 0.930 0.639
Boiler 0.214 0.794 0.978 0.661
Refrigerator 0.731 0.925 0.988 0.881
Washing machine 0.244 0.672 0.940 0.618
Vacuum cleaner 0.122 0.607 0.900 0.543
Personal computer 0.017 0.0970 0.382 0.165
Mobile phone 0.774 0.828 0.853 0.818
Bycicle 0.052 0.102 0.254 0.136
Land and livestock property
Household owns land 0.021 0.019 0.010 0.017
Household owns cattle 0.107 0.060 0.010 0.059
Note. Wealth quantiles are determined by the tercile in the wealth index, which is computed
using Principal Component Analysis following Filmer and Pritchett (2001). The index is built
using information on durable good ownership, access to utilities, type and property of the
dwelling, land property and livestock ownership. For limited space, I don’t include in the table
the following group of indicators that were used in the computation of the wealth index: other
types of dwelling property or rental, ownership of other types of animals, type of stove.
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Table H4: Comparison of household characteristics by presence of male partner
at the interview
Presence of male partner
Absent Present Diﬀerence
Household members 4.824 4.686 -0.137
[1.198] [1.098] (0.151)
Boys (6-13 years old) 0.336 0.254 -0.0817
[0.509] [0.460] (0.0491)
Girls (6-13 years old) 0.395 0.283 -0.112*
[0.641] [0.507] (0.0565)
Boys (14-19 years old) 0.782 0.866 0.0841
[0.653] [0.700] (0.0714)
Girls (14-19 years old) 0.891 0.792 -0.0986
[0.757] [0.751] (0.0864)
Male (head) 0.773 0.921 0.148***
[0.421] [0.270] (0.0455)
Age (wife) 41.36 42.17 0.815
[5.065] [5.756] (0.512)
Age (husband) 44.50 45.57 1.067**
[4.700] [5.439] (0.519)
- Lower primary or less (mother) 0.252 0.197 -0.0550
[0.436] [0.398] (0.0457)
- Upper primary (mother) 0.496 0.538 0.0418
[0.502] [0.499] (0.0503)
- Secondary school or more (mother) 0.143 0.158 0.0148
[0.351] [0.365] (0.0384)
- Lower primary or less (father) 0.227 0.201 -0.0262
[0.421] [0.401] (0.0435)
- Upper primary (father) 0.496 0.529 0.0329
[0.502] [0.500] (0.0551)
- Secondary school or more (father) 0.261 0.262 0.00114
[0.441] [0.440] (0.0367)
- Macedonian and others 0.345 0.455 0.111*
[0.477] [0.498] (0.0662)
- Albanian 0.429 0.292 -0.136*
[0.497] [0.455] (0.0708)
- Roma 0.109 0.136 0.0270
[0.313] [0.343] (0.0362)
- Turkish 0.134 0.118 -0.0162
[0.343] [0.323] (0.0384)
Rural 0.504 0.459 -0.0454
[0.502] [0.499] (0.0819)
Part of City of Skopje 0.235 0.102 -0.133**
[0.426] [0.303] (0.0561)
Wealth (low) 0.261 0.348 0.0872*
[0.441] [0.477] (0.0484)
Wealth (middle) 0.311 0.333 0.0224
[0.465] [0.472] (0.0495)
Wealth (high) 0.429 0.319 -0.110*
[0.497] [0.467] (0.0641)
Observations 119 558 677
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at municipality level. The table presents the
comparison of reported subjective expectations conditional on having the female partner present
at the interview at Baseline. Husband present is a dummy equal to 1 if the male partner is
present and equal to 0 otherwise. Individual and municipality controls are included.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This thesis is based on understanding whether a variation in intra-household al-
location of resources has an eﬀect on household decisions in developing countries
and whether this has a relationship with information and subjective expectations.
A first approach was to consider an exogenous variation in variables aﬀecting the
formation of the household, such as the marriage market. Another strategy was
to study a policy that exogenously switch resources between household mem-
bers. In the thesis I followed both approaches by looking at the Macedonian
Conditional Cash Transfer for Secondary School Education, which is a program
aiming at increasing secondary school attendance across poor households in the
Republic of Macedonia and whose payments are randomised across the country
in relation to the gender of the recipient (the mother versus the household head
in the household). Although there are several “first generation” impact evaluation
studies assessing the impact of conditional cash transfer programs, there are far
fewer “second generation” studies focusing on the question of how to design CCTs
more eﬃciently and specifically whether the gender of the recipient matters.
As a first approach to understand whether variables aﬀecting the formation of
the household, such as the marriage market, has an eﬀect on intra-household
dynamics, chapter 2 tested the assertion that the status of the marriage market
impacts on intra-household allocation of expenditure by looking at the pre-policy
structure of expenditures of poor households in Macedonia. I used measures of
both the marriage and the re-marriage market to capture diﬀerences about these
two variables. I find that sex ratios with a higher percentage of women aﬀect
intra-household allocation of expenditure through an increase in the expenditure
share of education and health and through a decrease of the share allocated to
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food. This provides new evidence on the relationship of sex ratio with labour
market characteristics since we would expect rarity of women to have a positive
eﬀect on the decision power of women within the household. Additionally, by
focusing on the municipality-level share of weddings in which the spouse had
previously divorced from another partner, I find evidence against the unitary
rationality hypothesis and I provide evidence that is consistent with the eﬀect of
the sex ratio and in favour of the eﬃciency assumption.
Chapter 2 showed that households don’t behave like a unitary individual and
that we need to take into account intra-household decision processes in order to
understand household decisions. This is particularly important since there is still
no consensus about how household members interact to take important invest-
ment decisions, such as determining human capital investments for the children.
Understanding how this decision is taken is particularly important in developing
countries, where households tend to underinvest due to market failures related to
information, such as incomplete or asymmetric information. For this reason, dur-
ing the 2010 and 2012 data collection waves of the Macedonian “Secondary School
Conditional Cash Transfer” evaluation household survey, information about the
parental perceived returns to schooling was collected to understand how informa-
tion interact with intra-household dynamics to determine child human capital in-
vestment. Data on subjective expectations have been collected using the method
proposed by Guiso et al. (2002). Under distributional assumptions, this method
allows eliciting the subjective expected earning distribution for each respondent.
By using the randomisation in the order of questions and testing whether re-
spondents understand the question and use suﬃcient mental eﬀort to report their
answers, chapter 3 showed that when asked about the probability to earn less
than a certain threshold and more than the same threshold, respondents tend to
reply with suﬃcient mental eﬀort only to the first question they are asked. This
suggests it would be sensible to use only the first information reported by the
respondent, specifically because complementary answers related to probabilities
tend to fail in their second component. At the same time, the chapter provided
evidence on the robustness of the method in relation to diﬀerent distributional
assumptions. These results are particularly important since there is still no con-
sensus in literature about the best practice to collect subjective expectations in
developing countries.
The Macedonian CCT Evaluation database and its module on subjective ex-
pectations related to schooling allowed studying the relationship between ex-ante
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expectations and schooling decisions. Chapter 4 investigated the role of parental
expected returns to schooling as determinants for schooling decisions two years
after the subjective expectation was reported.
The chapter analyses the relationship between schooling decisions and ex-ante
parental perceived returns to secondary school. I show that when observing
schooling decisions two years after the collection of information about perceived
returns, parental subjective expectations are strong predictors for the probab-
ility of the child to be enrolled in secondary school. In addition, by using the
longitudinal dimension of the data, I provide evidence against cognitive biases
in expectation reporting and against endogeneity issues, which provide support
for the use of subjective data in decision models. The chapter provided evidence
that ex-ante parental expectations are important in explaining secondary school-
ing decisions for children. Additionally, important diﬀerences exists across gender:
expected income conditional on completing secondary school is particularly im-
portant for girls’ enrolment, while boy’s enrolment is mainly driven by expected
income conditional on completing primary school and by the probability of suc-
cessfully finding a job after secondary school. However, since intra-household
gender diﬀerences might be one of the drivers of gender inequality, future re-
search needs to deepen the understanding of how parental expectations interact
with other decisions, such as early weddings, which are clearly linked to human
capital accumulation.
When studying the relation between schooling decisions and self-reported income
expectations, criticisms claim that results might be biased by cognitive disson-
ance, e.g. the tendency of the respondent to over-report their expectations to
support their decisions. In the Macedonian setting, cognitive dissonance would
aﬀect the updating of expectations such that expectations linked to choices made
during the two data collection points would be systematically revised upward
and the expectations for the educational option not taken would be systematic-
ally revised down. By making use of the longitudinal dimension of the data on
subjective expectation, chapter 4 provided important evidence that respondents
do not revise their expectations following a cognitive dissonance pattern, but
that the updating of expectations follow a similar pattern across individuals with
diﬀerent educational choices.
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Chapters 2 and 4 showed that both intra-household power allocation and the sub-
jective expectations are credible determinants of schooling decisions. Specifically,
chapter 5 studied how the interaction between intra-household allocation of re-
sources and expected returns to schooling influences human capital investment
among poor households. To do this I used a nationally implemented random-
ised programme in the Republic of Macedonia. The programme provided cash
transfers to poor households conditional on secondary school enrolment of their
children and payments were transferred either to mothers or to household heads.
The availability of the unique dataset with information on parental subjective
expectations of returns to schooling and employment risk allowed estimating the
heterogeneity of the eﬀect of the intervention. This chapter provided evidence
that targeting mothers allowed increasing secondary school enrolment only for
children whose returns are suﬃciently high at the beginning of the program.
This outcome was driven by increases in individual expenditure shares on educa-
tion for children in the highest tercile of the return distribution. Heterogeneous
eﬀects along the expected return distribution are supported by large ex-ante het-
erogeneity in parental expectations as discussed in chapter 4. At the same time,
no eﬀect was recorded for other inputs, such as monitoring of children school
attendance and parental time use.
These findings suggest that in order to understand the role of each member in
familial interactions is key not only to clarify how decision power is distributed
across members, but as well how this relates to subjective expectations. This is
particularly important in developing countries, since perceived returns to edu-
cation are often are diﬀerent than the market returns. Individuals have largely
heterogeneous expectations related to education and the perceived returns do cor-
relate with future choices and outcomes. If shifts in parental expectations have
indirect impacts on the decision to invest on human capital, then much work need
to be done in order to understand how subjective expectations form, how they
evolve over time and how they interact with individual and collective choices.
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